# Spam Detection in Voice-over-IP Calls through Semi-Supervised Clustering

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
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## Voice-over-IP (VoIP) Overview

- Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) or H.323 for signaling
- Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) for media
- Media flow happens after a successful call setup, which is achieved through signaling
- Real-time Transport Protocol (RTCP) for feedback
- Other supporting protocols: DNS, DHCP, ICMP







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- 2. Challenges in VoIP Spam Detection
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- 5. Efficient Clustering for Spam Detection: e-MPCK-Means, p-MPCK-Means
- 6. Call Trace and Experiments
- 7. Conclusions





#### **Spam Calls in VoIP Systems**

- SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT)
- Unsolicited and unwanted phone calls from (malicious) parties
  - Telemarketing calls
  - Harassing calls
  - Survey / polling calls
- Why is this a growing phenomenon?
  - VoIP calls are cheap to make
  - SPIT is very easy to automate
- Comparison with e-mail spam:
  - Motives and impacts are analogous
  - But, more disruptively, a VoIP spam intrudes in real-time



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#### **Challenges for Dealing with VolP Spam**

- A spam call in many ways appears like a normal (non-SPIT) call
  - Both follow the same protocols (SIP, H.323, RTP, RTCP)
  - No malformed packets
  - No exploitation of protocol vulnerabilities
  - Existing NIDS systems (Snort, SciDive<sup>[1]</sup>,...) do not apply
- VoIP is a real-time system
  - Before you pick up the call, can you tell if it's going to be a spam call?

[1] Y-S. Wu, S. Bagchi, S. Garg, N. Singh, T. Tsai, "SCIDIVE: A Stateful and Cross Protocol Intrusion Detection Architecture for Voice-over-IP Environments," DSN 05, pp. 401-410.





### **Challenges for Dealing with VoIP Spam**

- VoIP system is a dynamic environment
  - Call duration, call frequency, the words you say, ... can all be changing from one deployment to another
  - Different persons have different perspectives on what constitute a spit call
    - Some might be interested in buying merchandise from telemarketers while they do dislike other harassing phone calls.
  - Therefore, fixed threshold-based rules for detection are not suitable for filtering spam calls



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#### Contribution

- Identify features from a VoIP call for spam detection
- Clustering of VoIP calls to identify spam calls
- Use of user-feedback and semi-supervised clustering technique to differentiate between spam and legitimate calls
- Adapting the original MPCK-Means<sup>[2]</sup> algorithm into:
  - eMPCK-Means : A O(N) algorithm for clustering a batch of VoIP calls
  - pMPCK-Means : A real-time algorithm for detecting VoIP spam

[2] M. Bilenko, S. Basu, and R. J. Mooney, "Integrating constraints and metric learning in semi-supervised clustering," in *ICML*, 2004, pp. 81-88.







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


#### **Basic Clustering**

- Objective: Cluster calls into legitimate and spam calls
- Classic K-Means clustering

$$\sum_{j=1}^{K} \sum_{x_i \in X_j} \|x_i - \mu_i\|^2 \quad \text{is minimized}$$

- Objective function puts weight on each feature evenly
- However, there may be only a few call features that can distinguish between the different clusters
- Putting equal weight on all the selected features can drown out the influence of these distinguishing features





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**Semi-supervised clustering** 

- MPCK-Means
  - Distance from centroids (reweighted by *A* matrix)
  - Cost from violating must-link constraints (pairs of data points which should be put in the same cluster)
- Cost from violating cannot-link constraints (pairs of data points which should be put in different clusters)



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#### How to Update A matrix

• The A matrix  $A_h$  for cluster h is acquired by solving

$$\frac{\partial \tau_{\text{mpckm}}}{\partial A_h} = 0$$

- Covariance of data points in cluster h
- Cost from violating must-link constraints related to cluster h
- Cost from violating cannot-link constraints related to cluster h
- $\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A}_{h} &= \left| X_{h} \right| \left( \sum_{x_{i} \in X_{h}} (x_{i} \mu_{h}) (x_{i} \mu_{h})^{T} \\ &+ \sum_{\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right) \in M_{h}} \frac{1}{2} w_{ij} \left(x_{i} x_{j}\right) \left(x_{i} x_{j}\right)^{T} \mathbf{1} \left[ l_{i} \neq l_{j} \right] \\ &+ \sum_{\left(x_{i}, x_{j}\right) \in C_{h}} \left( \overline{w_{ij}} \left(x_{h}^{'} x_{h}^{"}\right) \left(x_{h}^{'} x_{h}^{"}\right)^{T} \\ &- \left(x_{i} x_{j}\right) \left(x_{i} x_{j}\right)^{T} \mathbf{1} \left[ l_{i} = l_{j} \right] \right) \right)^{-1} \end{aligned}$



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#### **Outline**

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#### **Our Contribution: eMPCK-Means**

- Batch mode of operation
- Improvement in runtime:
  - A O(N) approximation version of MPCK-Means
    - MPCK-Means is  $O(N^3)$
  - -O(N) complexity cluster initialization
    - Skip the pair-wise constraints  $=> O(N^2)$
    - Use the set of flagged spam calls, flagged legitimate calls, and the set of the rest of calls directly for cluster initialization
  - Efficient estimation of maximally separated points
    - Embed the estimation in the distance calculation
  - Use a constant number of constraints in cluster assignment step
    - Experiment results from [2] suggest that MPCK-Means can work reasonably well with only a few constraints



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#### **Our Contribution: eMPCK-Means**

- Improvement in clustering quality:
  - Pre metrics update on the starting cluster(s)
    - Update A matrix once before entering the main-loop of MPCK-Means
    - Results in an initial A matrix which reflects the user feedback information better
    - In comparison, an identity matrix is used as the initial *A* matrix in MPCK-Means





#### pMPCK-Means

- For real-time spam detection: Hang up a suspect call even before media flow starts
- Only allowed to use features available at call establishment phase
  - From URI, To URI, Start time, and Time since the last call from the originator of the current call
- For most of the time, each new data point (an incoming call) only involves a cluster assignment operation
  - O(1) complexity
- Occasionally, eMPCK-Means is invoked to recondition the clustering
  - Re-compute the clusters, A matrix, etc.
  - Can be carried out in an asynchronous manner in the background



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#### eMPCK-Means (multi-class)

- With MPCK-Means, eMPCK-Means, and pMPCK-Means, we create only two clusters:
  - Cluster of spam calls and cluster of legitimate calls
  - Because user feedback only provides a binary predicate on whether a call is spam / legitimate
- eMPCK-Means (multi-class)
  - Use of expert knowledge to differentiate different types of calls
  - Split each cluster (spam or legitimate) into three sub-clusters based on call types:
    - Calls going to voice mail box
    - Calls terminated by the user immediately after the call is established
    - The remaining types of calls





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#### **Call Traces for Experiments**

Name	Legitimate Call Length	Legitimate Call Inter- arrival time	Spam Call Length	Spam Call Inter- arrival time	Total # of Legitimate Calls	Total # of Spam Calls
v4	5	30	1	2	171	212
v5	5	10	1	10	338	45
v6	5	30	1	10	289	94
v7	5	30	5	10	302	81

#### Common characteristics for spam calls:


- There are 6 spitters in the system
- ➤ 10% chance of a call being hung up by the caller
- Non-silence period in media stream is dominated by the spitter


#### Common characteristics for legitimate calls:


- ➤ There are 90 legitimate users in the system
- ➤ 60% chance of a call being hung up by the caller

















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#### Conclusion

- Propose a solution to detect VoIP spam
- Our solution is built upon semi-supervised clustering
  - Able to adapt to different environments and needs
- Come up with scalable algorithm for batch detection of VoIP spam
  - Useful and practical for service provider
- Detect VoIP spam in real-time is hard
  - pMPCK-Means is barely usable due to the limited available features during call establishment
- Future Work
  - Better real-time detection
  - Sharing signatures of spam calls across ISPs



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