Lecture 32: Security Vulnerabilities of Mobile Devices

Lecture Notes on “Computer and Network Security”

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Goals:

• What makes mobile devices less vulnerable to malware — to the extent that is the case

• Protection provided by sandboxing the apps

• Security (or lack thereof) provided by over-the-air encryption for cellular communications with a Python implementation of A5/1 cipher

• Side-channel attacks on specialized mobile devices

• Examples of side-channel attacks: fault injection attacks and timing attacks

• Python scripts for demonstrating fault injection and timing attacks

• USB devices as a source of deadly malware

• Mobile IP
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32.1: MALWARE AND MOBILE DEVICES

- Mobile devices — cellphones, smartphones, smartcards, tablets, navigational devices, memory sticks, etc., — have now permeated nearly all aspects of how we live on a day-to-day basis. While at one time their primary function was only communications, now they are used for just about everything: as cameras, as music players, as news readers, for checking email, for web surfing, for navigation, for banking, for connecting with friends through social media, and, Ah!, not to be forgotten, as boarding passes when traveling by air.

- A unanimous ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States not too long ago is indicative of how integral and central such devices have become to our lives. In a 9-0 decision on June 25, 2014, the justices ruled that police may not search a suspect’s cellphone without a warrant. Normally, police is allowed to search your personal possessions — such as your wallet, briefcase, vehicle, etc. — without a warrant if there is “probable cause” that a crime was committed. Regarding cellphones, Chief Justice John Roberts said: “They are such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” Justice
Roberts also observed: “Modern cellphones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.”

• The justices obviously based their decision on the fact that people now routinely store private and sensitive information in their mobile devices — the sort of information that you would have stored securely at home in the years gone by.

• Given this modern reality, it is not surprising that folks who engage in the production and propagation of malware are training their guns increasingly on mobile devices.

• In a report on the security of mobile devices submitted to Congress, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that the number of different malware variants aimed at smartphones had increased from 14,000 to 40,000 in just one year (from July 2011 to May 2012). You can access this report at [http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648519.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648519.pdf) [The same report also mentions that the worldwide sales of mobile devices increased from 300 million to 650 million in 2012. Now consider the fact that over 1.5 billion smartphones (with a total sales value close to $500 billion) were sold in 2017. And that’s just the smartphones among all sorts of mobile devices. The numbers for 2017 are from https://www.statista.com/topics/840/smartphones/]
• Mobile devices have become a magnet for malware producers because they can be a source of sensitive information that an attacker may be able to use for monetary gain, to seek political advantage, to use as a means to break into a corporate network, and so on.

• As you would expect, many of the attack methods on mobile devices are the same as those on the more traditional computing devices such as desktops, laptops, etc., — except for one very important difference: Unless it is in a private network, a non-mobile host is usually directly plugged into the internet where it is constantly exposed to break-in attempts through software that scans large segments of IP address blocks for discovering vulnerable hosts. That is, in addition to facing targeted attacks through social engineering and other means, a non-mobile host connected to the internet also faces un-targeted attacks by cyber criminals who simply want to discover hosts (regardless of where they are) on which they can install their malware.

• On the other hand, mobile devices when they are plugged into cellular networks can only be accessed by outsiders through gateways that are tightly controlled by the cellphone companies. [Consider the opposite situation of a mobile device being able to access the internet directly through, say, a WiFi network. When on WiFi, the mobile device will be in a private network (normally a class A or class C private network) behind a wireless router/access-point. So the mobile device would not be exposed directly to IP address-block scanning. However, now, a mobile device could be vulnerable to eaves-
dropping and man-in-the-middle attacks if, say, you are exchanging sensitive information with a remote host in plain text. In the most common modes of using a smartphone, though, you are unlikely to be a target of even such attacks on account of the overall security provided by the servers. For example, your smartphone will establish a secure link with a website like Amazon.com before uploading your credit-card information to that website. As you know from Lecture 13, your smartphone will accomplish that by downloading Amazon.com’s certificate, verifying the certificate with the public key of the applicable root CA that is already stored in your smartphone, and your smartphone and the remote website will then jointly establish a session key for content encryption.

- Therefore, it is unlikely that a mobile device you own is going to get hit by random fly-by attack software.

- On account of the protection provided by (1) the cellular company gateways; (2) the protection made possible by encrypted connections with servers that seek your private information; (3) the protection provided by on-line app stores (like Google Play and Apple’s App Store) through their vetting of the apps for security holes before making them available to you; and, finally, (4) the protection provided by the fact that a mobile OS is likely to run the apps in a sandbox; it is not surprising that malware infection rates in smartphones are as low as mentioned in the next section.

- However, the mobile devices are just as vulnerable to social
engineering attacks as the more traditional computing devices such as desktops and laptops. (See Lecture 30 for Social Engineering attacks.) Of course, it goes without saying that if a mobile device contains unpatched software with known vulnerabilities, the device could be exploited through regular network attacks that do not depend on social engineering.

- Additionally, a certain class of more specialized mobile devices — smartcards in particular — may be vulnerable to attacks that come under the category of side-channel attacks. Smartcards have become ubiquitous. They are now used for paying fare in public transportation systems, car theft protection (your electronic car key), access control in buildings, etc. These attacks are most effective if an adversary can take physical control of a mobile device and subject it to scrutiny that either treats it as a block box and applies different kinds of inputs to it, or, when possible, examines it directly at the hardware/circuit level. Karsten Nohl gave a Black Hat talk in 2008 that showed how he could break the encryption in Mifare smartcards directly from the silicon. [A famous line from that talk: “There are no secrets in silicon”] Check it out at:


- In the rest of this lecture, I’ll first review the concepts of sandboxing the apps since that adds significantly to the protection of a mobile device against malicious apps.

- Next, I’ll review the A5/1 algorithm that has been widely de-
ployed around the world for encrypting over-the-air voice and SMS data in GSM (2G) cellphone networks. This algorithm is one of the best case studies in what can happen when people decide to create security by obscurity. This algorithm was kept secret for several years by cellphone operators. As is almost always the case with such things, eventually the algorithm was leaked out. As soon as the algorithm made its way into the public domain, it was shown to possess practically no security.

- Then I’ll will present what is meant by side-channel attacks. As mentioned previously in this section, specialized mobile devices such as smartcards are particularly vulnerable to these attacks. In order to lend further clarity to how one can construct such attacks, I’ll provide my Python implementations for some of the more common forms of such attacks.

- Finally, I’ll go over a topic that has been much in the news lately: the ease with which malware infections can be spread with USB devices such as memory sticks and why such infections cannot be detected by common anti-virus tools.
32.2: THE GOOD NEWS IS ...

• As was mentioned toward the end of the previous section, mobile devices — especially of the smartphone variety — benefit from multiple layers of protection. These are:

  − For the most part, individual smartphones can only be accessed through the gateways controlled by the cellular network companies;

  − When engaged in e-commerce interactions and regardless of whether a smartphone is communicating directly over a cellular network or through WiFi, the fact that a smartphone and the server create an encrypted session before any sensitive information is exchanged between the two (in accordance with client-server interactions described in Lecture 13);

  − The app stores (Google Play, Apple’s App Store, Windows Phone Store) scan and analyze the apps for malware before making them available to customers;

  − The fact that apps are typically run by the mobile OS in a sandbox. This is certainly true of the Android OS for the Android devices; iOS for all mobile devices by Apple and that includes various versions of iPhones, iPods, and iPads; and the Windows Phone OS for the Windows based mobile devices.
• Despite these layers of protection, the security of a smartphone can easily be compromised by: (1) man-in-the-middle attacks when the device is plugged into an unlocked WiFi network (especially if the user is sending or receiving sensitive information in plaintext); and (2) a user visiting a website that tricks or lures the user into downloading a document that either is malware or contains malware. But then these forms of vulnerability apply just as much to non-mobile computing devices such as desktops and laptops.

• Nonetheless, it remains that the four layers of security mentioned on the previous page make it less likely that your smartphone contains malware. This conclusion is borne out by the report “Android Security & Privacy, 2018 Year in Review” just released by Google that you’ll find at the following URL:


• This latest Android Security & Privacy report says:

“In 2018 only 0.08% of devices that used Google Play exclusively for app downloads were affected by PHAs. In contrast, devices that installed apps from outside of Google Play were affected by PHAs eight times more often. Compared to the previous year, even those devices saw a 15% reduction in malware due to the vigilance of Google Play Protect.”

where “PHA” stands for “Potentially Harmful Applications”. [As a fun aside, the last year’s version of the same report mentioned the follow-
In 2017, downloading a PHA from Google Play was less likely than the odds of an asteroid hitting the earth.” Are we to assume that the odds have gone up for an Android device to download malware? Or, could it be that Google has a better estimate now for the probability of an asteroid hitting the earth?

While it is comforting to know that overall the probability of your Android device becoming infected with malware is low, it would still be highly educational for the reader to go through the last four pages of the Android security report and read about the different malware families that are currently making the rounds in the Android ecosystem.

One of the nastier examples of this malware that was much in the news in 2017 spied on Android users through otherwise benign apps that used presumably legitimate ad network SDK to dish out the ads. As you surely know already, SDK stands for “Software Development Kit” and an ad network SDK is a software package, made available by an ad network organization, that app developers incorporate in their apps. Subsequently, the ad network in question can decide what ads to show to the Android device users and track the effectiveness of those ads in generating revenue that is shared by the ad network organization and the advertisers.

Lookout, a security company (https://www.lookout.com) specializing in
issues related to mobile devices, discovered that the ad network SDK made available by an ad network company called Igexin was downloading encrypted malicious plugins into the Android devices from the Igexin servers and uploading to the servers the users’ private data. **What is most important here is that when these apps were submitted to Google Play, there was no hint of malware in them.** Presumably, the app developers themselves were completely in the dark about how their apps would be mis-used by the ad network organization after the apps had been accepted by Google Play.

- In its report, Lookout mentions that the apps containing the affected SDK described above were downloaded over 100 million times across the Android ecosystem.

- As mentioned earlier, the last four pages of the 2018 Google Android Security & Privacy report provides a list of the different types of Android-related malware of current interest. Of these different types, this is what the report has to say about the type called “Chamois”:

  “Chamois was one of the most impactful PHA families in Android in 2018 **with more than 199 million installs.** ... Chamois is a well-engineered, sophisticated piece of malware. As of November 2018, there were five known variants of the Chamois **botnet** family, three of which emerged after November 2017. These variants are comprised of four or five stages with anti-analysis features and a command-and-control infrastructure for deploying their payload. **Google Play Protect classifies Chamois as a**
backdoor due to the remote command-and-control capabilities it has. The payloads for Chamois range from a variety of ad fraud payloads to SMS fraud to dynamic code loading.”

and about the type called “Snowfox”:

“Snowfox is an advertising SDK with two variants; one variant steals OAuth tokens from a device and the other injects JavaScript for click fraud into WebViews with loaded ads. The Snowfox campaign began in late 2017 and peaked in March 2018. Over the course of 2018, apps with the malicious Snowfox SDK were installed more than 16 million times. Snowfox is predominantly distributed outside of Google Play by apps including the SDK. However there are some distribution mechanisms where an application dynamically downloads the Snowfox SDK as a plugin, probably to bypass static analysis.”
32.3: SANDBOXING THE APPS

• A great deal of the security you get with mobile devices such as smartphones is owing to the fact that the third-party software (the apps) is executed in a sandbox. This is true for all major mobile operating systems today, such as the Android OS, iOS, Windows Phone OS, etc.

• In general, each app is run as a separate process in its own sandbox.

• Sandboxing means isolating the app processes from one another, on the one hand, and from the system resources, on the other. Sandboxing also requires putting in place a permissions framework that tightly regulates as to which other apps get access to the data produced by any given app. [Sandboxing is now also widely used for desktop/laptop applications. The web browser on your desktop/laptop is most likely being run in a sandbox. That way, any data downloaded/created by say a plug-in like Adobe Flash or Microsoft Silverlight is unlikely to corrupt your other files even when the downloaded data contains malware. Sandboxes are now also used by document readers for PDF and other formats so that any malware macros in those documents do not harm the other files.]
• The rest of this section focuses primarily on how Android isolates a process by running it in a sandbox. However, before talking about sandboxing in Android, let’s quickly review some of the highlights of the Android OS since it is the OS that demands that each app run in its own sandbox.

• I suppose you already know that Android was born from Linux. The very first release of Android was based on Version 2.6.25 of the Linux kernel. More recent versions of Android are based on Versions 3.4, 3.8 and 3.10 of the Linux kernel, depending on the underlying hardware platform. (As of mid April 2018, the latest stable version of the Linux kernel was 4.16.2 according to the information posted at the http://www.kernel.org website.) [If you are using your knowledge of Linux as a springboard to learn about Android, a good place to visit to learn about the features that are unique to Android is http://elinux.org/Android_Kernel_Features] To summarize some of the main differences: (1) One significant difference relates to how the interprocess communications is carried out in Android. (2) Android’s power management primitive known as “wakelock” that an app can use to keep the CPU humming at its normal frequency and the screen on even in the absence of any user interaction.

The normal mode of smartphone operation requires that the phone go into deep sleep (by turning off the screen and reducing the frequency of the CPU in order to conserve power) when there is no user interaction. However, that does not work for, say, a Facebook app that may need to check on events every few minutes. Those sorts of apps can acquire a wakelock to keep the CPU running at its normal frequency and, if needed, to turn on the screen when a new event of interest to the smartphone owner is detected. (Since the Facebook app’s need to acquire the wakelock every few minutes can put a drain on your battery, some Android users install a free root app called Greenify to first get a sense of how much battery is consumed by such an app and to then better control its need to wake up frequently.) (3) Android’s memory allocation functions. (4) And so on. In addition to these differences between Linux and Android, note also that the Android OS must
work with several different types of sensors and hardware components that a desktop/laptop OS need not bother with. We are talking about sensors and hardware components such as the touchscreen, cameras, audio components, orientation sensors, accelerometers, gyroscopes, etc. Finally, note that Android was originally developed for the ARM architecture. However, it is now also supported for the x86 and the MIPS processor architectures. Despite the differences between Linux and Android, the Linux Foundation and many others consider Android to be a Linux distribution (even though it does not come with the Gnu C libraries, etc. Android comes with its own C library that has a smaller memory footprint; it is called Bionic).

• As already mentioned, every Android app — written in Java — is run in a sandbox as a separate process. [More precisely speaking, a separate process is created for a digitally signed Linux user ID. If there exist multiple apps that are associated with the same Linux user ID, they can all be run in the same Linux process. Here is a good tutorial on how you go about creating public and private keys for digitally signing an Android app that you have created: ]

When you download a new app or update one of the apps already in your device, it is this sandboxing feature that causes your smartphone to ask you whether the app is allowed to access the data produced by other programs and various components of your smartphone — these would be the location information, the camera, the logs, the bookmarks, etc.

• By default, an app runs with no permissions assigned to it. When an app requests access to the data produced by another app, it is subject to the rules declared in the latter’s manifest file.
• Sandboxing ensures that, in general, any files created by an app can only be read by that app. Android does give app developers facilities for creating more globally accessible files through modes named `MODE_WORLDWritable` and `MODE_WORLDReadable`. Apps using these read/write modes are subject to greater scrutiny from a security standpoint.

• For greater control over what other app processes can access the data created by your own app, instead of using the two read/write modes mentioned in the previous bullet, your app can place its data in an object that is subclassed from the Android Java class `ContentProvider` and specify its `android:exported`, `android:protectionLevel`, and other attributes. [In most cases, a `ContentProvider` stores its information in an SQLite database, which as its name implies is an SQL database for storing structured information. An app requesting information from such a database must first create a client by subclassing from the Java class `ContentResolver`]

• In Linux systems, the two most widely deployed techniques for sandboxing a process are SELinux and AppArmor. SELinux — the name is a shorthand for “Security Enhanced Linux” — is a Linux kernel module that makes it possible for the operating system to exercise fine-grained access control with regard to the resource requests by running programs.

• Both SELinux and AppArmor are based on the LSM (Linux Security Modules) API for enforcing what is known as `Mandatory`
Access Control (MAC). MAC is meant specifically for operating systems to place constraints on the resources that can be accessed by running programs. By resources, we mean files, directories, ports, communication interfaces, etc.

- Perhaps the most significant difference between SELinux and AppArmor is that the former is based on context labels that are associated with all the files, the interfaces, the system resources, etc., and the latter is based on the pathnames to the same. By default, Ubuntu installs Linux with AppArmor. However, you can yourself install the SELinux kernel patch through the Synaptic Package Manager. Keep in mind, though, when you install SELinux, the AppArmor package will be automatically uninstalled. About comparing SELinux with AppArmor, there are many developers out there who prefer the latter because they consider the SELinux policy rules for isolating the processes to be much too complex for manual generation. While there do exist tools that can generate the rules for you, the complexity of the rules makes it difficult to verify them, according to these developers. On the other hand, the AppArmor rules are relatively simple, can be expressed manually, and are therefore more amenable to human validation. However, the access control you can achieve with AppArmor is not as fine grained as what you can get with SELinux. The following three sources provide a comparative assessment of SELinux and AppArmor for isolating the processes running in your computer:

https://www.suse.com/support/security/apparmor/features/selinux_comparison.html

- The Mandatory Access Control (MAC) used by Android to isolate a process by running it in a sandbox is based on SELinux. [This
is true for versions 4.3 and higher of Android. I believe the latest version of Android is 8.1 Oreo.] For that reason, the rest of this section focuses on SELinux.

- A good starting point for understanding the access control made possible by SELinux is what you get with a standard distribution of Linux. The standard distribution regulates access on the basis of the privileges associated with a running program. In general, if a program runs with superuser privileges (that is, privileges associated with user ID 0), it can bypass all security restrictions. That is, such a program has no constraints regarding what files, interfaces, interprocess communications, and so on, it can access. (Just imagine a rogue program in your machine that has managed to guess your root password.) [In case you happen to be thinking of access privileges in Windows platforms, the accounts SYSTEM and ADMINISTRATOR have privileges similar to those of root in Unix/Linux systems.] The access control in a standard distribution of Linux is referred to as the Linux Discretionary Access Control (DAC).

- SELinux, on the other hand, associates a context label with every file, directory, user account, process, etc., in your computer. A context label consists of four colon separated parts (with the last part being optional):

\[
\text{user : role : type : level}
\]

You can see the context label associated with a file or a directory by executing the command `ls -Z filename`. For example, when
I execute the command ‘ls -Z /home/kak/’, here are a few lines of what I get back:

```
system_u:object_r:file_t:s0  AdaBoost/
system_u:object_r:file_t:s0  admin/
```

...  ...

What you see in the first column are the context labels created by SELinux for the subdirectories in my home directory. Therefore, for the subdirectory AdaBoost, the ‘user’ is system_u, the ‘role’ object_r, the ‘type’ file_t, and the ‘level’ s0. SELinux uses these individual pieces of information to make access control decisions. When the security policy allows it, you can change components of a context label selectively by using the chcon command. That command stands for “change context”.

- And if you want to see the context labels associated with the processes currently running in your computer, execute the command ‘ps -eZ’. When I execute this command on my Ubuntu laptop, I get a very long list, of which just a few of the beginning entries are:

```
1 ? 00:00:02 init
2 ? 00:00:00 kthreadd
3 ? 00:00:01 ksoftirqd/0
```
As you can imagine, when you associate with every entity in your computer a context label of the sort shown above, you can set up a fine-grained access control policy by placing constraints on which resource a user (in the sense used in the context labels) in a given role and of a certain given type and level is allowed to access taking into account the resource’s own context label. You can now create a Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy, or a Type Enforcement (TE) policy, and, if SELinux specifies the optional ‘level’ field in the context labels, a Multi-Level Security (MLS) policy. In addition, you can set up a Multi-Category Security (MCS) policy — we will talk about that later.

To show a simple example of type enforcement from the SELinux FAQ, assume that all the files in a user account are given the type label `user_home_t`. And assume that the Firefox browser running in your machine is given the type label `firefox_t`. The following access control declaration

```plaintext
allow firefox_t user_home_t : file { read write };
```

will then ensure that the browser has only read and write permis-
sions with respect to user files — even if the browser is being run by someone with root privileges. [You can see why some people think of SELinux as a firewall between programs. Ordinarily, as you saw in Lecture 18, a firewall regulates traffic between a computer and the rest of the network.]

• In order to make it easier to create the access control policies for a new application, SELinux gives you a Reference Policy that can be modified as needed. A company named Tresys Technologies updates the Reference Policy on the basis of the user feedback sent to the Policy Project mailing list at GitHub. This reference policy is typically customized by the provider of your Linux platform.

• In order to become more familiar with SELinux, you can download and install SELinux in a Ubuntu machine through your Synaptic Package Manager. [Or you can do ‘sudo apt-get remove apparmor’ followed by ‘sudo apt-get install selinux’] Make sure you choose the meta-package selinux and not the package selinux-basics. SELinux becomes operational (although not enabled) just by installing it. Note that with Ubuntu, the reference policy you get is stored in the file /etc/selinux/ubuntu/policy/policy29.

• After you have installed SELinux as described above, you will need to reboot the machine in order to enable SELinux. [During this reboot, all of the files on the disk will acquire context labels in accordance with the explanation presented earlier in this section] Subsequently, if you execute a command like ‘sestatus’ (you don’t have to be root to run this command), you’ll see the
following output returned by SELinux:

SELinux status: enabled
SELinuxfs mount: /sys/fs/selinux
SELinux root directory: /etc/selinux
Loaded policy name: ubuntu
Current mode: permissive
Mode from config file: permissive
Policy MLS status: enabled
Policy deny_unknown status: allowed
Max kernel policy version: 28

If you now execute the command ‘sudo setenforce 1’, you’ll see the same output as shown above, but with the line ‘Current mode: permissive’ changed to ‘Current mode: enforcing’.

• If you want to see a listing of all the SELinux users, you can enter the command ‘seinfo -u’. When I run this command on my Ubuntu laptop, I get

Users: 6
sysadm_u
system_u
root
staff_u
user_u
unconfined_u

And if I execute the command ‘seinfo -r’ to see all of the roles used in the context labels, I get back
Roles: 6
staff_r
user_r
object_r
sysadm_r
system_r
unconfined_r

Along the same lines, executing the command ‘seinfo -t’ returns a long list of all of the types used in the context labels. This list in my laptop has 1041 entries. The list starts with:

Types: 1041
bluetooth_conf_t
etc_runtime_t
audisp_var_run_t
auditd_var_run_t
ipsecnat_port_t
...
...
...

• To get a sense of how fine-grained access control with SELinux can be made, execute the command ‘seinfo -a’ to see a list of the large number of attributes that go with the type labels. When I execute this command, I get a list with 174 entries. Here is how the list begins:

Attributes: 174
direct_init
privfd
file_type
In case you are curious, you can see the context label assigned to your account name by entering the usual ‘id’ command. Prior to installing SELinux, this command just returns the user ID and group ID associated with your account. However, after having installed SELinux, I get back the following (all in one line):

```
uid=1001(kak) gid=1001(kak) groups=1001(kak),4(adm),7(lp),27(sudo),109(lpadmin),124(sambashare)
context=system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
```

What you see at the end is the context label associated with my account. If I just wanted to see the context label, I can execute the command ‘id -Z’. Running this command yields

```

system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0
```

which says that I am a **system_u** user (presumably because of my sudo privileges), that my role is **system_r**, that the type label associated with me is **kernel_t**, and that my level is **s0**.

- Remember the following six SELinux users returned by the command ‘**seinfo -u**’: **sysadm_u**, **system_u**, **root**, **staff_u**, **user_u**, and **unconfined_u**. Suppose we want to find out what different possible roles can be played by each of these users, we can execute the command ‘**sudo semanage user -l**’. This command returns:

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<th>SELinux User</th>
<th>Labeling</th>
<th>MLS/MLS/ Prefix</th>
<th>MLS/MLS/ Level</th>
<th>MLS/MLS/ MCS Range</th>
<th>SELinux Roles</th>
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<tr>
<td>root</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0-s0:c0.c255</td>
<td>staff_r sysadm_r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff_u</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0-s0:c0.c255</td>
<td>staff_r sysadm_r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sysadm_u</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0-s0:c0.c255</td>
<td>sysadm_r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>system_u</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0-s0:c0.c255</td>
<td>system_r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unconfined_u</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0-s0:c0.c255</td>
<td>system_r unconfined_r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>user_u</td>
<td>user</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>s0</td>
<td>user_r</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This display shows that a ‘**root**’ user in my laptop is allowed to acquire any of the three roles: **staff_r**, **sysadm_r**, and **system_r**. However, since as ’kak’ I am a **system_u** user, the only role I am allowed is **system_r**.

- Let’s now talk about the fourth column in the tabular presentation returned by the command ‘**sudo semanage user -l**’. This is the column with the heading “MLS/MCS Range”. Each entry in this column consists of two parts that are separated by a colon. What is to the left of the colon is the range of levels that is allowed for each SELinux user (where, again, by ’user’ we mean
one of the six user labels that SELinux understands). As you will recall, earlier in this section we talked about MLS standing for Multi-Level Security that is made possible by the level field in the context labels. What is displayed on the right of the colon — it is important to the implementation of an MCS (Multi-Category Security) access control policy mentioned earlier — is the range of categories allowed for each SELinux user. You can, for example, associate a set of different categories with each file in a directory. **A user will be able to access a file in that directory only if the user belongs to all of the categories specified for that file.** The declaration syntax `c0..c255` is a shorthand for categories `c0` through `c255`. When MCS based access control is used, it comes subsequent to the access control stipulated by LDAC, and the access constraints created through role-based, type-based, and level-based access control enforcement. So MCS can only further constrain what resources can be accessed on a computer. [As mentioned earlier in this section, the access control made available by a standard distribution of Linux is referred to as Linux Discretionary Access Control (DAC).]

- In case you need to, you can disable SELinux with a command like

  ```bash
  sudo setenforce 0
  ```

  and re-enable it with

  ```bash
  sudo setenforce 1
  ```

  As mentioned earlier, you can check the status of SELinux running on our machine by
sestatus

If it says “enforcing,” that means that SELinux is providing protection. To completely disable the SELinux install in your machine, change the SELINUX variable in the `/etc/selinux/config` file to read

```
SELINUX=disabled
```

- Should it happen that you run into some sort of a jam after installing SELinux in a host, perhaps you could try executing the command `sudo setenforce 0` in that host in order to place SELinux in a permissive mode. To elaborate with an example, let’s say you try to `scp` a file into a SELinux enabled host as a user named ‘xxxx’ (assuming that xxxx has login privileges at the host) and it doesn’t work. You check the ‘/var/log/auth.log’ file in the host and you see there the error message “failed to get default SELinux security context for xxxx (in enforcing mode)”. In order to solve this problem, you’d need to fix the context label associated with the user ‘xxxx’. Barring that, you can also momentarily place the host in a permissive mode through the command `sudo setenforce 0` and get the job done.

- What is achieved in Linux with MAC is achieved in Windows systems with Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) that associates one of the following five Integrity Levels (IL) with processes: Low, Medium, High, System, and Trusted Installer.
While we achieve significant security by sandboxing the apps, one cannot be lulled into thinking that that’s is the answer to all systems related vulnerabilities in computing devices. When it comes to systems related issues in computer security, here is some food for thought: Is it possible that your OS bootstrap loader (such as the GRUB bootloader) could be used by a rogue program to download a corrupted OS kernel? Is it possible that the /sbin/init file (that is used to launch the init process from which all other processes are spawned in Unix/Linux platforms) could itself be replaced by a corrupted version? And what about an adversary exploiting the ptrace tools that is normally used in Linux by one process to observe and control the execution of another process?
32.4: WHAT ABOUT THE SECURITY OF OVER-THE-AIR COMMUNICATIONS WITH MOBILE DEVICES?

- Even if we were to think that our smartphones are free of malware, what would that imply with respect to the ability of the devices to engage in secure voice and data communications with the base stations of cellular operators? It is this question that I’ll briefly address in this section.

- The answer to the question posed above depends on which generation of cellphone technology you are talking about. As you know, we now have 2G (GSM), 3G (UMTS), 4G (LTE, ITU), and now 5G wireless standards for cellphone communications. The algorithms that are used for encrypting over-the-air voice and data communications with these different standards are referred to as the A5 series of algorithms. The algorithm that is used for encrypting voice and SMS in the 2G standard (which, by the way, still dominates in most geographies around the world) is the A5/1 stream cipher. A5/2, a weaker version of A5/1 created to meet certain export restrictions of about a decade ago, turned out to be an extremely weak cipher and has been discontinued. A5/3 and A5/4 are meant for 3G and 4G wireless technologies.
standard defines a set of algorithms for encryption and authentication services. These algorithms are named ‘Ax’ where ‘x’ in an integer that indicates the function of the algorithm. For example, a base station can call on the A3 algorithm to authenticate a mobile device. The A5 algorithm provides the encryption/decryption services. The algorithm A8 is used to generate a 64 bit session key. An algorithm with the name COMP128 combines the functionality of A3 and A8.

- Both A5/3 and A5/4 are based on the KASUMI block cipher, which in turn is based on a block cipher called MISTY1 developed by Mitsubishi. The KASUMI cipher is used in the Output Feedback Mode that we talked about in Lecture 9, which generates a bitstream in multiples of 64 bits. Regarding KASUMI, it is a 64-bit block cipher with a Feistel structure (that you learned in Lecture 3) with eight rounds. KASUMI needs a 128-bit encryption key.

- The rest of this section, and the subsection that follows, focuses on the A5/1 cipher that is used widely in 2G cellular networks. It is now well known that this cipher provides essentially no security because of the speed with which it can be cracked using ordinary computing hardware.

- What makes A5/1 interesting is that it is a great case study in how things can go wrong when you believe in security through obscurity. As I mentioned in Section 32.1, this algorithm was kept secret for several years by the cellphone operators. But, eventually, it was leaked out and found to provide virtually no
security with regard to the privacy of voice data and SMS messages.

• A5/1 is bit-level stream cipher with a 64-bit encryption key. The encryption key is created for each session from a master key that is shared by the cellphone operator (with which the phone is registered) and the SIM card in the phone. When a base station (which may belong to some other cellphone operator) needs a session key, it fetches it from the cellphone operator that holds the master key.

• GSM transmissions are bursty. Time division multiplexing is used to quickly transmit a collected stream of bits that need to be sent over a given communication link between the base station and a phone. A single burst in each direction consist of 114 bits of 4.615 milliseconds duration.

• The purpose of A5/1 is to produce two pseudorandom 114-bit streams — called the keystreams — one for the uplink and the other for the downlink. The 114-bit data in each direction is XORed with the keystream. The destination can recover the original data by XORing the received bit stream with the same keystream.

• In addition to the 64-bit key, the encryption of each 114-bit stream is also controlled by a 22-bit frame number which is always
publicly known.

- A5/1 works off three LFSRs (Linear Feedback Shift Register), designated R1, R2, and R3, of sizes 19, 22, and 23 bits, as shown in Figure 1. Each shift register is initialized with the 64-bit encryption key and the 22-bit frame number in the manner illustrated by the Python code in the next subsection.

- Each shift register has what is known as a *clocking bit* — for each register it’s marked with a red box in Figure 1. As you can tell from the figure, for R1, the clocking bit is at index 8, and for both R2 and R3 at index 10. During the production of the keystream, the clocking bits are used to decide whether or not to clock a shift register. [Pay close attention to the distinction between the *clocking bit*, of which there is ONLY ONE in each shift register, and the *feedback bits*, of which there are SEVERAL in each shift register, as shown in Figure 1.]

- Clocking a shift register involves the following operations: (1) You record the bits at the feedback taps in the register; (2) You shift the register by one bit position towards the MSB (which is at the right end of the shift registers, the end with the highest indexed bit position); and (3) You set the value of the LSB to an XOR of the feedback bits. When you are first initializing a register with the encryption key, you add a fourth step, which is to XOR the LSB with the key bit corresponding to that clock tick, etc.
Figure 1: This figure shows how three Linear Feedback Shift Registers are used in the A5/1 algorithm for encrypting voice and SMS in 2G cellular networks. (This figure is from Lecture 32 of “Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security” by Avi Kak)
• After the shift registers have been initialized, you produce a keystream by doing the following at each clock tick:

  – You take a majority vote of the clocking bits in the three registers R1, R2, and R3. Majority voting means that you find out whether at least two of the three are either 0’s or 1’s.

  – You only clock those registers whose clocking bits are in agreement with the majority bit.

  – You take the XOR of the MSB’s of the three registers and that becomes the output bit.

• The next subsection presents a Python implementation of this logic to remove any ambiguities about the various steps outlined above.

• A5/1 has been the subject of cryptanalysis by several researchers. The most recent attack on A5/1, by Karsten Nohl, was presented at the 2010 Black Hat conference. The PDF of the paper is available at:


  Here is a quote from Karsten Nohl’s paper:
“..... A5/1 can be broken in seconds with 2TB of fast storage and two graphics cards. The attack combines several time-memory trade-off techniques and exploits the relatively small effective key size of 61 bits”

Nohl has demonstrated that a rainbow table attack can be mounted successfully on A5/1. You learned about rainbow tables in Lecture 24.

- Another interesting (but more theoretical) paper about mounting attacks on A5/1 is “Cryptanalysis of the A5/1 GSM Stream Cipher” by Eli Biham and Orr Dunkelman that appeared in Progress in Cryptology – INDOCRYPT, 2000. Another important publication that talks about cryptanalysis of A5 ciphers is “Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted Communication” by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, and Nathan Keller.
32.4.1: A Python Implementation of the A5/1 Cipher

- So that you can better understand the algorithmic steps for the A5/1 stream cipher described in the previous section, I’ll now present here its Python implementation. As the comment block at the top of the code file says, my Python implementation is based on the C code provided for the algorithm by Marc Briceno, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner.

- Line (1) of the code defines the three registers R1, R2, and R3 as three BitVectors of sizes 19, 22, and 23 bits respectively. It is best to visualize these registers as shown in Figure 1. The BitVectors constructed will actually contain the LSB at the left end and the MSB at the right end.

- Line (2) defines the BitVectors needed for the feedback taps on R1, R2, and R3. We set the tap bits in Lines (3), (4) and (5). We can get hold of the feedback bits in each register by simply taking the logical AND of the register BitVectors, as defined in Line (1), and the tap BitVectors, as defined in Line (2).

- Lines (9) through (11) set the encryption key. This key can obviously be set to anything at all provided it is 64 bits long. The
specific value shown for the key is the same as used by Briceno, Goldberg, and Wagner in their C code.

• In a similar fashion, Lines (12) and (13) set the frame number which must be a 22-bit number. I have used the same number as Briceno et al.

• Lines (14) and (15) define the two 114-bit long BitVectors that are used later for storing the two output keystreams.

• Lines (16) through (32) define the support routines parity(), majority(), clockone(), and clockall(). Their definitions should make clear the logic used in these functions.

• The setupkey() in Lines (33) through (44) initializes the three shift registers by, first, clocking in the 64 bits of the encryption key, then, by clocking in the 22 bits of the frame number, and, finally, by simply clocking the registers 100 times for the “avalanche” effect. Note the important difference between how the registers are clocked in Lines (34) through (39) and in Lines (40) through (44). In Lines (34) through (39), we clock all three registers at each clock tick. However, in lines (40) through (44), a register is clocked depending on how its clocking bit compares with the clocking bits in other two registers.
• The function that actually produces the keystreams, `run()`, is defined in Lines (45) through (55). I have combined the production of the two keystreams into a single 228-iterations loop in Lines (48) through (53). The first 114 bits generated in this manner are for the uplink keystream and the next 114 bits for the downlink keystream. This is reflected by the division made in lines (54) and (55).

• The rest of the code is for checking the accuracy of the implementation against the test vector provided by Briceno et al. in their C-based implementation. The variables `goodAtoB` and `goodBtoA` store the correct values for the two keystreams for the encryption key of Line (9) and the frame number of Line (12).

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python

## A5_1.py
## Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
## April 21, 2015

## This is a Python implementation of the C code provided by Marc Briceno, Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner at the following website:
## http://www.scard.org/gsm/a51.html
## For accuracy, I have compared the output of this Python code against the test vector provided by them.

## The A5/1 algorithm is used in 2G GSM for over-the-air encryption of voice and SMS data. On the basis of the cryptanalysis of this cipher and the more recent rainbow table attacks, the A5/1 algorithm is now considered to provide virtually no security at all. Nonetheless, it forms an interesting case study that shows that when security algorithms are not opened up to public scrutiny (because some folks out there believe in "security through obscurity"), it is possible for such an algorithm to become deployed on a truly global basis before its flaws become evident.
```
### The A5/1 algorithm is a bit-level stream cipher based on three LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register). The basic operation you carry out in an LFSR at each clock tick consists of the following three steps: (1) You record the bits at the feedback taps in the register; (2) You shift the register by one bit position towards the MSB; and (3) You set the value of the LSB to an XOR of the feedback bits. When you are first initializing a register with the encryption key, you add a fourth step, which is to XOR the LSB with the key bit corresponding to that clock tick, etc.

```python
from BitVector import *

# The three shift registers
R1, R2, R3 = BitVector(size=19), BitVector(size=22), BitVector(size=23)

# Feedback taps
R1TAPS, R2TAPS, R3TAPS = BitVector(size=19), BitVector(size=22), BitVector(size=23)

print "R1TAPS: ", R1TAPS
print "R2TAPS: ", R2TAPS
print "R3TAPS: ", R3TAPS

keybytes = [BitVector(hexstring=x).reverse() for x in ['12', '23', '45', '67', '89', 'ab', 'cd', 'ef']]
key = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, keybytes)
print "encryption key: ", key

frame = BitVector(intVal=0x134, size=22).reverse()
print "frame number: ", frame

# We will store the two output keystreams in these two BitVectors, each of size 114 bits. One is for the uplink and the other for the downlink:
AtoBkeystream = BitVector(size = 114)
BtoAkeystream = BitVector(size = 114)

# This function used by the clockone() function. As each shift register is clocked, the feedback consists of the parity of all the tap bits:
def parity(x):
    countbits = x.count_bits()
    return countbits % 2

# In order to decide whether or not a shift register should be clocked at a given clock tick, we need to examine the clocking bits in each register and see what the majority says:
def majority():
    if sum >= 2:
        return 1
    else:
        return 0
```

## This function clocks just one register that is supplied as the first arg to the function. The second argument must indicate the bit positions of the feedback
## taps for the register.
def clockone(register, taps):  
    tapsbits = register & taps  
    register.shift_right(1)  
    register[0] = parity(tapsbits)

## This function is needed for initializing the three shift registers.
def clockall():
    clockone(R1, R1TAPS)  
    clockone(R2, R2TAPS)  
    clockone(R3, R3TAPS)

## This function initializes the three shift registers with, first, the 64-bit 
## encryption key, then with the 22 bits of frame number, and, finally, by simply 
## clocking the registers 100 times to create the 'avalanche' effect. Note that 
## during the avalanche creation, clocking of each register now depends on the 
## clocking bits in all three registers.
def setupkey():
    # Clock into the registers the 64 bits of the encryption key:
    for i in range(64):
        clockall()
        R1[0] ^= key[i]; R2[0] ^= key[i]; R3[0] ^= key[i]
    # Clock into the registers the 22 bits of the frame number:
    for i in range(22):
        clockall()
        R1[0] ^= frame[i]; R2[0] ^= frame[i]; R3[0] ^= frame[i]
    # Now clock all three registers 100 times, but this time let the clocking 
    # of each register depend on the majority voting of the clocking bits:
    for i in range(100):
        maj = majority()  
        if (R1[8] != 0) == maj: clockone(R1, R1TAPS)  
        if (R2[10] != 0) == maj: clockone(R2, R2TAPS)  
        if (R3[10] != 0) == maj: clockone(R3, R3TAPS)

## After the three shift registers are initialized with the encryption key and the 
## frame number, you are ready to run the shift registers to produce the two bit 114 
## bits long keystreams, one for the uplink and the other for the downlink.
def run():
    global AtoBkeystream, BtoAkeystream
    keystream = BitVector(size=228)
    for i in range(228):
        maj = majority()  
        if (R1[8] != 0) == maj: clockone(R1, R1TAPS)  
        if (R2[10] != 0) == maj: clockone(R2, R2TAPS)  
        if (R3[10] != 0) == maj: clockone(R3, R3TAPS)
        keystream[i] = R1[-1] ^ R2[-1] ^ R3[-1]
    AtoBkeystream = keystream[:114]  
    BtoAkeystream = keystream[114:]

## Initialize the three shift registers:
setupkey()  
## Now produce the keystreams:
run()  
## Display the two keystreams:
print "\nAtoBkeystream: ", AtoBkeystream
print "\nBtoAkeystream: ", BtoAkeystream

## Here are the correct values for the two keystreams:
goodAtoB = [BitVector(hexstring = x) for x in ['53','4e','aa','58','2f','e8','15','1a',
'b6','e1','85','5a','72','8c','00']]  #(60)
goodBtoA = [BitVector(hexstring = x) for x in ['24','fd','35','a3','5d','5f','b6','52',
'6d','32','f9','06','df','1a','c0']]  #(61)
goodAtoB = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, goodAtoB)  #(62)
goodBtoA = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, goodBtoA)  #(63)

print "\nGood: AtoBkeystream: ", goodAtoB[:114]  #(64)
print "\nGood: BtoAkeystream: ", goodBtoA[:114]  #(65)

if (AtoBkeystream == goodAtoB[:114]) and (BtoAkeystream == goodBtoA[:114]):  #(66)
  print "\nSelf-check succeeded: Everything looks good"

• When you run this code, you should see the following output

R1TAPS: 00000000000001001111
R2TAPS: 0000000000000000000011
R3TAPS: 00000001000000000000111
encryption key: 0100100011000100101000101110011010010001110101011011111111111
frame number: 0010110010000000000000

AtoBkeystream: 010100110100111010101010010110000010111111101000000101010001
1010110110111000011000010101101100111100101001000001101010011010110011
BtoAkeystream: 00100100111111010011010110100011011011111111011011001101001101
00100101100110010110110000101011011111101101011001111111111101101111

Good AtoBkeystream: 010100110100111010101010010110000010111111101000000101010001
1010110110111000011000010101101100111100101001000001101010011010110011

Good BtoAkeystream: 00100100111111010011010110100011011011111111011011001101001101
00100101100110010110110000101011011111101101011001111111111101101111

Self-check succeeded: Everything looks good

• You are probably wondering as to why I did not show the keystreams in hex. In general, you can display a BitVector object in hex by
calling its instance method `get_hex_from_bitvector()` — provided the number of bits is a multiple of 4. Our keystreams are 114 bits long, which is not a multiple of 4. I could have augmented the keystreams by appending a couple of zeros at the end, but then you are taking liberties with the correctness of the output.
32.5: SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACKS ON SPECIALIZED MOBILE DEVICES

• I’ll now describe attacks that are best carried out if an adversary has physical possession of a computing device. Therefore, by their very nature, mobile devices are vulnerable to these form attacks — especially so the more specialized mobile devices like smartcards that contain rudimentary hardware and software compared to what you find in smartphones these days. By physically subjecting the hardware connections in such devices to externally injected momentary faults (say by a transient voltage spike from an external source), or by measuring the time taken by a cryptographic routine for a very large number of inputs, it may be possible to make a good guess at the security parameters of such devices.

• Before reading this section further (and also before reading Sections 32.7 and 32.8), you should go through Karsten Nohl’s 2008 Black Hat talk at the link shown below. This talk will give you a good sense of the intrusive nature of the attacks you can mount on a device like a smartcard in order to break its encryption:

• In general, a side-channel attack means that an adversary is trying to break a cipher using information that is NOT intrinsic to the mathematical details of the encryption/decryption algorithms, but that may be inferred from various “external” measurements such as the power consumed by the hardware executing the algorithms for different possible inputs, the time taken by the hardware for the same, how the hardware responds to externally injected faults, etc.

• Various forms of side-channel attacks are:

**Fault Injection Attack:** These are based on deliberately getting the hardware on which a specific part of encryption/decryption algorithm is running to return a wrong answer. As shown in the next section, a wrong answer may give sufficient clues to figure out the parameters of the cryptographic algorithm being used.

**Timing Attack:** These attacks try to infer a cryptographic key from the time it takes for the processor to execute an algorithm and the dependence of this time on different inputs.

**Power Analysis Attack:** Here the goal is to analyze the power trace of an executing cryptographic algorithm in order to figure out whether a particular instruction was executed at a specific time. It has been shown that such traces can reveal
the cryptographic keys used.

**EM Analysis Attack:** Assuming that the hardware implementing a cryptographic routine is not adequately shielded against leaking electromagnetic radiation (at the clock frequency of the processor), if you can construct a trace of this radiation, you may be able to infer whether or not a particular instruction was executed at a given time — just as in a power analysis attack. From such information, you may be able to draw inferences about the bits in a encryption key.

- In the sections that follow, I will consider two of these attacks in greater detail: the fault-injection attack and the timing attack. In order to explain the principles involved, for both these attacks, I will assume that a mobile device is charged with digitally signing the outgoing messages with the RSA algorithm. The goal of the attacks will be make a guess at the private exponent used for constructing a digital signature. **Note that these days if an attack can reliably guess even a single bit of a secret, it is considered to be a successful attack.**
32.6: FAULT INJECTION ATTACKS

- The goal of this section is to show that if you can get the processor of a mobile device to yield a faulty value for a portion of the calculations, you may be able to get the device to part with its secret, which could be the encryption key you are looking for.

- I will assume that the processor of the mobile device has an embedded private key for digitally signing messages with the RSA algorithm.

- The reader will recall from Lecture 12 that given a modulus $n$ and a public and private key pair $(e, d)$, we can sign a message $M$ by calculating its digital signature $S = M^d \mod n$. [In practice, you are likely to calculate the signature of just the hash of the message $M$. That detail, however, does not change the overall explanation presented in this section.]

- As explained in Section 12.5 of Lecture 12, calculation of the signature $S = M^d \mod n$ can be speeded up considerably by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Since the owner of the private key $d$ will also know the prime factors $p$ and $q$ of
the modulus $n$, with CRT you first calculate [In the explanation in Section 12.5 of Lecture 12, our focus was on encryption/decryption with RSA. Therefore, the private exponent $d$ was applied to the ciphertext integer $C$. Here we are talking about digital signatures, which calls for applying the private exponent to the message itself (or to a hash of the message).]

\[
V_p = M^d \mod p \\
V_q = M^d \mod q
\]

In order to construct the signature $S$ from $V_p$ and $V_q$, we must calculate the coefficients:

\[
X_p = q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \\
X_q = p \times (p^{-1} \mod q)
\]

The CRT theorem of Section 11.7 of Lecture 11 then tells us that the signature $S$ is related to the intermediate results $V_p$ and $V_q$ by

\[
S = (V_p \times X_p + V_q \times X_q) \mod n = (q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q) \mod n \quad (1)
\]

- Let’s now assume that we have somehow introduced a fault in the calculation of $V_p$ by, say, subjecting the hardware to a momentary voltage surge. Since the voltage surge is limited in duration, we assume that while $V_p$ is now calculated erroneously as $\hat{V}_p$, the value of $V_q$ remains unchanged. Let’s use $\hat{S}$ to represent the signature calculated using the erroneous $\hat{V}_p$. We can write:
\[ \hat{S} = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q \right) \mod n \]

- Subtracting the faulty signature \( \hat{S} \) from its true value \( S \), we have

\[ S - \hat{S} = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p)(V_p - \hat{V}_p) \right) \mod n \quad (2) \]

- The above result implies that

\[ q = \gcd(S - \hat{S}, n) \quad (3) \]

As you can see, the attacker can immediately figure out the prime factor \( q \) of the modulus by calculating the GCD of \( S - \hat{S} \) and \( n \). [See Lecture 5 for how to best calculate the GCD of two numbers.] Subsequently, a simple division would yield to the attacker the other prime factor \( p \). In this manner, the attacker would be able to figure out the prime factors of the RSA modulus without ever having to factorize it. After acquiring the prime factors \( p \) and \( q \), it becomes a trivial matter for the attacker to find out what the private key \( d \) is since the attacker knows the public key \( e \).

- The ploy described above requires that the attacker calculate both the true signature \( S \) and the faulty signature \( \hat{S} \) for a message \( M \). As it turns out, the attacker can carry out the same exploit with just the faulty signature \( \hat{S} \) along with the message \( M \).
• To see why the same exploit works with $M$ and $\hat{S}$, note first that if we are given the correct signature $S$, we can recover $M$ by $M = S^e \mod n$. Also note that since $S^e \mod n = M$, we can write:

$$S^e = k_1 \times n + M$$

$$= k_1 \times p \times q + M$$

for some value of the integer constant $k_1$. The second relationship shown above leads to:

$$S^e \mod p = M \quad (4)$$

$$S^e \mod q = M \quad (5)$$

• Also note that, using Equation (1), we can write for the correct signature:

$$S = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q \right) \mod n$$

$$= q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_2 \times p \times q$$

for some value of the constant $k_2$. We can therefore write:

$$S^e = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_2 \times p \times q \right)^e$$

and that implies
\[ S^e \mod p = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_2 \times p \times q \right)^e \mod p \]

\[ = \left( \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_2 \times p \times q \right) \mod p \right)^e \mod p \]

\[ = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p \right)^e \mod p \]

(6)

We can derive a similar result for \( S^e \mod q \). Writing the two results together, we have

\[ S^e \mod p = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times V_p \right)^e \mod p = M \] (7)

\[ S^e \mod q = \left( p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q \right)^e \mod q = M \] (8)

where we have also placed the result derived earlier in Equations (4) and (5).

Let’s now try to see what happens if carry out similar operations on the faulty signature \( \hat{S} \). However, before we raise \( \hat{S} \) to the power \( e \), let’s rewrite \( \hat{S} \) as

\[ \hat{S} = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q \right) \mod n \]

\[ = q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_3 \times p \times q \]

for some value of the integer \( k_3 \). We may now write for \( \hat{S}^e \):

\[ \hat{S}^e = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_3 \times p \times q \right)^e \]
This allows us to write:

\[
\hat{S}^e \mod p = \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_3 \times p \times q \right)^e \mod p \\
= \left( \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p + p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_q + k_3 \times p \times q \right) \mod p \right)^e \mod p \\
= \left( q \times (q^{-1} \mod p) \times \hat{V}_p \right)^e \mod p
\]

(9)

- In a similar manner, one can show

\[
\hat{S}^e \mod q = \left( p \times (p^{-1} \mod q) \times V_p \right)^e \mod q 
\]

(10)

- Comparing the results in Equations (6) and (7) with those in Equations (4) and (5), we claim

\[
\hat{S}^e \mod p \not= M \quad (11)
\]

\[
\hat{S}^e \mod q = M \quad (12)
\]

- Equation (9) implies that we can write

\[
\hat{S}^e = M + k_4 \times q 
\]

(13)

for some value of the constant \( k_4 \). This relationship may be expressed as
\[
\hat{S}^e - M = k_4 \times q 
\]  

(14)

- Since \( n = p \times q \), what we have is that \( \hat{S}^e - M \) and the modulus \( n \) share common factor, \( q \). Since \( n \) possesses only two factors, \( p \) and \( q \), we can therefore write

\[
gcd(\hat{S}^e - M, n) = q 
\]  

(15)
32.6.1: Demonstration of Fault Injection with a Python Script

• The goal of this demonstration is to illustrate that when you miscalculate (deliberately) either $V_p$ or $V_q$ in the CRT step of the modular exponentiation required by the RSA algorithm, you can easily figure out the private key $d$.

• In the Python script that follows, lines (1) through (18) show two functions, `gcd()` and `MI()` that you saw previously in Lecture 5. The `gcd()` is the Euclid’s algorithm for calculating the greatest common divisor of two integers. And the function `MI()` returns the multiplicative inverse of the first-argument integer in the ring corresponding to the second-argument integer.

• Subsequently, lines (19) through (29) first declare the two prime factors for the RSA modulus and then compute the values to use for the public exponent $e$ and the private exponent $d$. As the reader will recall from Section 12.2.2 of Lecture 12, $e$ must be relatively prime to both $p - 1$ and $q - 1$, which are the two factors of the totient of $n$. The conditional evaluation in line (25) guarantees that. After setting $e$, the statement in line (28) sets the private exponent $d$. 
• The code in lines (30) through (37) first sets the message integer $M$ and then calculates the intermediate results $V_p$ and $V_q$, as defined in the previous section. Note that we use Fermat’s Little Theorem (see Section 11.2 of Lecture 11) to speed up the calculation of $V_p$ and $V_q$. [Given the small sizes of the numbers involved, there is obviously no particular reason to use FLT here. Nonetheless, should be reader decide to play with this demonstration using large numbers, using FLT would certainly make for a faster response time from the demonstration code.] In line (36), we use the CRT theorem to combine the values for $V_p$ and $V_q$ into the RSA based digital signature of the message integer $M$.

• Finally, the code in lines (39) through (47) is the demonstration of fault injection and how it can be used to find the prime factor $q$ of the RSA modulus $n$. We simulate fault injection by adding a small random number to the value of $V_p$ in line (42). Subsequently, we use Equation (10) of the previous section to estimate the value for $q$ in line (44).

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python

## FaultInjectionDemo.py
## Avi Kak (March 30, 2015)

## This script demonstrates the fault injection exploit on the CRT step of the
## of the RSA algorithm.

## GCD calculator (From Lecture 5)
def gcd(a,b):
    while b:
        a,b = b, a%b
    return a

## The code shown below uses ordinary integer arithmetic implementation of
## the Extended Euclid’s Algorithm to find the MI of the first-arg integer
## vis-a-vis the second-arg integer. (This code segment is from Lecture 5)```
```python
def MI(num, mod):  
    '''
The function returns the multiplicative inverse (MI) of num modulo mod
    '''
    NUM = num; MOD = mod
    x, x_old = 0L, 1L
    y, y_old = 1L, 0L
    while mod:
        q = num // mod
        num, mod = mod, num % mod
        x, x_old = x_old - q * x, x
        y, y_old = y_old - q * y, y
    if num != 1:
        raise ValueError("NO MI. However, the GCD of %d and %d is %u" \
                        % (NUM, MOD, num))
    else:
        MI = (x_old + MOD) % MOD
        return MI

# Set RSA params:
p = 211  # (19)
q = 223  # (20)
n = p * q  # (21)
print "RSA parameters:"
print "p = %d q = %d modulus = %d" % (p, q, n)  # (22)
totient_n = (p-1) * (q-1)  # (23)
for e in range(3,n):
    if (gcd(e,p-1) == 1) and (gcd(e,q-1) == 1):
        break
print "public exponent e = ", e  # (27)
# Now set the private exponent:
d = MI(e, totient_n)  # (28)
print "private exponent d = ", d  # (29)

message = 6789  # (30)
print "\nmessage = ", message  # (31)

# Implement the Chinese Remainder Theorem to calculate
# message to the power of d mod n:
dp = d % (p - 1)  # (32)
dq = d % (q - 1)  # (33)
V_p = ((message % p) ** dp) % p  # (34)
V_q = ((message % q) ** dq) % q  # (35)
signature = (q * MI(q, p) * V_p + p * MI(p, q) * V_q) % n  # (36)
print "\nsignature = ", signature  # (37)

import random  # (38)

print "\nESTIMATION OF q THROUGH INJECTED FAULTS:";
for i in range(10):  # (39)
    56
```
Shown below is the output of the script. As the reader can see, for all values of the random error added to the value of $V_p$, we are able to correctly estimate the prime factor $q$ of the RSA modulus.

**RSA parameters:**
- $p = 211$
- $q = 223$
- modulus = 47053
- public exponent $e = 11$
- private exponent $d = 21191$

message = 6789

signature = 42038

**ESTIMATION OF $q$ THROUGH INJECTED FAULTS:**

$V_p = 49$  $V_{hat\_p} = 56$  error = 7
possible value for $q = 223$
Attack successful!!!

$V_p = 49$  $V_{hat\_p} = 55$  error = 6
possible value for $q = 223$
Attack successful!!!

$V_p = 49$  $V_{hat\_p} = 53$  error = 4
possible value for $q = 223$
Attack successful!!!

$V_p = 49$  $V_{hat\_p} = 52$  error = 3
possible value for $q = 223$
Attack successful!!!
\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 54 \quad \text{error} = 5 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 52 \quad \text{error} = 3 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 53 \quad \text{error} = 4 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 56 \quad \text{error} = 7 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 58 \quad \text{error} = 9 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

\[ V_p = 49 \quad V_{hat\_p} = 58 \quad \text{error} = 9 \]
possible value for \( q \) = 223
Attack successful!!!

- Fault injection attacks were first discovered by Dan Boneh, Richard DeMillo, and Richard Lipton in 1997 and are described in their 2001 Journal of Cryptology publication “On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations.” The logic used in the Python script shown in this section is based on a refinement of the original attack by A. K. Lenstra. This refinement is also mentioned in the publication by Boneh et al.
32.7: TIMING ATTACKS

- Timings attacks are based on the premise that if you can monitor how long it takes to execute a certain segment of a cryptographic routine, you may be able to make a good guess for the secret parameters of the algorithm.

- To elaborate, let’s consider the following algorithm for modular exponentiation that you saw earlier in Section 12.5.1 of Lecture 12:

  ```python
  result = 1
  while B > 0:
      if B & 1: #(1)
          result = ( result * A ) % n #(2)
      B = B >> 1
      A = ( A * A ) % n
  return result
  ```

As explained in Section 12.5.1 of Lecture 12, this algorithm carries out a bitwise scan of the exponent $B$ from its least significant bit to its most significant bit. It calculates the square of the base $A$.
at each step of the scan. This squared value is multiplied with the intermediate value for the result only if the bit of the exponent is set at the current step.

• Now imagine that you have somehow acquired the means to monitor how long it takes to execute the code in lines (1) and (2) shown above. Assuming that your time measurements are reasonably accurate, these time measurements would directly yield the exponent \( B \). And even if your time measurements are not so reliable, perhaps you can carry out the exponentiation operation repeatedly and then average out the noise. This is exactly the basis for the demonstration in the Python script shown next.

• Obviously, your first reaction to the claim made above would be: How would you get inside the hardware of a mobile device to monitor the execution time of the code segments in order to infer the secret through the time taken by those portions of the code? In practically all situations, the most an attacker would be able to do would be to feed different messages into a mobile device and measure the total time taken by an algorithm for each of those messages. Subsequently, if at all possible, the attacker would need to infer the secret from those times.

• The goal of the subsection that follows is to show that it is possible to determine an encryption key from the overall time taken by algorithm for each of a large collection of randomly constructed
messages.

- The goal of the current section, however, is simply to focus on showing how one can measure the execution time associated with a code fragment and the averaging that is needed to mitigate the effects of noise associated with such measurements.

- Let’s now address the question of how one might measure the time associated with the execution of an entire algorithm, or with just a fragment of the code, and why such measurements are inherently noisy. You might try to measure the execution time by taking the difference of the wall clock time just before the entry into the code segment and just after exiting from that code segment. Such an estimate is bound to be merely an approximation to the actual time spent in the processor by that segment of code. You see, at any given instant of time, there could be tens, if not hundreds, of processes and threads running “concurrently” in your computer. Assuming for the sake of argument that you have a single-core processor, what that means is that all the processes and threads are time-sliced with regard to their access to the CPU. That is, a process or a thread currently being executed in the CPU is rolled out and its state saved in the memory when the quantum of time for which it is allowed to be executed expires. Subsequently, one of the waiting processes or threads is rolled into the CPU, and so on. [All modern operating systems maintain several queues for the concurrent execution of multiple processes and threads. There is, for example, a queue of processes that are waiting for their turn at the CPU. Should a process that is currently being executed by the CPU need access to a particular I/O device, it is
taken off the CPU and placed in a queue for that I/O device. After it is done with I/O, it goes back into the queue of the processes waiting for their turn at the CPU. Unless a process is taken off the CPU for I/O reasons, or because it has been interrupted, etc., more ordinarily a process is taken off the CPU because its allotted time-slice in the CPU has expired. In Unix/Linux systems, there is a special process of PID 0 that acts as a processor scheduler. The scheduler’s job is to figure out which of the waiting processes gets a turn at the CPU.

• To demonstrate how noisy the measurement of running time can be, shown below are 10 trials of the same algorithm that consists of 16 steps. The execution time of each step was measured as the difference between the wall-clock time before and after the execution of the code segment corresponding to that step. That several of the entries are ‘0.0’ is not surprising because 12 of the 16 steps are essentially do-nothing step. However, the remaining four do require a large multiplication. The four steps that involve a large multiplication are at the first, eighth, tenth, and the sixteenth steps.

#1: [5.96e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#2: [5.96e-06, 9.53e-07, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#3: [5.96e-06, 9.53e-07, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.19e-06]
#4: [5.96e-06, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.19e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.19e-06, 0.0]
#5: [5.96e-06, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 1.19e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#6: [5.96e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.19e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#7: [5.96e-06, 9.53e-07, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#8: [5.96e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
#9: [8.10e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.19e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07]
#10: [6.19e-06, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 9.53e-07, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
• Our goal in this section is to illustrate how to recover the value of the exponent $B$ in the computation of $A^B \mod n$ from the noisy execution times of one key step in the modular exponentiation algorithm shown in the previous section.

• In the script that follows, lines (1) through (12) define the same modular exponentiation algorithm you saw earlier — except for the time measurement statements that are interspersed. The time measurement statements are in lines (2), (5), (8), and (9). We want to measure the time it takes to compute the multiplication step in line (7) recognizing that this multiplication takes place subject to the condition in line (6). The number of iterations in the while loop that starts in line (4) is equal to the number of bits in the binary representation of the exponent $B$.

• Subsequently, in order to deal with the noise in the measurement of execution time as demonstrated in the previous section, we define the function `repeated_time_measurements()` in lines (13) through (20). All that this function does is to call the modular exponentiation function repeatedly. It is the third argument to `repeated_time_measurements()` that determines how many times the modular exponentiation function will be called. The time measurements in each call to modular exponentiation are stored in a list of lists bound to the variable `list_of_time_traces`.

• In lines (21) through (24), we then set the values for the base $A$,
the exponent $B$, the modulus $n$, and the number of repetitions for calling the modular exponentiation function. In line (25), we then call `repeated_time_measurements()` with these values.

- The rest of the code, in lines (26) through (38), is for first averaging the noisy time measurements for each of the steps, finding a threshold as the half-way point between the minimum and the maximum of the time measurements, thresholding the time measurements, and constructing a bit string from the 0’s and 1’s thus obtained.

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
## EstimatingExponentFromExecutionTime.py
## Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
## March 31, 2015
## This script demonstrates the basic idea of how it is possible to infer
## the bit field of an exponent by measuring the time it takes to carry
## out the one of the key steps in the modular exponentiation algorithm.
import time
#
## This is our basic script for modular exponentiation. See Section 12.5.1 of
## Lecture 12:
def modular_exponentiate(A, B, modulus): #(1)
    time_trace = [] #(2)
    result = 1 #(3)
    while B > 0: #(4)
        start = time.time() #(5)
        if B & 1: #(6)
            result = ( result * A ) % modulus #(7)
        elapsed = time.time() - start #(8)
        time_trace.append(elapsed) #(9)
        B = B >> 1 #(10)
        A = ( A * A ) % modulus #(11)
    return result, time_trace #(12)

## Since a single experiment does not yield reliable measurements of the time
## taken by a computational step, this function helps us carry out repeated
## experiments:
```
def repeated_time_measurements(A, B, modulus, how_many_times):
    list_of_time_traces = []
    results = []
    for i in range(how_many_times):
        result, timetrace = modular_exponentiate(A, B, modulus)
        list_of_time_traces.append(timetrace)
        results.append(result)

    # Also return 'results' for debugging, etc.
    return list_of_time_traces, results

A = 123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890
B = 0b1111110101001001
modulus = 987654321
num_iterations = 1000

list_of_time_traces, results = repeated_time_measurements(A, B, modulus, num_iterations)

sums = [sum(e) for e in zip(*list_of_time_traces)]
averages = [x/num_iterations for x in sums]
print "\ntimings: ", averages
minval, maxval = min(averages), max(averages)
threshold = (maxval - minval) / 2
bitstring = ''
for item in averages:
    if item > threshold:
        bitstring += '1'
    else:
        bitstring += '0'
print "\nbitstring for B constructed from timings: ", bitstring

• If you run the Python script as shown above, it outputs the bit string:

1111110101001001

which is the same as the bit pattern for the exponent in line (22). You can run the same experiment with other choices for the exponent $B$ in line (22). For example, if I change that line to $B = 0b1100110101110101$, the answer returned by the script is 1100110101110101, and so on.
• This establishes that, *despite the inherently noisy nature of time measurements*, you can figure out the value of the exponent in a modular exponentiation required for a cryptographic calculation just by measuring how long it takes to execute one of the key steps of the algorithm.

• That it may be possible to mount the timing attack on a cryptographic routine was first conjectured by Paul Kocher in 1996 in a paper entitled “Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems,” that appeared in CRYPTO’96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1355.

• Keeping these considerations in mind, the next subsection demonstrates the basic elements of a Timing Attack with the help of a Python script.
32.7.1: A Python Script That Demonstrates How To Use Code Execution Time for Mounting a Timing Attack

• Let’s now talk about how to actually mount a timing attack using the times required for fully computing the RSA signatures for a collection of randomly constructed messages. In other words, we will no longer assume that we can measure the times taken by the individual steps of the modular exponentiation algorithm.

• As matters stand today, for a serious attempt at mounting a timing attack, we will need to implement it in a way that is described in the paper “A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack” by Jean-Francois Dhem, Francois Koeune, Philippe-Alexandre Leroux, Patrick Mestre, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, and Jean-Louis Willems that appeared in the Proceedings of the International Conference on Smart Cards and Applications, 1998, pp. 167-182. [This is a probabilistic approach that entails: (1) scanning the bit positions in an encryption key from right to left; (2) forming two hypotheses at each bit position, one for the bit being 0 and the other for the bit being 1; (3) Finding probabilistic support for each hypothesis taking into account the bits discovered so far, and the difference between the sizes of the message populations under the two hypotheses (membership in the populations takes into account the fact that the hypothesis that calls for the bit to be 1 would entail a slightly longer computation).] Using this approach, the authors were able to break a 512-bit key in a few minutes using 300,000 timing measurements.
• My goal in this section is not to replicate the work described in the publication cited above. On the other hand, all I want to show is that there exist correlations between the time measurements for modular exponentiation for a collection of randomly constructed messages and the times measured for the same exponentiations under the hypothesis that a particular bit in the exponent is 1 or 0. Further, that these correlations can be exploited to make guesses for the individual bits of the exponent.

• In order to frame the problem that the Python script in this section tries to solve with a toy implementation, let’s go back to the case of a device that uses the RSA algorithm to digitally sign the outgoing messages. As stated earlier, given a message $M$ and the private exponent $d$, this device must compute $M^d \mod n$ where $n$ is the RSA modulus. Earlier, in Section 32.6.1, we saw how the CRT step that is used to simplify the modular exponentiation can be subject to fault injection for discovering the value of the private key.

• We will now assume that we are directly computing modular exponentiation $M^d \mod n$ required for digitally signing a message $M$ with a private exponent $d$. Our goal is to discover $d$ just from the time it takes to calculate the signatures for an arbitrary collection of messages. As will always be the case, we will assume that $d$ is odd and, therefore, its least significant bit is always 1. Our goal is to discover the rest of the bits.
• The overall logic of the script is to estimate the bits of the private exponent $d$, one bit at a time, starting from its least significant bit (which, as already mentioned, is 1). The estimation is based on finding correlations between the times taken to calculate the signatures under two conditions: when the bit to be estimated can be assumed to be 0 and when it can be assumed to be 1. Under each hypothesis, the correlation is with the time measurements for the actual signature computations. We declare a value for the next bit on the basis of which correlation is larger.

• The workhorse in the script that follows is the method `find_next_bit_of_private_key()`. Its two main blocks are in lines (F9) through (F25) and in lines (F33) through (F46). In the first block, in lines (F9) through (F25), this function calculates the correlation for the case when we assume 0 for the next bit position in the private exponent $d$. In the second block, in lines (F33) through (F46), we calculate a similar correlation for the case when we assume the next bit to be 1. The two correlation values are compared in line (F47).

• You have to use a very large number of message integers for the attack to work to any extent at all. As you will notice from the constructor call in lines (A1) through (A6), my own experiments with this script typically involve 100,000 message integers.

• You might think that in the multiple runs of the overall attack in lines (A9) through (A25), we could speed up the overall time
taken by the script by placing the call that generates the very large number of messages in line (A11) outside the loop. Note that the time taken to generate 100,000 messages is a very small fraction of the time taken by the modular exponentiation of those messages through the code in lines (X1) through (X11).

- The dictionary bound to the instance variable `correlations_cache` in line (J15) is used in `find_next_bit_of_private_key()` in lines (F8) and (F30). This dictionary helps avoid duplicating the correlation calculations for the same value of the private exponent.

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
## TimingAttack.py
## Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
## April 13, 2015
##
## This script demonstrates the basic idea of how the Timing Attack can be used to infer the bits of the private exponent used in calculating RSA based digital signatures.
##
## CAVEATS: This simple implementation is based on one possible interpretation of the original paper on timing attacks by Paul Kocher. Note that this implementation has only been tried on 8-bit moduli.
##
## I am quite certain that this extremely simpleminded implementation will NOT to work on RSA moduli of the size that are actually used in working algorithms.
##
## For a more credible timing attack, you would need to include in this implementation the probabilistic logic described in the paper "A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack" by Dhem, Koeune, Leroux, Mestre, Quisquater, and Willems.

import time
import random
import math
```
class TimingAttack( object ):  #(I1)
    def __init__( self, **kwargs ):  # (J2)
        if kwargs.has_key('num_messages'): num_messages = kwargs.pop('num_messages')  # (J3)
        if kwargs.has_key('num_trials'): num_trials = kwargs.pop('num_trials')  # (J3)
        if kwargs.has_key('private_exponent'): private_exponent = kwargs.pop('private_exponent')  # (J4)
        if kwargs.has_key('modulus_width'): modulus_width = kwargs.pop('modulus_width')  # (J5)
        self.num_messages = num_messages  # (J6)
        self.num_trials = num_trials  # (J7)
        self.modulus_width = modulus_width  # (J8)
        self.d = private_exponent  # (J9)
        self.d_reversed = '{:b}'.format(private_exponent)[::-1]  # (J10)
        self.modulus = None  # (J11)
        self.list_of_messages = []  # (J12)
        self.times_taken_for_messages = []  # (J13)
        self.bits_discovered_for_d = []  # (J14)
        self.correlations_cache = {}  # (J15)

    def gen_modulus(self):  # (G1)
        modulus = self.gen_random_num_of_specified_width(self.modulus_width/2) * \  # (G2)
                  self.gen_random_num_of_specified_width(self.modulus_width/2)  # (G3)
        print "modulus is: ", modulus  # (G4)
        self.modulus = modulus  # (G5)
        return modulus

    def gen_random_num_of_specified_width(self, width):  # (R1)
        'This function generates a random number of specified bit field width:'  # (R2)
        candidate = random.getrandbits(width)  # (R3)
        if candidate & 1 == 0: candidate += 1  # (R4)
        candidate |= (1 << width - 1)  # (R5)
        candidate |= (2 << width - 3)  # (R6)
        return candidate

    def modular_exponentiate(self, A, B):  # (X1)
        'This is our basic function for modular exponentiation as explained in  
        Section 12.5.1 of Lecture 12:'  # (X2)
        if self.modulus is None:  # (X3)
            raise SyntaxError("You must first set the modulus")  # (X4)
        time_trace = []  # (X5)
        result = 1  # (X6)
        while B > 0:  # (X7)
            if B & 1:  # (X8)
                result = ( result * A ) % self.modulus  # (X9)
            B = B >> 1  # (X10)
            A = ( A * A ) % self.modulus  # (X11)
        return result  

def correlate(self, series1, series2):  # (C1)

if len(series1) != len(series2): # (C2)
    raise ValueError(“the two series must be of the same length”) # (C3)
mean1, mean2 = sum(series1)/float(len(series1)),sum(series2)/float(len(series2)) # (C4)
mseries1, mseries2 = [x - mean1 for x in series1], [x - mean2 for x in series2] # (C5)
products = [mseries1[i] * mseries2[i] for i in range(len(mseries1))] # (C6)
mseries1_squared, mseries2_squared = [x**2 for x in mseries1], [x**2 for x in mseries2] # (C7)
correlation = sum(products) / math.sqrt(sum(mseries1_squared) * sum(mseries2_squared)) # (C8)
return correlation # (C9)

def gen_messages(self): # (M1)
    '''
    Generate a list of randomly created messages. The messages must obey the usual
    constraints on the two most significant bits:
    '''
    self.correlations_cache = {} # (M2)
    self.times_taken_for_messages = [] # (M3)
    self.list_of_messages = [] # (M4)
    for i in range(self.num_messages): # (M5)
        message = self.gen_random_num_of_specified_width(self.modulus_width) # (M6)
        self.list_of_messages.append(message) # (M7)
    print “Finished generating %d messages” % (self.num_messages) # (M8)

def get_exponentiation_times_for_messages(self): # (T1)
    '''
    For each message in list_of_messages, find the time it takesto calculate its
    signature. Average each time measurement over num_trials:
    '''
    if self.modulus is None: # (T2)
        raise SyntaxError(“You must first set the modulus”) # (T3)
    for message in self.list_of_messages: # (T4)
        times = [] # (T5)
        for j in range(self.num_trials): # (T6)
            start = time.time() # (T7)
            self.modular_exponentiate(message, self.d) # (T8)
            elapsed = time.time() - start # (T9)
            times.append(elapsed) # (T10)
        avg = sum(times) / float(len(times)) # (T11)
        self.times_taken_for_messages.append(avg) # (T12)
    print “Finished calculating signatures for all messages” # (T13)

def find_next_bit_of_private_key(self, list_of_previous_bits): # (F1)
    '''
    Starting with the LSB, given a sequence of previously computed bits of the
    private exponent d, now compute the next bit:
    '''
    num_set_bits = reduce(lambda x,y: x+y, 
                           filter(lambda x: x == 1, list_of_previous_bits)) # (F2)
    correlation0,correlation1 = None,None # (F3)
    arg_list1, arg_list2 = list_of_previous_bits[:], list_of_previous_bits[:] # (F4)
    B = int(‘’.join(map(str, list(reversed(arg_list1)))), 2) # (F5)
    print “\nB = “, B # (F6)
    if B in self.correlations_cache: # (F7)
        correlation0 = self.correlations_cache[B] # (F8)
else:

times_for_partial_exponentiation = []
for message in self.list_of_messages:
signature = None
times = []
for j in range(self.num_trials):
    start = time.time()
    self.modular_exponentiate(message, B)
elapsed = time.time() - start
times.append(elapsed)
avg = sum(times) / float(len(times))
times_for_partial_exponentiation.append(avg)
correlation0 = self.correlate(self.times_taken_for_messages, \
times_for_partial_exponentiation)
correlation0 /= num_set_bits
self.correlations_cache[B] = correlation0

print "correlation0: ", correlation0
# Now let's see the correlation when we try 1 for the next bit
arg_list2.append(1)
B = int(''.join(map(str, list(reversed(arg_list2)))), 2)
print "B = ", B
if B in self.correlations_cache:
correlation1 = self.correlations_cache[B]
else:

times_for_partial_exponentiation = []
for message in self.list_of_messages:
signature = None
times = []
for j in range(self.num_trials):
    start = time.time()
    self.modular_exponentiate(message, B)
elapsed = time.time() - start
times.append(elapsed)
avg = sum(times) / float(len(times))
times_for_partial_exponentiation.append(avg)
correlation1 = self.correlate(self.times_taken_for_messages, \
times_for_partial_exponentiation)
correlation1 /= (num_set_bits + 1)
self.correlations_cache[B] = correlation1
print "correlation1: ", correlation1
if correlation1 > correlation0:
    return 1
else:
    return 0

def discover_private_exponent_bits(self):
    
    Assume that the private exponent will always be odd and that, therefore, its
    LSB will always be 1. Now try to discover the other bits.
    
    discovered_bits = [1]
    for bitpos in range(1, self.modulus_width):
        nextbit = self.find_next_bit_of_private_key(discovered_bits)
        print "value of next bit: ", nextbit
        print "its value should be: ", self.d_reversed[bitpos]
if nextbit != int(self.d_reversed[bitpos]): # (D7)
    raise ValueError("Wrong result for bit at index \%d" % bitpos) # (D8)
discovered_bits.append(nextbit) # (D9)
print "discovered bits: ", discovered_bits # (D10)
self.bits_discovered_for_d = discovered_bits # (D11)
return discovered_bits # (D12)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    private_exponent = 0b11001011
    timing_attack = TimingAttack(# (A1)
        num_messages = 100000, # (A2)
        num_trials = 1000, # (A3)
        modulus_width = 8, # (A4)
        private_exponent = private_exponent, # (A5)
    )
    modulus_to_discovered_bits = {} # (A6)
    for i in range(10): # (A7)
        print "
        ================Starting run %d of the overall experiment===============\n" % i # (A8)
        discovered_bits = [] # (A9)
        timing_attack.gen_messages() # (A10)
        modulus = timing_attack.gen_modulus() # (A11)
        timing_attack.get_exponentiation_times_for_messages() # (A12)
        try: # (A13)
            discovered_bits = timing_attack.discover_private_exponent_bits() # (A14)
        except ValueError, e: # (A15)
            print "exception caught in main:" , e # (A16)
            e = str(e).strip() # (A17)
            if e[-1].isdigit(): # (A18)
                pos = int(e.split()[-1]) # (A19)
                print "\n        Got %d bits!!" % pos # (A20)
                continue # (A21)
        if discovered_bits: # (A22)
            modulus_to_discovered_bits[i] = 
                (modulus, ",".join(map(str, list(reversed(discovered_bits))))) # (A23)
            print "\nSUCCESS!!!!!!!" # (A24)

• Shown below is the output from one session with the code shown above. Note that, even for the same modulus, your results will vary from one run to another since the messages are generated randomly for each run.

• In the 10 runs of the code whose output is shown below, three of the runs managed to discover correctly six of the eight bits of
the exponent \(d\). Every once in a long while, you will see that the entire exponent is estimated correctly by the code.

==========Starting run 0 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

\[ B = 1 \]
\[ \text{correlation0: } 0.00535503170757 \]
\[ B = 3 \]
\[ \text{correlation1: } 0.11955357822 \]
\[ \text{value of next bit: } 1 \]
\[ \text{its value should be: } 1 \]
\[ \text{discovered bits: } [1, 1] \]

\[ B = 3 \]
\[ \text{correlation0: } 0.11955357822 \]
\[ B = 7 \]
\[ \text{correlation1: } 0.146688433404 \]
\[ \text{value of next bit: } 1 \]
\[ \text{its value should be: } 0 \]
\[ \text{exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 2} \]

Got 2 bits!!

==========Starting run 1 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

\[ B = 1 \]
\[ \text{correlation0: } 0.00658805175542 \]
\[ B = 3 \]
\[ \text{correlation1: } 0.144786607015 \]
\[ \text{value of next bit: } 1 \]
\[ \text{its value should be: } 1 \]
\[ \text{discovered bits: } [1, 1] \]

\[ B = 3 \]
\[ \text{correlation0: } 0.144786607015 \]
\[ B = 7 \]
\[ \text{correlation1: } 0.191148434475 \]
\[ \text{value of next bit: } 1 \]
\[ \text{its value should be: } 0 \]
\[ \text{exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 2} \]

Got 2 bits!!!
Starting run 2 of the overall experiment

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
   correlation0: 0.0111837174243

B = 3
   correlation1: 0.146686335386
   value of next bit: 1
   its value should be: 1
   discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
   correlation0: 0.146686335386

B = 7
   correlation1: 0.0666330591075
   value of next bit: 0
   its value should be: 0
   discovered bits: [1, 1, 0]

B = 3
   correlation0: 0.146686335386

B = 11
   correlation1: 0.166780797308
   value of next bit: 1
   its value should be: 1
   discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1]

B = 11
   correlation0: 0.166780797308

B = 27
   correlation1: 0.143863234986
   value of next bit: 0
   its value should be: 0
   discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0]

B = 11
   correlation0: 0.166780797308

B = 43
   correlation1: 0.161661497094
   value of next bit: 0
   its value should be: 0
   discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]

B = 11
   correlation0: 0.166780797308

B = 75
   correlation1: 0.140458705926
   value of next bit: 0
   its value should be: 1
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 6
Got 6 bits!!!

==========Starting run 3 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 225
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.0069115683713
B = 3
correlation1: 0.351567105915
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.351567105915
B = 7
correlation1: 0.268789028694
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.351567105915
B = 11
correlation1: 0.285057307844
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 1
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 3

Got 3 bits!!!

==========Starting run 4 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.0024184358209
B = 3
correlation1: 0.186079682903
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.186079682903
B = 7
correlation1: 0.204226222605
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 0
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 2

Got 2 bits!!!

============Starting run 5 of the overall experiment=============

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 169
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.0184536640473
B = 3
correlation1: 0.217174073139
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.217174073139
B = 7
correlation1: 0.20723379241
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.217174073139
B = 11
correlation1: 0.241820663832
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1]

B = 11
correlation0: 0.241820663832
B = 27
correlation1: 0.192410585206
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0]

B = 11
correlation0: 0.241820663832
B = 43
correlation1: 0.189418029495
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]

B = 11
correlation0: 0.241820663832
B = 75
correlation1: 0.175041915625
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 1
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 6

    Got 6 bits!!!

==========Starting run 6 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.00865525117668
B = 3
correlation1: 0.177818285803
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.177818285803
B = 7
correlation1: 0.194471520198
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 0
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 2

    Got 2 bits!!!

==========Starting run 7 of the overall experiment==========

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 225
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.000834328683801
B = 3
correlation1: 0.29649299753
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.29649299753
B = 7
correlation1: 0.268359146286
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0]
B = 3
correlation0: 0.296449299753
B = 11
correlation1: 0.200498385434
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 1
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 3

Got 3 bits!!!

=============Starting run 8 of the overall experiment============= 

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 195
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: 0.009350807053
B = 3
correlation1: 0.10085277594
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.10085277594
B = 7
correlation1: 0.123326809251
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 0
exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 2

Got 2 bits!!!

=============Starting run 9 of the overall experiment============= 

Finished generating 100000 messages
modulus is: 225
Finished calculating signatures for all messages

B = 1
correlation0: -0.00389727670499
B = 3
correlation1: 0.251815183197
value of next bit: 1
its value should be: 1
discovered bits: [1, 1]

B = 3
correlation0: 0.251815183197
B = 7
correlation1: 0.224629240235
value of next bit: 0
its value should be: 0
discovered bits: [1, 1, 0]

B = 3
  correlation0: 0.251815183197
  B = 11
  correlation1: 0.253504735599
  value of next bit: 1
  its value should be: 1
  discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1]

B = 11
  correlation0: 0.253504735599
  B = 27
  correlation1: 0.205049470386
  value of next bit: 0
  its value should be: 0
  discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0]

B = 11
  correlation0: 0.253504735599
  B = 43
  correlation1: 0.186280401626
  value of next bit: 0
  its value should be: 0
  discovered bits: [1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0]

B = 11
  correlation0: 0.253504735599
  B = 75
  correlation1: 0.195741658334
  value of next bit: 0
  its value should be: 1
  exception caught in main: Wrong result for bit at index 6

Got 6 bits!!!
32.8: USB MEMORY STICKS AS A SOURCE OF DEADLY MALWARE

- Who could have imagined that the innocuous looking USB memory sticks would become be a potential source of deadly malware! That this is indeed the case was demonstrated very convincingly by Karsten Nohl and Jacob Lell at the 2014 Black Hat conference:


This exploit was named BadUSB by its discoverers. It is estimated that roughly half the USB devices out there are vulnerable to the BadUSB exploit.

- If you do read the Nohl and Lell paper mentioned above, you owe it your yourself to also go through the following report by Stephanie Blanchet Hoareau, Erwan Le Disez, David Boucher, and Benoit Poulo-Cazajou:


One of the things I enjoyed about this well-written report is the historical context it provides for the BadUSB exploit. It was through this report I found out that, back in 2011, Angelos Stavrou and Zhaohui Wang gave a talk in that year’s Black Hat conference that was entitled “Exploiting Smart-Phone USB
Connectivity For Fun And Profit,” in which they showed how an Android phone connected to a computer as a USB device could be emulated to act like a keyboard in order to inject hostile commands into the host.

• It is important to realize that BadUSB is not about any malware files in the flash memory of a USB stick. [It is possible to detect those by anti-virus software and, in the worst case, you can always just reformat a memory stick to get rid of any suspected malware that resides in the flash memory of the stick.] BadUSB is about malware threats that reside in the microcontroller firmware that controls how the device operates. The current tools for detecting malware are unable to identify these firmware based threats. One can make the argument that the very nature of this malware is such that it will not lend itself to detection by virus scanning tools, present or future. See the end of this section for this argument. [BadUSB is also not about the “USB Propagation Mode” for malware that was described in Lecture 22. As the reader will recall, if a Windows machine has “AutoRun” enabled, a file named autorun.inf in the USB device would be automatically executed when the device is plugged into the computer. An infected copy of this file in the device can infect a computer with the malware.]

• Karsten Nohl and Jacob Lell chose to not make public the software for their exploit. That talk was followed by a presentation entitled “Making BadUSB Work For You” at the Derbycon 2014 conference by Adam Caudill and Brandon Wilson where they showed that they had successfully developed their own implementation of the BadUSB exploit. They have made their code available on GitHub.
• Now that the cat is out of the bag and people have started posting code on the web that makes this exploit possible, you may want to exercise greater caution when you stick your memory stick in other people’s computers or stick other people’s memory sticks in your own. [When in a hotel, who hasn’t downloaded the boarding passes from an airline website into a personal memory stick and taken the stick over to a hotel computer for printing them out! In light of the BadUSB exploit, you may never want to do that again. (In the future, you may just want to download the boarding pass into your smartphone directly). With all and sundry plugging their memory sticks into that hotel computer in the lobby, there is always the possibility that, intentionally or unintentionally, someone may use the BadUSB exploit to plant malware on that computer. Just imagine the consequence that after your own memory stick has become infected in this manner, you plug it into your own computer!]

• To understand the BadUSB exploit, it’s best to revisit the main reason the USB standard was created back in the mid 1990’s. What prompted the development of this standard was the ever increasing choice of peripherals that people could connect with their computers: keyboard, mouse, webcam, music player, external drive, and so on. It was felt that if a single connector type could be devised for all such peripherals, that would considerably simplify the hardware support that would need to be incorporated in a computer for the data transfer connections with the different peripherals. [The USB standard has fulfilled that goal. The acronym USB stands for "Universal Serial Bus". One reason for the popularity of USB for connecting portable devices to a computer is that you can connect and disconnect the devices without having to reboot the host computer. That is, USB devices tend to be hot-swappable.]

• Considering that so many different types of devices can present
themselves to your computer through a USB connection, haven’t you wondered as to how is it that a computer can tell the difference between, say, a keyboard and a thumb drive if they both present themselves to your computer through the same hardware port?

- When you insert a USB device in your computer, the very first thing the OS in your computer does is to determine what “USB class” the device belongs to. The USB standard defines a large number of classes (over 20), some of the most commonly used being:

  **Human Interface Device (HID)**: USB devices that belong to this class are used for connecting pointing devices (computer mouse, joystick), keypads, keyboards, etc.

  **Image**: USB devices that belong to this category are used for connecting webcam, scanner, etc., to a computer.

  **Printer**: As you might guess from its name, USB devices that fall in this class are used to connect different types of printers to a computer.

  **Mass Storage (MSC)**: USB devices that belong to this class are used for flash memory drives, digital audio players, cameras, etc. [As you might have guessed already, the acronym MSC stands for "Mass Storage Class". Another name for this class is UMS for "USB Mass Storage"][1]

  **USB Hub**: Such a device is used to expand a single USB port into several others. [Some of the lightest laptops come with only a single USB port. If you wanted to connect multiple devices to such a laptop, you need a USB Hub. Also, when a machine does possess multiple USB ports, it is usually an internally built single USB Hub that is expanded into multiple ports you see on the outside of your laptop (rather than having independent USB circuitry for each separate port).]
**Smart Card**: These types of USB devices can be used to read smartcards.

and several others

- Each of the USB device classes is given a numerical code in the USB standard. For example, the numerical code associated with the HID class is 0x03, the code associated with the MSC class 0x08.

- As mentioned earlier, as soon as the OS on a host computer has detected a USB device, it queries the USB device for the class the device belongs to. The USB device responds back with the numerical code of the class. The OS then loads the software driver appropriate to that device class. [Subsequently, all communications between the host computer and the USB device is in the form of packets. The first byte of each packet is the packet identifier byte, which declares the purpose of the packet. For example, a packet may be a handshaking packet, or a data bearing packet, or perhaps an error or a status message packet, etc.]

- Assuming the USB device is of class MSC, the software driver in the host computer then interacts with the firmware in the microcontroller in the USB device for transferring data between the host computer and the flash memory in the USB memory stick. [A microcontroller is just a small inexpensive single-chip computer, with its own CPU, RAM, and I/O, that, for USB devices, is powered by the current drawn through the USB port from the host computer. And the firmware consists of program stored in an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Read Only Memory) that is executed in the CPU of the microcontroller.]
• The ”mini-review” of USB devices presented so far describes how such devices work under normal conditions. Let’s now consider the following aspect of the firmware that sits in the microcontrollers of such devices that can turn a memory stick into a dangerous source of malware.

• To allow for bug fixes to be carried out in the firmware in a USB microcontroller and to also allow for the firmware to be upgraded, the USB manufacturers permit third-party tools to alter their firmware. In fact, you can download a manufacturer-consortium supported open-source tool called ”USB Device Firmware Upgrade tool” for this purpose from

https://admin.fedoraproject.org/pkgdb/package/dfu-util/

This is a vendor- and device-independent Device Firmware Upgrade (DFU) tool for upgrading the firmware in the USB devices. You can use this tool to both download the firmware currently in the USB device and to upload to the device a new version of the firmware.

• The fact that one can replace the manufacturer’s firmware in the microcontroller of a USB opens it up to exploits for spreading malware infection. Here is how that can happen: You take a memory stick (that would normally belong to the class MCS) and you alter its firmware so that, upon being inserted into a host computer, it reports to the OS that its class is HID. That would allow the USB stick to act as a keyboard vis-a-vis the host
computer it is connected to. Any keystrokes sent by the USB masquerading as a keyboard could be for executing commands that install malware from remote sites. The commands executed in this manner could also install malware that would be permanently stored in the host and installed in all USBs memory sticks that are plugged into the host in the future.

- What makes this exploit particularly dangerous is that it is undetectable by any virus scanning tools. These tools are not meant for examining the firmware in the peripheral devices connected to a computer.

- Obviously, your first reaction to the state of affairs described in the previous bullet is likely to be: Why not augment the virus scanning tools to also look at the firmware in the peripheral devices connected to a host? You might think of a scanning tool that is placed at the disposal of the OS so that when the OS first detects a USB devices, it makes a point of examining the firmware before allowing any data exchange with the device. However there is a problem with that scenario: How would this tool distinguish between a USB that belongs legitimately to the HID class and the devices that are masquerading as belonging to the same?
32.9: MOBILE IP

• Let’s say you are at home and you want to use your smartphone to send a text message to your friend who lives in the same town as you, but who at the moment happens to be enjoying a local brew in a Starbucks in a far-away country. Let’s assume that your friend’s smartphone is connected to that Starbucks’s WiFi.

• The fact that your text message will reach your friend’s smartphone regardless of where exactly he/she is on the face of the earth is pretty amazing. Haven’t you ever wondered how is it that the cell phone operator at your end of the communication link knows how to route your packets to your friend’s phone regardless of the location of that phone? [The communication problem involved here is more complex than you might think. In the old days, when all telephones had fixed numbers, a telephone exchange at the source end of a communication link could immediately figure out how to route a phone call just by examining the country code, the area code, etc., associated with a dialed number. But that obviously does not apply to modern cell-phone based communications. You might think that a smartphone currently connected to the internet in some remote country has an IP address assigned to it by the ISP in that remote location. (That would certainly be the case for a non-mobile device like a laptop.) If that is indeed the case, how would be network at the source end know how to route the packets to the remote phone if it is the source that is initiating the connection?]
• The answer to the question posed above lies in the concept of what is known as **IP Mobility Support** as defined in RFC 5944. What RFC 5944 spells out is also informally referred to as **Mobile IP**.

• According to the RFC 5944 standard, every mobile “node” in a network is **always** identified by its **home IP address**, regardless of the current location of the node. When away from home, a mobile node also has another IP address associated with it; this second IP address is known as **care-of IP address**. [Think of the home IP address as the permanent identifier for a smartphone. When a smartphone is away from its home network, it needs both IP addresses, the home IP address and the care-of IP address, to operate according to RFC 5944.]

• Whereas a mobile node is uniquely identified by its **home IP address**, the **care-of IP address**, when it exists, is the mobile node’s current **point-of-attachment** with the internet.

• Informally speaking, the cell phone operator where the home IP address for a mobile node is registered is referred to as the **home agent** in RFC 5944. And the cell phone operator at the mobile node’s current point of attachment is known as the node’s **foreign agent**. [For the official definitions: **Home Agent**: A router on a mobile node’s home network that tunnels datagrams for delivery to the mobile node when it is away from home, and maintains current location information for the mobile node. **Foreign Agent**: A router on a mobile node’s visited network that provides routing services to the mobile node while registered. The foreign agent detunnels and delivers to the mobile node datagrams that were tunneled by the mobile node’s home agent. For]
datagrams sent by a mobile node, the foreign agent may serve as a default router for registered mobile nodes.

- Regardless of the current point of attachment for a mobile node, if your smart phone wants to send packets to that mobile node, it sends the packets to the mobile node’s home agent. The home agent tunnels the packets to the mobile node’s current foreign agent, which, in turn, routes the packets to their final destination using the care-of IP address. This is illustrated by the following diagram taken from RFC 5944:

![Diagram](image)

**Operation of Mobile IPv4 (from RFC 5944)**

- In the diagram shown above, the “host” at the bottom of the diagram could be your smart phone and the “mobile node” the
smart phone of your friend at any remote location on earth where there is cell phone coverage.

- What's most interesting about the routing diagram shown above is the path taken by the packets from the remote cell phone back to your smart phone. As shown by the diagonal arrow, the return path for the packets bypasses the home agent.

- Another important point related to the return packets is that source IP address in those packets is the mobile node’s home IP address. So as far as the “host” at the bottom of the diagram is concerned, the packets it receives from the remotely located mobile node look as if the mobile node were located in its home network.

- Let’s get back to the subject of your smartphone sending packets to your friend’s smartphone that is currently at a remote location. The data coming off your smartphone will look no different from when your friend phone is plugged into the home network. It is the job of the router in the home network to tunnel the packets coming off your phone to the router at the current point of attachment of your friend’s phone. Tunneling means that the home router places the packets coming off your smartphone in the data payload of the packets sent to the router where your friend’s smartphone is currently located. That router detunnels the packets and sends them to your friend’s smartphone.