Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for installed SIS

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Abstract

The intent of this presentation is to:

• Introduce API RP 754

• Briefly walk though the concepts of KPIs, define and explain Leading and Lagging indicators,

• Application of these KPIs to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) designed and implemented using ISA 84.00.01.
API RP 754

• API RP 754 is titled “Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and petrochemical Industries”, the first edition of which came out in April 2010.

• With reference to Safety life Cycle of ISA 84.00.01, this RP is applicable during the Operation and Maintenance phase.

• The purpose of the Recommended Practice (RP) is to identify leading and lagging indicators in the refinery and petrochemical industries whether for public reporting or for use at individual facilities including methods for the development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI).

• As a framework for measuring activity, status or performance, the RP classifies Process Safety Indicators (PSI) into four tiers of leading and lagging indicators. Tiers 1 and 2 are suitable for public reporting while Tier 3 and 4 are meant for internal use at individual sites.
Key Performance Indicators (KPI)

Corporate

Business activity

Business unit

Facility

Plant

Shift

More emphasis on Tier 1 and 2 KPIs, greater aggregation, limited or no detail at facility, plant or shift levels, more text on high-level interpretation of data.

Great specificity, more emphasis on Tier 3 and 4 KPIs, less aggregation, more data and greater integration with operational parameters.
The Safety Life Cycle as defined in ISA84.00.01

1. Conceptual Process Design
2. Perform Process Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment
   - Apply non-SIS protection layers to prevent identified hazards or reduce risk
3. SIS Required?
   - Yes: Define Target SIL
   - No:

4. Develop Safety Requirements Specification
5. Perform SIS Conceptual Design, and verify it meets the SRS
6. Perform SIS Design Detail
7. SIS Installation, Commissioning and Pre-Startup Acceptance Test

Analysis phase

Implementation phase

Operation phase

Pre-startup Safety Review (Assessment)
SIS Startup Operation, Maintenance Periodic Functional testing

Modify or Decommission SIS?
SIS Decommissioning
Decommission

LOPA

SIS Validation

SIL Verification

Define Target SIL

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SIL Analysis

SIL – Safety Integrity Level

Major parts to the process of SIL Analysis

Analysis phase:

• **SIL determination (LOPA)** – Determine the extent of risk and indicate it in the form of a number, SIL1 to SIL4. The higher the number, the higher the risk. Identify potential protection layers to reduce this risk.

• **SRS** - Generate a document (or set of documents) which identifies the Integrity and Functionality of all identified SIFs.

Implementation phase:

• **SIL verification** – By reliability calculations and instrument selection, design SIFs which are sufficient to meet the required risk reduction.

• **SIL validation** – Check if the SIFs are functionally working per the SRS.
Hazop

- **Node**: Vessel V-1
- **Guideword**: HIGH PRESSURE
- **Consequence**: High Pressure, possible vessel rupture & fire
- **Cause of failure**: PIC-1 (BPCS), Control valve (PCV-1) stuck open
- **Existing Safeguards**: PSV-1
- **Additional Protection Layers**: No recommendation
Required Risk Reduction

From the HAZOP risk matrix for this Process, the team decided:

1. Frequency of Initiating Event (IE) – Once per 10 years
2. Severity – 1 serious injury

Present Risk “H1” = 0.1 (1 Serious injury in 10 years)

Acceptable Risk “L” - .0001 (1 Serious injury in 10,000 years)

Risk Reduction Factor = 0.1/0.0001

Total Required RRF = 1,000
Risk and Risk Reduction

Acceptable Risk: 1 serious injury per 10,000y

Present Risk: 1 serious injury in 10 years

Residual risk

Acceptable risk

Process risk

TOTAL Required RRF-1,000

Necessary risk reduction

Actual risk reduction

Partial risk covered by other technology safety-related systems
Partial risk covered by E/E/PE safety-related systems
Partial risk covered by external risk reduction facilities

Risk reduction achieved by all safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities

RISK Gap - 10

PSV RRF – 100

Cause – PIC-1 fails

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Case Study, Add a SIF (SIL1, RRF-10)

- High Pressure Trip PSHH-1 added
  - Shuts off ESDV-1 when PT-2 detects Pressure in Vessel V-1 > 3.75 BAR
  - ESDV-1 will be a De-energized To Trip (DTT) Fail Close valve, Open when Pressure is less than 3.75 BAR
Identification of IPLs

The two IPLs identified in this scenario are (assuming PIC-1 fails):

1. SIF-1 – the PSHH-1 interlock
2. PSV-1 – the Pressure relief valve to flare
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) of SIF-1

- Pressure Transmitter
- Logic Solver
- Shut down valve

- PT-2 (1oo1)
- PSHH-1 (SIL3)
- ESDV-1 (1oo1)
PFDavg equations on 1oo1 voting

1. \[ \lambda_D = \lambda_{DU} + \lambda_{DD} \quad \lambda_{DD} = \lambda_D DC \quad \lambda_{DU} = \lambda_D (1 - DC) \]

2. \[ t_{CE} = \frac{\lambda_{DU}}{\lambda_D} \left( \frac{T_1}{2} + MRT \right) + \frac{\lambda_{DD}}{\lambda_D} MTTR \]

3. \[ PFD_{AVG} = (\lambda_{DU} + \lambda_{DD}) t_{CE} \]
Table B.4 from IEC-61508-6

Table B.4 — Average probability of failure on demand for a proof test interval of 2 years and a mean time to restoration of 8 hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>DC</th>
<th>$\lambda = 1.0E-07$</th>
<th>$\lambda = 5.0E-07$</th>
<th>$\lambda = 1.0E-06$</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta = 1%$</td>
<td>$\beta = 5%$</td>
<td>$\beta = 10%$</td>
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<tr>
<td>1oo1 (see note)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.4E-04</td>
<td>2.2E-03</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1.8E-04</td>
<td>8.8E-04</td>
<td>1.8E-03</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>4.4E-05</td>
<td>2.2E-04</td>
<td>4.4E-04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>4.8E-06</td>
<td>2.4E-05</td>
<td>4.8E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1oo2</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9.0E-06</td>
<td>4.4E-05</td>
<td>8.8E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3.5E-06</td>
<td>1.8E-05</td>
<td>3.5E-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>8.8E-07</td>
<td>4.4E-06</td>
<td>8.8E-06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>9.2E-08</td>
<td>4.6E-07</td>
<td>9.2E-07</td>
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<tr>
<td>2oo2 (see note)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8.8E-04</td>
<td>4.4E-03</td>
<td>8.8E-04</td>
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<td>1oo2D</td>
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### PFD_{avg} calculation of SIF-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From Table B.4, IEC61508-6</th>
<th>‘( \lambda )’ Failures per hour</th>
<th>‘PTI’ Proof Test Interval in months</th>
<th>‘MTTR’ Mean time to repair in hours</th>
<th>‘DC’ in percent</th>
<th>PFD_{avg}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1oo1 Sensor (Pressure transmitter)</td>
<td>1 x 10^{-6}</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.4 x 10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logic Solver (SIL 3) (data NOT from table B.4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 x 10^{-4}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1oo1 Final element (On-off valve)</td>
<td>1 x 10^{-5}</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.4 x 10^{-2}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PFDavg calculation of SIF-1

\[
PFD_{avg}(\text{SIF-1}) = PFD_{avg}(\text{SE}) + PFD_{avg}(\text{LS}) + PFD_{avg}(\text{FE})
\]

\[
PFD_{avg}(\text{SIF-1}) = 4.4 \times 10^{-2} \text{ (approx.)}
\]

\[
RRF = \frac{1}{PFD_{avg}} = 22.7
\]
PFD_{avg} of both the IPLs put together

\[ \text{PFD}_{avg} (\text{of all IPLs}) = \text{PFD}(\text{IPL1}) \times \text{PFD}(\text{IPL2}) \times \ldots \times \text{PFD}(\text{IPLn}) \]

In our example:

\[ \text{PFD}_{avg} (\text{SIF-1 and PSV-1}) = 4.4 \times 10^{-2} \times 0.01 = 4.4 \times 10^{-4} \]

\[ \text{RRF} = \frac{I}{\text{PFD}_{avg}} = 2272 \]

(note - from industry standard books, the PFD_{avg} of a PSV is 0.01)
Risk Reduction based on SIF-1 design

Target Risk:
1 serious injury per 1,000y

Present Risk:
1 serious injury per year

TOTAL Required RRF-1,000

Necessary risk reduction

Actual risk reduction

Partial risk covered by other technology safety-related systems

Partial risk covered by E/E/PE safety-related systems

Partial risk covered by external risk reduction facilities

Risk reduction achieved by all safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities

(If BPCS failure is the Cause)

SIF-1 RRF-22.7

PSV-1 RRF-100

Achieved RRF - 2272
Case Study, Add a SIF (SIL1, RRF-22)

- High Pressure Trip PSHH-1 added
  - Shuts off ESDV-1 when PT-2 detects Pressure in Vessel V-1 > 3.75 BAR
  - ESDV-1 will be a De-energized To Trip (DTT) Fail Close valve, Open when Pressure is less than 3.75 BAR
Use of KPIs in our example

- **Release of PSV-1 to Flare (KPI 1)** – This would mean both the DCS and SIS loop had failed to maintain the pressure in the vessel below dangerous levels. This would be a lagging indicator and could be classified as Tier 1 or 2 by the individual site based on amount of gas released to flare.

- **SIF-1 exercised (KPI 2)** – This would mean that the Pressure in the vessel was not controlled by DCS and reached a limit where SIF-1 had to shut the Hydrocarbon inlet line. This would be a Tier 3, leading indicator as far as LOPC is concerned but a lagging indicator in terms of Process Availability.

- **Audit findings (KPI 3)** - If an Audit finding indicates that the SIF-1 field instruments are not being Proof Tested once every 2 years (as was considered during the SIL verification calculations), this will be informed to the individual site management as a Tier 4 leading indicator.

- **SIF component detected failure (KPI 4)** – One of the components of SIF-1 fails and is detected, the SIF is now running in a degrade mode. The component needs to be fixed and restored so that SIF-1 can give the full risk reduction it was designed for. This would be a Tier 4 leading indicator.
What if PT-2 Transmitter Fails?

If PT-2 Fails, then there is no active SIF
PFD_{avg} of both the IPLs put together

In our example:

PFD_{avg} (SIF-1 [degrade] and PSV-1) = 1 \times 0.01 = 0.01

RRF = I/PFD_{avg} = 100
Risk Reduction based on SIF-1 (degrade mode)

Target Risk: 1 serious injury per 1,000y

Present Risk: 1 serious injury per year

Residual risk → Acceptable risk → EUC risk

TOTAL Required RRF-1,000

Necessary risk reduction

Actual risk reduction

Partial risk covered by other technology safety-related systems
Partial risk covered by E/E/PE safety-related systems
Partial risk covered by external risk reduction facilities

Risk reduction achieved by all safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities

(If BPCS failure is the Cause)

RISK GAP

SIF-1 degrade RRF-1
PSV-1 RRF-100
Achieved RRF - 100

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HAZOP

LOPA Layers of protection required to achieve acceptable risk

Non-SIS Independent Layers of Protection (IPLs)

Required SIL of the Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)

SIL Calculations tool and SRS, IPL specs, Project execution

Plant commissioned

IPL Maintenance scheduler

SIL Calc tool, online calc of new RRF if SIF fails

LOPA risk gap calculation online

IPL Monitoring tool

IPL KPIs at various Org. levels

Feedback to HAZOP/LOPA teams
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) summary

KPI’s are a useful measure to:

- **Prevent major incidents** – Based on Tier 1 KPIs released by an individual site to the company headquarters and later nationwide, the company (and other companies in the similar business) can analyze and learn what led to the Process Safety Incident, the root cause and how this can be avoided in the future.

- **Improve Reliability** – Steps taken by a company to reduce major Process Safety Incidents help improve Reliability of Process Operations.

- **Avoid Complacency** – KPI’s provide a measure of asset integrity. Just because there has been no major incident for a long time does not mean everything is fine. Leading KPI’s could provide valuable information on the health of assets and indicate that it is time to do maintenance on the asset.

- **Communicate Performance** – Tier 1 and 2 KPI’s could provide to the company and nationwide how the individual site is performing while Tier 3 and 4 KPI’s could assess performance internal to the individual site.
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Conclusion

• The Safety Instrumented System (SIS) Safety Life Cycle (SLC) per IEC 61511 / ISA 84.00.01 starts with the Analysis and Design phase in which the requirement of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) and other Independent protection Layers (IPL) are Analyzed and later designed to prevent / mitigate process risk in a process plant. During the Operation / maintenance phase of the SLC, by using the KPI definitions and selection criteria as given in API RP 754, the functioning of the designed SIFs and other IPLs can be monitored.

• Use of KPIs will be helpful to let the public (based on Tier 1 and 2) know how safe the Process units are being operated in their neighborhood and the individual site management (based on Tier 1 to 4) to know how well the IPLs are keeping up to their design intent to prevent / mitigate Process Risk.
Thank You...