

# After the Fire: How Can We Determine that the Drinking Water is Safe?

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www.PlumbingSafety.org





### **Our Focus**

**Water Safety** and Disasters

**Infrastructure Construction** and Repair Technologies

**Waste Materials and Management Solutions** 






















## Wildfire Response and Recovery Guidance for Municipalities, Public Health and Elected Officials



PURDUE

- ✓ Post-fire chemicals to test for
- ✓ Videos for emergency managers and health officials
- Guidance for private well owners
- Guidance for building owners
- ✓ Federal and state government agency resources
- ✓ FEMA mitigation guidance
- Other training resources

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### Drinking water for the U.S. population

85%: "Regulated" public drinking water systems

15%: Private drinking water well











# Public drinking water systems and their assets are vulnerable to fire.



Fires can physically and chemically damage infrastructure





### Lessons Learned from the 2017 Tubbs Fire and 2018 Camp Fire



Wildfire caused widespread drinking water distribution network contamination

Download FREE here: https://doi.org/10.1002/aws2.1183

VOCs and SVOCs present, levels can exceed hazardous waste limits (40,000 ppb benzene, etc.)

Do Not Use water order should be issued

Protect homeowners and their plumbing






### November 8, 2018 Camp Fire

Public Water Systems (% Homes Gone)	Population	Source Water	
Paradise Irrigation District (PID) (-96%)	26,032	Surface	
Del Oro Water Company (DOWC) – Paradise Pines (-38%)	11,324	Surface	
DOWC – Lime Saddle (-50%)	1,106	Surface	
DOWC – Magalia (-89%)	924	Ground	
DOWC – Stirling Bluffs (0%)	548	Surface	
DOWC – Buzztail (-34%)	106	Ground	
Foothill Solar Community	180	Ground	
Forest Ranch Mobile Home Park	25	Ground	
Forest Ranch Mutual Water Company	92	Ground	
Gran Mutual Water Company	202	Ground	
Humboldt Woodlands Mutual Water Company	75	Ground	
Meadowbrook Oaks Mobile Home Park	50	Ground	
Mountain Village Homeowners Association	40	Ground	

# Boil water advisories were issued to 40,000 people



Private wells
13,227 exist in Butte County
2,438 wells in Camp Fire area

### February 2019: 3 day visit and briefing, called us 3 months post-fire













CalOES, SWRCB, BCHD, FEMA, PID, DOWC, Town, CalFire did not understand how to proceed

< 50 water samples had been collected total

Benzene testing only; State assumed benzene was the only chemical present

Our onsite recommendations:


- Find out what's in the water (not just benzene)
- Reevaluate water use restrictions
- Isolate → Test (72hr) → Decon/replace
- Population in homes needs help, they were left to fend for themselves

#### Onsite Visit Response and Recovery Observations Presented to PID February 13, 2019

Purdue University & Manhattan College Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D., Amisha Shah, Ph.D., Juneseok Lee, Ph.D., P.E., Caitlin Proctor, Ph.D., David Yu, Ph.D. Questions: awhelton@purdue.edu

#### A. Overall

- PID has done a good job in moving towards stabilizing their infrastructure. This includes repressurizing distribution systems, identifying damaged assets, fixing breaks/leaks, flushing out contaminated water, issuing appropriate water advisories, and other activities
- The water system is still in the response phase because the system is not yet stabilized and there are many challenges to resolve: for example, how to test for contamination.
- Persons living in the disaster area have complicated the response because PID has had
  to take action to both respond to their system damage but also to requests of customers.
- A recommendation is that PID focus on completing the response and moving into recovery, but this is and will continue to be slowed by multiple demands on limited resources. For example, PID staffing has been reduced since the disaster took place and the disaster has created an enormous need for additional staffing for response and recovery.
- A critical element to moving forward in a timely manner will be clear and straight-forward recommendations from CalOES and FEMA regarding funding of response efforts.



### Damage

90%+ of their
172 mile water
distribution
system was
depressurized for
hours to weeks

100s+ of leaks










Standing homes were scattered throughout the contaminated water systems: PID Example

2 sources1 treatment plant

7 pressure zones
172 miles of buried pipe
PVC (35%)
Steel (33%)
CML (19%)
AC (10%)
Irons (6%)
1,400 fire hydrants
10,600 service lines and meters
Cu, Brass, GIP,

GSP, HDPE, PB

#### **PID Pressure Zones vs. Standing Structures**





### Water Distribution System Contamination

### 500 ppb benzene – U.S. Federal RCRA hazardous waste limit

Chemical that	2018 Camp Fire (8 months after the fire)				2017 Tubbs Fire (11 months after the fire)			
Exceeded a	PID	DOWC	Exceedance		Santa Rosa			
Drinking Water Limit	Max, ppb	Max, ppb	Exceeded Long-Term Limit?	Exceeded  Short-Term  Limit?	Max, ppb	Exceeded Long- Term Limit?	Exceeded  Short-Term  Limit?	
Benzene	>2,217	530	Yes	Yes	40,000	Yes	Yes	
Methylene chloride	45	NA	Yes	No	41	Yes	No	
Naphthalene	693	NA	Yes	Yes	6,800	Yes	Yes	
Styrene	378	NA	Yes	No	460	Yes	No	
Tert-butyl alcohol	13	NA	Yes	-	29	Yes	-	
Toluene	676	NA	Yes	No	1,130	Yes	No	
Vinyl chloride	1	NA	Yes	No	16	Yes	No	


Long-term limit for an adult for 70 years Short-term (1 day) limit for a 1 year old child


AWWA Water Science, Proctor et al. 2020 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/aws2.1183">https://doi.org/10.1002/aws2.1183</a>


### Potential PRIMARY Sources

2. Plastic thermal degradation

1. Forest biomass or structure combustion








Secondary Sources: Infrastructure

### December 2020 Study: Thermally damaged plastic pipes can be a source of water contamination





Drinking water contamination from the thermal degradation of plastics: implications for wildfire and structure fire response, AWWA Water Science

https://doi.org/10.1039/D0EW00836B

Download FREE here:

Heating new HDPE, PEX, PVC, CPVC, and PP pipes < T<sub>dea</sub> generated VOCs *and* SVOCs

Benzene generated by heating all pipes except PP

Once plastic cooled, chemicals leached into water



200-400°C	Confirmation of BTEX				Number of TICs in extract <sup>a</sup>	
	Components in Water					
Material	В	T	$\mathbf{E}$	X	Water	<i>n</i> -Hexane
Cold water pipes						
PVC	✓	✓	_	_	4	41
HDPE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	14	100
Hot and cold wate	r pipe	S				
CPVC	✓	_	_	_	3	32
PEX-a1-a	✓	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	19	123
PEX-a1-b	✓	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	16	122
PEX-a2	✓	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	22	117
PEX-b	✓	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	18	127
PEX-c1-a	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	19	133
PEX-c1-b	✓	$\checkmark$	✓	$\checkmark$	17	134
PEX-c1-EVOH	✓	$\checkmark$	✓	$\checkmark$	20	109
PP	-	$\checkmark$	_	_	6	95

Fires are often >200°C, but ground temperature can be >100°C for hrs

#### **Chemistry:**

Polymer chain scission
 Aromatization
 The role of additives
 The role of temperature
 The role of RH
 The role of  $O_2$ Partitioning after generation

Building codes <u>never</u> considered heat damaged plastic water system materials becoming a 1° or 2° source of drinking water contamination. (est. 300,000 structure fires per year - **NFPA**)









# Organic Chemical Contaminants in Water System Infrastructure Following Wildfire, ES&T Water

https://doi.org/10.1021/acsestwater.1c00401


Characterized target and nontarget VOCs and SVOCs in water from **1** contaminated service line after the Camp Fire.

PVC, PEX, and HDPE pipe heating experiments conducted

#### Results:

- PVC heating: 32 compounds
- HDPE/PEX heating: 28 compounds
- Service line: 55 compounds associated with uncontrolled burning of biomass and waste materials.


Findings support hypotheses that wildfires can contaminate drinking water systems both by thermal damage to plastic pipes and intrusion of smoke.





# Simulation of Heat Transfer Through Soil for the Investigation of Wildfire Impacts on Buried Pipelines, Fire Technology

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10694-022-01232-3







#### **Mathematical Modeling Results:**

- The upper limit temperature for pressure service of the pipelines was exceeded at depths up to 0.45 m (1.5 ft).
- The upper limit temperature will be exceeded at least 50% of the time at depths up to 0.19 m (0.6 ft).

Buried depth will impact thermal vulnerability



### FINAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATING HDPE SERVICE LINES BY FLUSHING 1. With continuous/intermittent flushing, how much water will we consume? 2. Similarly, what is the slowest rate we can flush, given a certain pipe size?

<u>PURPOSE</u>

This document is not intended to design or endorse any particular approach to high-density polyethylene (HDPE) service line decontamination of to endorse any particular decontamination goal. The purpose of this document is to illustrate the scientific and technical ability to address the two main questions regarding HDPE service line decontamination, along with important caveats regarding this information. The information in this document may help decision—makers take more informed actions regarding their site-specific needs, however, it is incumbent upon those decision-makers to establish the desired poals and operational parameters for any analysis to provide meaningful guidance.


#### SUMMARY

The decontamination goals

Water Distribution System
Decontamination


<u>Collaboration between Us & USEPA</u>

Hydraulics
Polymer Science
Environmental Engineering



Numerical modeling:
Greater than 286 days vs.
less than 64 days of
continuous water flushing
for 1-inch HDPE service line
(Haupert et al. 2019)


Science has been applied to some water distribution system testing and decontamination decisions, but more work is needed



Initial measurement concentration (C <sub>2</sub> )		oal A ove 0.5 ppb)	Goal B (only exceed 0.5 ppb after 72 hours of stagnation)		
	Continuous	Intermittent (once/72 hrs)	Continuous	Intermittent (once/72 hrs)	
100 ppb	286	312	195	240	
50 ppb	246	270	156	198	
20 ppb	195	213	104	141	
10 ppb	155	171	66	99	
5 ppb	116	129	33	60	
2 ppb	64	74	8	20	

https://engineering.purdue.edu/PlumbingSafety/opinions/Final-HDPE-Service-Line-Decontamination-2019-03-18.pdf

# Chemicals can sorb into and leach from water system materials including plumbing components



For water samples, **Stagnation Time** is needed

Before you collect a water sample you must allow the chemicals to leach out into water.

Watch the video at <a href="https://youtu.be/ythX2fP3-S4">https://youtu.be/ythX2fP3-S4</a>
How chemicals contaminate plastic pipes and drinking water










### Water safety attitudes, risk perception, experiences, and education for households impacted by the 2018 Camp Fire

Natural Hazards, Published May 2021

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04714-9

#### **Critical Public Health Issues**

- 1) Water use restrictions,
- 2) Plumbing sampling and testing,
- 3) <u>Plumbing</u> decontamination methods and validation,
- 4) Water tank selection and maintenance,
- 5) In-home treatment device selection and maintenance, and
- 6) <u>Plumbing</u> design and material selection for property repairs and new construction.



# Should in-home POU water filtration devices be used to treat wildfire contaminated drinking water?

Water Collected	Preliminary Results, ppb					
and Analyze	Benzene	Toluene	<b>Ethyl Benzene</b>	Xylene		
<b>Entering the filter</b>	713	911	87	212		
<b>Exiting the filter</b>	-					
1 L	20	15	3	4		
1.5 L	33	30	5	9		
2 L	47	46	6	11		
3 L	64	75	10	21		
3.5 L	62	75	10	20		
4 L	24	22	4	5		
4.5 L	87	98	11	21		
5 L	37	37	5	8		



In 2019, CA OEHHA concluded that short-term 26 ppb benzene exposure would prompt an increased risk of blood effects in children such as a decrease in lymphocytes and white blood cells; Benzene has a 5 ppb Federal MCL, 1 ppb CA MCL

The devices are NOT designed for this.

The range of contamination must be known + testing.



### Camp Fire: 'Standing Home' Public Health Issues

#### Citizens must be warned and protected from contaminated water

- State officials told people to SMELL (not test) water to determine if its safe
- 2 systems contaminated --- no water restrictions (max. 530 ppb benzene)
- Some Paradise customers did not follow water use restrictions
- Home testing guidance by agencies defied hydraulics and chemistry
- Labs told people to flush taps for 10-15 min BEFORE taking water sample

#### **Contaminated water entered home plumbing for 6+ months**

- Benzene found in homes by residents, State said they had no knowledge (because they didn't credibly sample)
- Utilities were still trying to identify their contaminated assets
- Checkerboard recovery: Loss of pressure (main break, leak) could move contaminated water into a standing home service line

#### Plumbing received 6+ months of contaminated water

Cold and hot water systems became nonpotable

Trunk-and-branch vs. homerun designs


In-home treatment devices (est. \$7 million)

Paying for water testing, results not representative

External water tank maintenance and microbiological growth

Some had no economic capacity to purchase bottled water, devices

<u>Insurance companies made decisions (not USEPA, State or health department)</u> about in-home treatment





Content updated on 5/14/1

WARNING: Recent testing conducted by the California State Water Board of creeks and rivers flowing from the fire affected areas on March 27th indicate elevated levels of heavy metals, including: Aluminum, Antimony, Arsenic, Cadmium, Selenium, Lead and Poly Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH's). Property owners who have private wells and also live near creeks or rivers should test for the presence of these heavy metals and PAH's in their well water. Residents in these areas should drink bottled water until well water is tested, treated and free of contamination.

How to determine well water safety

. If the casing or plumbing around the well was damaged by fire the water should be tested


### Recommended for private wells

Bacteria, heavy metals, PAHs, VOCs, SVOCs

72 hr stagnation on well

Please note, the Public Health Laboratory only tests water for bacteria. If Benzene, PAH or heavy metal testing is needed, please contact one of the other labs listed below.

 (Bacterial Only) Butte County Public Health Laboratory: (530) 891-2747 | Oleander Ave. in Chico



a Major Wildfire. ES&T Water. 2021.

In-home sampling 11 months later:
PID system (101), Del Oro system (24)
First draw, kitchen sink cold only,
12+ hr stagnation
Looked for more than benzene

2 homes: benzene found, and less than 1 ppb CA MCL

4 homes: methylene chloride exceeded USEPA 5 ppb MCL (max. 9.2 ppb)

THF found above other state limits (no CA or federal limit)

H<sub>A</sub>: Galvanized iron pipes influenced methylene chloride levels

Homes not statistically representative, homeowner service lines not tested

Hot water systems are separate, where inhalation exposure occurs, but were not tested

Testing should occur as soon as possible

Max. Benzene, ppb	Event / Location	Рор.	System	Year
221	Marshall Fire/ Colorado	20,319	City of Louisville	2021
5.1	Marshall Fire/ Colorado	300	East Boulder County Water District	2021
5.5	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	120	Whispering Pines Mobile Home Park	2020
11.3	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	362	Hiland WC -Echo Mountain	2020
1.1	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	760	Panther Creek Water District	2020
76.4	Almeda Fire/ Oregon	6,850	City of Talent	2020
44.9	Lionshead Fire/ Oregon	205	Detroit Water System	2020
1.8	CZU Lightning Complex Fire/ California	1,650	Big Basin Water Company	2020
42	CZU Lightning Complex Fire/ California	21,145	San Lorenzo Valley Water District	2020
>2,217	Camp Fire/ California	26,032	Paradise Irrigation District	2018
38.3	Camp Fire/ California	924	Del Oro Water CoMagalia	2018
8.1	Camp Fire/ California	1,106	Del Oro Water CoLime Saddle	2018
530	Camp Fire/ California	11,324	Del Oro Water CoParadise Pines	2018
40,000	Tubbs Fire/ California	175,000	City of Santa Rosa	2017

Have there been more? Probably. Testing not always conducted correctly.



Is **benzene** THE indicator of contamination?

--No

Is **BTEX** THE indicator of contamination? --No



--Probably not, untested theory

Oregon 2021: Methyl ethyl ketone (138 ppm) exceeded the USEPA 1-day drinking water health advisory in the absence of benzene

No shortcuts to chemical contamination decisions





# Water Contamination and the December 2021 Marshall Fire, Boulder County, Colorado





Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D., Caroline Jankowski, Kris Isaacson, Christian Ley, Ph.D., Myles Cook, Madeline Larsen, Deepika Solamathu

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Web: <u>www.PlumbingSafety.org</u>



2214580 RAPID: Drinking Water System Contamination Response & Recovery Following the 2021 Colorado Fires







\$\$\$





U.S. pop Boulder Co., CO

Butte Co., CA

331,893,745

330,758

208,309

\$62,843

\$127,292

\$51,566

\$217,500

\$592,000


\$49,000


32.1%

**62.1**%

26.0%







December 30, 2021

11:06 am, Fire in Boulder Co. 12:10 pm, Fire in Superior 12:50 pm, Fire in Louisville 1:00 pm, 1,000 acres

40,000+ evacuation ordered


*The 3 largest communities* 

Lafayette: 30,411

Louisville: 21,266

**Superior: 13,094** 

Source: Fischer & Wham et al. GEER. The 2021 Marshall Fire, Boulder County, CO.



6 public water systems were in the burn area

- L. Louisville
- 2. Superior
- 3. Lafayette
- 4. EBCWD
- 5. Eldorado
- S. SSMHP

# The public water systems served about 60,000 people

Public Water System (population)	Damaged/ Destroyed Properties	Water Mains, miles	Hydrants	Finished Water Storage, MG	Raw Water
Louisville (20,319)	593 of 7,339	120	1,200	7.5	Surface water
Superior (17,170)	436 of tbd	50	430	3.4	Surface water
Lafayette (28,700)	22 of 9,700	177	900	14	Surface water
EBCWD (300)	72 of 137	8	40	0.1	Lafayette
Eldorado Artesian Spring (259)	0	0	0	0	2 Wells, 1 Spring
S.S. Mobile Home Park (150)	3 of 61, wind	<1	None	None	1 Well

Louisville: VOC and SVOC contamination confirmed (benzene 221 ppb + others), decon underway


**Superior:** Smokey – ash tray drinking water odor, no VOC contamination so far, testing underway

Lafayette: No VOC contamination found (1 month stagnation, then sampled)


EBCWD: Paint thinner water odor, VOC contamination confirmed (benzene 5.1 ppb + others), decon underway



### The first 24 hours







# To expedite contamination testing, we reviewed all literature and compiled a "fire package" list of chemicals

Aceto		1
$\Lambda \wedge \Lambda + \Lambda$	nıtrı	$\sim$
ACHIO		
<i>,</i> 10010		
		_

Acetone

Acrolein

Acrylonitrile

#### Benzene

Bromochloromethane

Bromodichloromethane

**Bromoform** 

*n*-Butylbenzene

sec-Butylbenzene

tert-Butylbenzene

Carbon disulfide

Carbon tetrachloride

Chlorobenzene

Chlorodibromomethane

Chloromethane

4-Chlorotoluene

Dibromochloromethane

1,2-Dichlorobenzene

1,4-Dichlorobenzene

1,1-Dichloroethane

1,2-Dichloroethane

1,1-Dichloroethene

cis-1,2-Dichloroethene

*trans-*1,2-Dichloroethylene

1,2-Dichloropropane

**Ethanol** 

Ethylbenzene

Ethyl-tert-butyl ether (ETBE)

Iodomethane

Isopropylbenzene

Methylene chloride

Methyl ethyl ketone (MEK)

Methyl iso butyl ketone (MIBK)

Methyl-tert-butyl ether (MTBE)

**Naphthalene** 

**Styrene** 

tert-Butyl alcohol (TBA)

Tetrachloroethylene

Tetrahydrofuran (THF)

**Toluene** 

1,2,3-Trichlorobenzene

1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene

1,1,1-Trichloroethane

1,1,2-Trichloroethane

Trichloroethylene

**Trichloromethane** 

1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene

1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene

Vinyl chloride

ortho-Xylene

*meta-*Xylene

para-Xylene


NOTES: In the absence of benzene other chemicals have exceeded health-based limits; RED text indicates the chemical exceeded a short- or long-term health-based limit after a prior fire; SVOCs can also be present.





Internal leadership, exceptional staff, and requests for aide helped utilities stabilize

Helpful neighbors:
Boulder, Ft. Collins,
Erie, Westminster,
South Adams County,
Broomfield,
Longmont, more...




Technology was critical to Louisville and Superior in finding valves, isolating systems, flushing, and identifying sampling locations to restore pressure.

Each utility moved at a different pace with different challenges

1st focus: Bacteria and chlorine

Next: Fire caused VOCs

And then (some): Fire caused SVOCs





# In Louisville, CO, chemical contamination was found above short-term drinking water exposure limits in isolated, shutoff sections

Sample → Flush → Sample → Stagnate 72 hr → Sample → Repeat

Chemical	Max	>Limit?	Odor?
Benzene	221	Y	
Toluene	511		Y
Ethylbenzene	160		Y
Xylenes	5		
Styrene	1,900	Y	Y
Naphthalene	11		Y
Acrolein	24		Y

3 EPA Methods (524.2, 524.4, and 8260C) and >4 laboratories used

Locations with VOC exceedances were not returned to service until results were below health limits

Majority of samples had no detections

SVOCs were found too

Others: 1,1-DCP, 1,2,4-TMB, 1,2-Dichloroethane, 4-Chlorotoluene, Acetone, Acetonitrile, Acrylonitrile, DEHP, Carbon disulfide, Chlorobenzene, Chloromethane, IPB, MEK, MTBE, N-Butylbenzene, N-Propylbenzene




# Smoky, Ash Tray, Camp Fire Ravored Water

Superior received 300+ complaints in a day

#### Community concerns:

- ✓ Present at 1 household and not the neighbors
- ✓ Present in hot water only, not cold water
- ✓ Water heaters were contaminated
- ✓ The depressurized system sucked in chemicals
- ✓ Contamination was trapped in parts of the system

Smoke flavor after '03, '13, '16 wildfires assumed to be caused by drinking water source ash contamination.



CSU Dr. Omur-Ozbek confirmed the flavor was originating from the source water (lake) —and— in the treatment plant —and— in the water distribution system


CU Boulder Dr. Thurman, Dr. Ferrer, and Corona identified and attributed a tricarboxylic benzoic acid and a dicarboxylic benzoic acid as the "smoky flavor" agents at ppb (Ferrer et al. 2021)

They stated chemicals identified were not known to be a health risk at levels found





# For drinking water wells damaged by fire, there's no consistency on "what" chemicals to test for



BCHD (CA): Bacteria, Al, As, Cd, Pb, Sb, Se, PAH's

**CDC:** Bacteria, NO<sub>3</sub><sup>-</sup>; BTEX; local contaminants

WaDOH (WA): Coliform bacteria

**SCCHD (CA):** Coliform bacteria, turbidity, pH, conductivity, color, NO<sub>3</sub><sup>-</sup>; VOCs, SVOCs

**OHA (OR):** Coliform bacteria, As, Pb, NO<sub>3</sub><sup>-</sup>; BTEX





# No VOCs Found, but SVOCs

Contominant	W7 W7		14/12	<b>\</b>
Contaminant	(surface)	(3-4 ft)	W13	W5
Azobenzene	_	-	-	0.3
2-Nitrophenol	0.15	0.15 0.11		-
1,2,3-Trichlorobenzene	0.14 0.16		-	-
Naphthalene	0.15 0.19		-	-
2-Methylnaphthalene	0.10 0.08		-	-
1-Methylnaphthalene	0.16 0.18		-	-
2-Nitroaniline	_	0.10	-	-
Acenaphthylene	0.19	0.23	-	-
1,2-Dinitrobenzene	0.14	0.11	-	-
Fluorene	0.10	0.13	-	-
4-Nitroaniline	0.10	-	-	-
Phenanthrene	0.14	0.25	-	-
Di- <i>n</i> -butylphthalate	5.9	0.48	-	-
Fluoranthene	0.13	1.0	0.19	-
Pyrene	0.14	0.19	-	-
Bis(2-ethylhexyl)adipate	9.3	4.9	-	-
Chrysene	0.12	0.12	-	-
Bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate	3.6	3.0	-	-
Anthracene	-	-	0.11	-

## **Inorganics**


Data Description	Min	Max	Mean <u>+</u> Stdev
Wells & Cisterns – Marshall Fire (14)	12.4	105	42 <u>+</u> 26
Faucet – Marshall Fire (8)	4.2	89.3	34.8 <u>+</u> 25.1
PWS UCMR3 – Colorado (108)	0.9	1,700	20.3 <u>+</u> 54.1
PWS UCMR3 – Marshall Fire area (108)	1.6	131	25.8 <u>+</u> 23.7


### USEPA Li Screening Level: 10 ppb

Data Description	Min	Max	Mean <u>+</u> Stdev
Wells & Cisterns – Marshall Fire (14)	9.3	243	69.4 <u>+</u> 73
Faucet – Marshall Fire (8)	15.5	86.5	59.3 <u>+</u> 30.4
PWS UCMR5 – ongoing	tbd	tbd	tbd


USEPA V Screening Level: 86 ppb









- 1. Assessing well damage
- 2. Permit requirements for well repair
- 3. Water testing
- CDPHE Factsheets: Lithium and vanadium
- Testing laboratories for VOCs, SVOC, and heavy metals
- 6. Home water filtration systems
- 7. Resources for well owners
- Resources for onsite wastewater treatment system owners



We created two 1 page inspection and water testing guidance sheets for private wells and building water systems

Access here → [Click]







# Assessing damage to private wells

Addressing Contamination of Drinking Water Distribution Systems from Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) After Wildfires

After the 2017 Tubbs Fire and the 2018 Camp Fire in California, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were found in the drinking water of the impacted towns. Tests of the water revealed elevated levels of several VOCs, such as benzene, in water mains, service connections, and building fixtures. If unaddressed, VOC contamination can pose a potential health risk for consumers and result in a loss of consumer confidence.

Addressing VOC contamination can be a potentially long-term problem. Flushing is the primary method for removing VOC contamination; however, flushing may not always be effective or feasible. Infrastructure replacement is another option, but depending on the scale, can take time and be cost-prohibitive. Delays in addressing contamination can impact the return of residents to their homes and the restart of commercial businesses, significantly slowing community recovery. This factsheet examines VOC drinking water contamination from the Tubbs and Camp Fires and recommends practices to assist drinking water utilities in identifying and addressing contamination. While this information is intended for public water systems, it also may benefit private water systems and well owners.



contamination in distribution systems is an

emerging field of study. The cited research

impacts on drinking water distribution

systems as well as the informational

gaps. This document is meant to provide a resource for water utilities, communities

and state primacy agencies dealing with

wildfire damage and public health concerns Utilities should contact their state primacy

agency or EPA Regional Office for addition

reflects the current understanding of wildfire

Check

#### Wildfire VOC Contamination

VOC contamination may occur when water distribution infrastructure (e.g., pipes, valves, meters, etc.) is impacted by a wildfire. VOC contamination has been observed primarily in areas that were damaged during the wildfire and experienced pressure loss in the water system. Research into the exact cause of the VOC contamination is ongoing, but two possible explanations have been proposed that may account for such contamination either alone or in combination.

 Contamination may be released into the water from infrastructure containing polyvinyl chloride (PVC), high density polyethylene (HDPE), or other plastic materials that degrade when exposed

Released September 2021

For more information, please visit www.epa.gov/waterutilityresponse



Job Aid for Disaster Recovery Reform Act, Section 1205 Additional Activities for Wildfire and Wind Implementation under Hazard Mitigation Assistance Programs December 3, 2019



#### Replacing water systems that have been burned and have caused contamination

Wildfires generate intense heat that can adversely impact water system components both on the surface and underground. If intense heat modifies the chemical properties of water system components, chemicals might leach into the water, causing contamination. Infrastructure retrofits that reduce future risk to existing utility systems, including water systems, are eligible for HMA funding. The mitigation measures that are applied to the utility system can be multi-hazard to address more than just the hazard that caused the damage. Because HMA grants can be used to address undamaged portions of a utility system, they can be used to mitigate system components that have not been damaged but have properties like other systems that have sustained damage as well as undamaged portions of systems that have been partially damaged.





# ...Government Policies















### WaterRF Project 5106: Post-Wildfire Water Distribution System Water Quality Impacts and Potential Responses













NSF RAPID 2214580: Drinking Water System Contamination Response and Recovery Following the 2021 Colorado Wildfires





# **In Conclusion: What Do We Know?**

- Chemical drinking water contamination occurs due to fire posing an <u>immediate</u> <u>health risk</u> due to water users (inhalation, dermal, ingestion).
- 2. Chemicals enter water systems by <u>multiple pathways</u>: Depressurization vs. direct thermal damage
- 3. Sources are varied: Plastics vs. structures vs. vegetation
- 4. Nonroutine water sampling and testing methods must be applied
- 5. Finding and removing contamination takes weeks to months
- 6. Responding agency staff may not understand how to advise on this testing and recovery problem
- 7. Major differences in finding contamination in neighboring wells and homes
- 8. Bacteria has not been found post-fire....but health departments test for it

## **How Can We Work to Keep Drinking Water Safe?**


- 1. Keep power, water pressure.... don't depressurize
- 2. Keep heat away from plastic assets (meter boxes, exposed piping, pump houses, buildings, etc.)
- 3. Isolate leaks during fire to lessen pressure loss and contamination spread
- 4. Issue Do Not Use Orders to protect the population from exposure until tests
- 5. Chemically test the water distribution system extensively after fire
- 6. Inspect and chemically test private wells/plumbing after fire

## To make systems more resilient...

- 1. Use backflow prevention devices in new builds and retrofits
- 2. Reduce vegetation near assets (meter boxes, exposed pipes, structures, etc.)
- 3. Bury assets at least 2 ft below the ground, maybe more
- 4. Public Water Systems: Signup for XXWARN to get rapid access to surge people and equipment

# Thank you. Questions?

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More Wildfire Lessons Coming Soon to: www.PlumbingSafety.org

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