

Water x Fire

***Challenges and
opportunities for
executives, policy
makers, and innovators***

Andrew J. Whelton, Ph.D.


Lyles School of Civil and Construction Eng.
School of Sustainability and Environmental Eng.

PlumbingSafety.org CIPPSafety.org



2023 Kula Fire in Maui, Hawai'i

Clark et al. 2022. *Frontiers in Human Dynamics*.
<https://doi.org/10.3389/fhmd.2022.886545>



Wildfires cause health and safety risks, and are increasing in intensity as well as the number of acres burned ([UNEP 2022](#))




U.S. Fire Administration
Working for a fire-safe America


In the U.S. more than 46 million residences in 70,000 communities are at risk ([USFA, 2022](#))

Wildfires threaten the health, safety, and economic security of communities

Water System Purpose

- ✓ Fire-fighting
- ✓ Hygiene, sanitation
- ✓ Healthcare
- ✓ Education
- ✓ Business
- ✓ Recreation
- ✓ Agriculture
- ✓ Industry






153,336 acres
86 fatalities

~13,972 residences destroyed
14,793 structures destroyed
3 firefighters injured




The 2018 Camp Fire in Paradise, California

Town of Paradise Limits



2021 Marshall Fire: 90 to 102 mph wind gusts



December 30, 2021

11:06 am, Fire in Boulder Co.

12:10 pm, Fire in Superior

12:50 pm, Fire in Louisville

1:00pm, 1,000 acres

60,000+ evacuation ordered

The 3 largest communities

Louisville: 21,266

Superior: 13,094

Lafayette: 30,411

6 regulated water systems impacted and private wells

*Image source: Fischer et al.
GEER. The 2021 Marshall Fire,
Boulder County, CO.*



Hurricane Dora

60-80 mph gusts onshore

Olinda Fire: 1,081 ac, 2 structures


Kula Fire: 202 ac, 544 structures

Lahaina Fire: 2,170 ac, 2,207 structures

Puelho Fire: 5,300 ac, 0 structures

Maui Wildfires August 8, 2023

Deadliest wildfire incident in modern U.S. history




L.A. Wildfires January 7, 2025

14,021 acres

17 Fatalities

Structures Destroyed = 9,418

Structures Damaged = 1,073



Palisades Fire

23,707 acres

12 Fatalities

Structures Destroyed = 6,833

Structures Damaged = 973



Pressure

Asset and structure destruction, leaks

Power

Electric poles/lines, power and gas shutoff by provider, generators destroyed, fuel lacking

Telecommunications/Monitoring

Outages inhibit tank level, pressure, chemical feed, and pump status monitoring

Personnel

Hazardous situations, staff availability

Contamination

Chemicals and microbiologicals drawn into the water system, immediate health risk



California · Colorado · Hawai'i · New Mexico · Oregon : 2017 Tubbs Fire · 2018 Camp Fire · 2020 Bear Fire · 2020 Oregon Fires · 2021 Marshall Fire · 2021 Lytton Fire · 2022 CC/HP Fire · 2023 Maui Wildfires · 2025 Los Angeles Fires

Two weeks after the incident, spot fires were still burning, damage was still being assessed, and the communities were being provided support.



Some water meters serving properties with destroyed structures had been removed.



After a water meter was shutoff, the homeowner reconnected their plumbing to the damaged distribution system. Some Olinda property owners replaced their service lines that ruptured during the fire.



A household that solely relied on a rainwater cistern had noticeable particulate debris on their roof.



<https://doi.org/10.1039/D4EW00216D>

Some of the water system assets like wellheads, buildings, distribution piping, and storage tanks were located inside the burn area footprint and others were not.



More than 50,000 ft of HDPE pipes used for irrigation and animal watering were damaged or destroyed



Some animal watering equipment was unaffected, and other equipment seems to be contained or be coated with particulate. This included livestock tubs, troughs, and tire waterers.



An underground fire was found during the field investigation.

<https://doi.org/10.1021/acsestwater.5c00896>



Challenge: Water and pressure to protect lives and property

Today's systems are not designed for wildfires

Building sprinkler systems enable evacuation

Residents run lawn sprinklers to wet their property

Hydrants opened and left

Power lost, water production and pumping impacted

Fires damage and destroy structures prompting uncontrolled water and pressure loss

For example....

$500 \text{ structures} \times 13 \text{ GPM/each} \times 60 \text{ min} = 390,000 \text{ gallons of water loss in 1 hour}$



Challenge: Extreme drinking water contamination

Immediate vs. long-term health risk

VOCs and other organic chemicals

Burned properties: Cross connections

Exposure Routes


(i.e., Adults, children, infants, etc.)



Ingestion




Dermal contact



Inhalation

Water Use Warnings



Do Not Use (DNU)



Do Not Drink (DND)



Boil Water Order




Max. Benzene, ppb	Event / Location	Pop.	System	Year
I can't recall	Eaton Fire/ California	9,600	Rubio Cañon Land and Water Assoc.	2025
440	Eaton Fire/ California	4,847	Las Flores Water Co.	2025
31	Eaton Fire/ California	16,126	Lincoln Ave. Water Co.	2025
22.5	Palisades Fire/ California	3,856,043	Los Angeles Dept. Water & Power	2025
40	Lahaina Fire/ Hawai'i	20,036	Maui County – Lahaina	2023
3.8	Kula Fire/ Hawai'i	7,686	Maui County – Upper Kula	2023
Other	Calf Canyon/Hermits Peak/ New Mexico	500	Pendaries Village Community Assoc.	2022
5.1	Marshall Fire/ Colorado	500	East Boulder County Water District	2021
220	Marshall Fire/ Colorado	20,319	City of Louisville	2021
5.5	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	120	Whispering Pines Mobile Home Park	2020
11.3	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	362	Hiland WC -Echo Mountain	2020
1.1	Echo Mountain Fire/ Oregon	760	Panther Creek Water District	2020
76.4	Almeda Fire/ Oregon	6,850	City of Talent	2020
44.9	Lionshead Fire/ Oregon	205	Detroit Water System	2020
1.5	North Complex Fire/ California	297	Lake Madrone Water District	2020
1.8	CZU Lightning Complex Fire/ California	1,650	Big Basin Water Company	2020
42	CZU Lightning Complex Fire/ California	21,145	San Lorenzo Valley Water District	2020
>2,217	Camp Fire/ California	26,032	Paradise Irrigation District	2018
38.3	Camp Fire/ California	924	Del Oro Water Co.-Magalia	2018
8.1	Camp Fire/ California	1,106	Del Oro Water Co.-Lime Saddle	2018
530	Camp Fire/ California	11,324	Del Oro Water Co.-Paradise Pines	2018
40,000	Tubbs Fire/ California	175,000	City of Santa Rosa	2017

BOLD and RED exceeded a health-based drinking water limit in a wildfire impacted water system as of March 2024


Acetonitrile	Chlorodibromomethane	Ethyl benzene	¥Toluene**
*Acetone	Chloromethane	Ethylene dibromide (EDB) **	1,2,3-Trichlorobenzene
Acrolein	4-Chlorotoluene	Ethyl- <i>tert</i> -butyl ether (ETBE)	1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene
Acrylonitrile	Dibromochloromethane	Iodomethane	1,1,1-Trichloroethane
*Benzene **	1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP) **	Isopropylbenzene	1,1,2-Trichloroethane
Bromochloromethane	1,2-Dichlorobenzene	Methylene chloride**	Trichloroethylene
Bromodichloromethane	1,4-Dichlorobenzene	*Methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) **	Trichloromethane **
Bromoform	1,1-Dichloroethane	Methyl iso butyl ketone (MIBK)	1,2,3-Trichloropropane (TCP) **
<i>n</i> -Butylbenzene	1,2-Dichloroethane **	Methyl-<i>tert</i>-butyl ether (MTBE) **	1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene
sec-Butylbenzene	1,1-Dichloroethene	*Naphthalene**	1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene
<i>tert</i> -Butylbenzene	<i>cis</i> -1,2-Dichloroethene	*Styrene**	Vinyl chloride **
Carbon disulfide	<i>trans</i> -1,2-Dichloroethylene	<i>tert</i>-Butyl alcohol (TBA) **	¥ortho-Xylene
Carbon tetrachloride **	1,2-Dichloropropane **	Tetrachloroethylene	¥meta-Xylene
Chlorobenzene	*Ethanol	Tetrahydrofuran (THF) **	¥para-Xylene

There are 3 ways water distribution systems become contaminated

1. Biomass and structure combustion



2. Plastic thermal degradation




3. Contaminated water and material back siphonage



Secondary Sources: Infrastructure desorption



Challenge: Restoring Service for Public Safety, Health, and Economic



Support firefighting
Isolate damage
Maintain pressure
Water use warnings

Personnel surge
Restore control,
pressure
Repeated sampling
Laboratories

Personnel surge
Repeated sampling
Laboratories
Decon, remove, replace

Inspection, Testing, and Repair vs. Replace

Water Meters vs. Hydrants vs. Water Quality




CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECONTAMINATING HDPE SERVICE LINES BY FLUSHING

- With continuous/intermittent flushing, how much water will we consume?
- Similarly, what is the slowest rate we can flush, given a certain pipe size?

PURPOSE

This document is not intended to design or endorse any particular approach to high-density polyethylene (HDPE) service line decontamination or to endorse any particular decontamination goal. The purpose of this document is to illustrate the scientific and technical ability to address the two main questions regarding HDPE service line decontamination, along with important caveats regarding this information. The information in this document may help decision-makers take more informed actions.

Water Distribution System
Decontamination
Collaboration between Us &
USEPA
Hydraulics
Polymer Science
Environmental Engineering






Numerical modeling:
Greater than 286 days vs.
less than 64 days of
continuous water flushing
for 1-inch HDPE service
(Haupert et al. 2019)

Challenge: Decontamination

Stagnation needed to find contamination

Different plastic pipes uptake and
leach different amounts of VOCs and
SVOCs

Huang et al. 2017. *J. HazMat.*




There is a step-wise process for
responding to and recovering
from contamination
Whelton et al. 2017. *ES: WR&T.*

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4. Roles and responsibilities of key orgs
5. Conditions that prompt drinking water contamination
6. Response and key decisions
7. Post-fire exposures and warnings
8. Post-fire chemicals, concentrations, and exposure limits
9. Post-fire chemical analysis
10. Water sampling considerations
11. Decision-making considerations using results
12. Communication and general questions

Appendices

- A. Example return to service plan
- B. CDC guidance about water advisories
- C. Target chemicals for water sampling
- D. Water sampling SOPs
- E. Example FAQs
- F. Guidance about water testing reports for the general public



Free from the WaterRF.org

PROJECT NO. 5106

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Plan for Water Distribution System Testing and Recovery

LA DWP Los Angeles Department of Water & Power

SJW SAN JOSE WATER

EBMUD

CONTRA COSTA WATER DISTRICT


Water safety attitudes, risk perception, experiences, and education for households impacted by the 2018 Camp Fire

Natural Hazards, Published May 2021


<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-021-04714-9>

Households Require Support

- 1) Water use restrictions
- 2) **Plumbing** sampling and testing
- 3) **Plumbing** decontamination methods and validation,
- 4) Water tank selection and maintenance
- 5) In-home treatment device selection and maintenance
- 6) **Plumbing** design and material selection for property repairs and new construction




Post-Fire Sampling... Inside Buildings...



2019

Agricultural water systems...




Bipartisan Commission report...




2023

Private wells...




2020

Public health basics...




2024

Inside Buildings...




2021

Post-fire utility and health decisions




2024

Environmental health basics...



2023

LA Blue Ribbon Commission



2025



Opportunities for Prevention and Recovery: Lessen the impact of fires

- ✓ Adopt fire safe **setback** distances and **design** for utility assets
- ✓ Lessen **power loss**: Backup power, emergency generators
- ✓ Evaluate **fire flow vulnerability** with hydraulic models
- ✓ Install **emergency interconnections** to neighbor water systems
- ✓ Where vulnerable to fire, protect or minimize/avoid **plastic use**
- ✓ Have **bypass capability** for raw water sources and treatment plant
- ✓ **Zone** the water distribution system to prevent backflows
- ✓ Adopt **service line backflow prevention** devices/ check valves
- ✓ Adopt remote **automatic shutoffs**
- ✓ Develop and issue evidence-based drinking **water use warnings**



Opportunities: Lessen the time to restore safe water service

Establish and strengthen **mutual aid** networks

Develop evidence-based and technology assisted physical **damage assessments**


Identify **chemical source** profiles

Innovate infrastructure **decon technologies**

Share knowledge and mitigation methods and practices nationwide

Create evidence-based asset repair vs. replacement **decision framework**

Support small water systems who do not have technical expertise, \$\$, or personnel to recover



Thank you



**Special
thanks
to...**



**Support
from...**



R&S KAYNE FOUNDATION



Andrew Whelton's Wallet

Visit our wildfire response and recovery resources page at www.PlumbingSafety.org

- ✓ Post-fire chemicals to test for
- ✓ Brief videos for emergency managers and health officials
- ✓ Guidance for private well owners
- ✓ Guidance for building owners
- ✓ Government agency resources
- ✓ FEMA mitigation guidance
- ✓ Other training resources

Andrew Whelton, Ph.D.
awhelton@purdue.edu



Water & Infrastructure Resilience: Public Health & Extreme Events

March 14-23, 2025

Aero. & Astronautical Eng.
Chem. Eng.
Civil Eng.
Construction Eng.
Electrical Eng.
Environ. & Eco. Eng.
Environ. & Nat. Res. Eng.
Mechanical Eng.

*Study Abroad
Engagement:*



love every drop
anglianwater



Imperial College
London

CE 597: Disasters & Emergencies

Science, engineering, policy, law, insurance, emergency management, social science, communications, journalism

Course Description: Focused on introducing and inspiring students about the engineering, science, and policy challenges associated with disasters and emergencies. Topics will span infrastructure, the environment, public safety, and public health.

Learning Objectives:

- ID key population needs following natural and man-made disasters;
- Explain the roles and responsibilities of common organizations responding to incidents;
- Recognize the wide-breadth of expertise involved in response and recovery;
- Communicate technical concepts effectively with audiences with widely-varying backgrounds;
- Recognize the different expertise involved in incident response and recovery.

Approach: Field trip; NIIMS/ICS training; NSF CONVERGE trainings; Speaker reflections; Sci. paper/report reflections; quizzes; Hurricane exercise; Chemical exercise; Press conference; Final report and video.

