

#### **Overview of Research Group**

<u>Mission Statement</u>: We believe that optimal decisions in the construction industry emerge out of scientific evidence and empirical data. To realize such a paradigm shift, SARMAD:

- (1) Promotes original, unbiased, and innovative research that addresses the global challenges in today's construction industry;
- (2) Integrates multiple scientific perspectives to unearth transformative and breakthrough discoveries; and
- (3) Develops state-of-the-art decision-support systems, tools, and applications that enable agile and rapid industrial transformation

<u>Vision Statement</u>: SARMAD envisions a construction industry that is: safe for its workers; sustainable for the environment; ethical for our society; creates value for its customers; on time, on budget, and productive for its project managers; collaborative for its stakeholders; and profitable for its constructors.



**Motto**: *Set the standard in quality and innovation!* 

## Construction Safety, Risk Management, & Decision Making

- Data Analytics
- > Human Error
- Ergonomics
- Cyber-Physical-Human Systems
- Visualization and Training
- Project Performance

# 1. Data Analytics

#### **Data Analytics**




#### **Accident scenario:**

Fatal

Non-fatal


If an employee is working on electric parts to install lights, signs, or fences, if an accident happens, the probability of a **fatal injury** is **three times** more than a **non-fatal injury**.









## **Attribute-Based Risk Management**






#### **Attribute-Based Risk Management**






# 2. Human Error

## **Problem Statement**




#### **Human Error Detection (HED) Framework**





#### **Attention and Human Error**



**Safety Training:** Receiving traditional safety training has minimal impact on workers' attentiveness to hazards.








Attentional distribution of groups: with (left) vs. without training (right)


**Working Experience:** As a worker gets more experience in construction field, s/he will be more aware of safety requirements in jobsite.








Cognitive process of: G1=<5 yrs (left), G2: >10 yrs (right) of experience






0.034\* Ladder 34 0.633 2.622 0.028\*Fall to Lower Level 0.651 2.738 34 Fall-Protection  $0.015^{*}$ 0.714 3.149 34 Struck-By 0.732 3.268 0.012\*34 Housekeeping 0.642 2.682 34  $0.031^*$ **All Hazard Types** 0.622 2.559  $0.037^*$  $p \le 0.05$ 

✓ Using Pillai's trace, worker's level of hazard identification skill has significant effect on their eye movements metrics. V= 0.622, F (3, 34) = 2.559, p= 0.037.


#### **Working Memory and Human Error**


✓ Goal: Measuring the Impact of Working Memory Load on the Safety Performance of Construction Workers



#### **Findings**

- ✓ As working memory load increases, the ability of participants to identify hazards decreases significantly.
- ✓ Under high-load conditions being 3.8 times (in fall-to-lower-level hazard) and 1.3 times (in fall protection-related hazard) more likely to miss fall hazards





Distributions of missing (a) fall-to-lower-level hazards and (b) fall protectionrelated hazards under different memory load

	Low mem	ory load	High men	High memory load		Simulation (B=10,000)	
ET metrics	T metrics Mean N Mea		Mean	N	Welsh statistic	p- value	
Fall-to-lower-level							
Dwell time	3173.961	456	2669.671	456	3.342	0.001*	
First fixation	3046.753	445	4062.827	415	-4.678	$0.000^{*}$	
time							
Run count	5.015	456	4.156	456	4.994	$0.000^{*}$	
Fall protection							
Dwell time	1214.555	418	885.263	532	3.124	0.002*	
First fixation	5947.554	312	6755.303	353	-2.447	0.013*	
time							
Run count	2.311	418	1.855	532	3.163	$0.002^{*}$	
* p < 0.05	2.511	110	1.000		5.105	0.002	

#### **Risk Taking Behavior**

#### **Safety-Risk Perception Measurement**

Statement-based questionnaire to measure risk perception of construction workers

Phase

Phase II

#### Risk statements

- 1- Working on ladders
- 2- Working near an unprotected edge (roof)
- 3- Working near an unprotected opening
- 4- Working near a skylight
- 5- Working on a scaffold
- 6- Working on structural frames (e.g., steel frames)
- 7- Working on an aerial platform
- 8- Working/standing on heavy equipment9- Working on a slippery surface
- 10- Working on an unsecured or unstable surface
- 11- Working on an uneven working

#### Risk perception score = (Frequency Score) x (Severity Score)

Scenario-based questionnaire to measure risk perception of construction workers



issume that one o	f your colleagues	is the worker	who is working	on the ele

as such it is the study. It is impricate useful managed by the instantance of your facilities and inequing on pass a wave unurue one of the washows. He will continue working in this situation for about 15 minutes.

From the best of your knowledge and experience of construction sites (if it applies), or this situation, which was the properties of the following concerned.

Injury Outcome	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	Very Likely
First aid	0	0	0	0	0
Medical case	0	0	0	0	0
Lost work time	0	0	0	0	0
Permanent disablement	0	0	0	0	0
Fatality	0	0	0	0	0

Scenario #1.2: Do you have any concerns about the construction safety issues in this scenario? If yet please specify.

Scenario #1.3: If you were in your colleague's place, how likely would you stop weeking in this situation and report the unsafe working condition to your employer?


Scenario #1.4: Assume that your colleague is doing the same activity, but this time he is a sold read off a case platform. How would you reassess the frequency of each of the following outcomes in this time:


Injury Outcome	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	Very Likely
First aid	0	0	0	0	0
Medical case	0	0	0	0	0
Lost work time	0	0	0	0	0
Permanent disablement	0	0	0	0	0

#### **Risk-Taking Behavior Measurement**

# Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART):

Modeling real-world risk behavior through the conceptual frame of balancing the potential for reward versus loss.






#### **Risk Taking Behavior**

<u>Null hypothesis 1 ( $H_{01}$ )</u>: There is no association between risk perception and the risk-taking behaviors of construction workers.

**Null hypothesis 2 (H\_{02})**: There is no significant difference in the risk-taking behaviors of individuals with different risk perception.




#### **Correlational Analysis**



- Risk perception is significantly related to risk-taking behaviors (p-value = 0.026 < 0.05).
- Workers who have lower risk perception on construction sites generally engaged in more risk-taking behaviors than those who have higher risk perception.

## Permutation Analysis




• Risk-taking behavior score of the subjects with high-risk perception was moderately statistically different from the risk-taking behavior score of the subjects with low-risk perception (Welsh t-statistic = 1.91; p-value = 0.08<0.1).</p>


#### **Personality and Human Error**

<u>Null hypothesis 1 ( $H_{01}$ )</u>: There is no association between Big Five personality traits and workers' attentiveness (fixation count or run count) to fall hazards.

**Null hypothesis 2 (H**<sub>02</sub>**):** Workers' Big Five personality traits have no impact on their attentiveness (fixation count or run count) to fall hazards on a construction site.





#### **Personality and Human Error**



#### **Mediation & Moderation**








M transmits the effect of X on Y

#### **MODERATION**



W influences the strength of association between X and Y


#### **Moderated Mediation**

# Dwell Time Time-to-first fixation Visual Attention \*a E.g., Experience Training Injury Exposure Worker Characteristics Personality Traits

\*Paths a, b, c


file Each participant has a unique entry of variables

## Multilevel Modeling




Data from multiple participants nested in both low and high WM groups

## **Mediation & Moderation**



PREDICTOR	OUTCOME	MODERATOR	В	P-VALUE	L-CI	U-CI
Work Exp	TTFF	Consc. (L)	0.024	0.009*	0.006	0.041
Work Exp	TTFF	Open. (H)	0.019	0.018*	0.003	0.034
D. Time	НІ	Consc. (H)	0.076	0.020*	0.013	0.139
TTFF	HI	Consc. (H)	0.244	0.010*	0.062	0.427



PREDICTOR	OUTCOME	MODERATOR	В	P-VALUE	L-CI	U-CI
WM	TTFF	Agreeableness	-2991.36	0.005*	-4994.38	-988.34
WM	TTFF	Conscientiousness	-3281.87	0.007*	-5584.53	-979.21
TTFF	ні	Agreeableness	-0.151	0.012*	-0.283	-0.046
TTFF	НІ	Conscientiousness	-0.165	0.015*	-0.314	-0.049

W Ch.: Worker Characteristics

**VA**: Visual Attention **HI**: Hazard Identification

**WM**: Working Memory

## **Change Blindness: Examples**



Safety relevant ☐Safety irrelevant



Safety relevantSafety irrelevant



Safety relevant change



Safety irrelevant change




Safety relevant change




Safety irrelevant change

#### **Planning and Experimental Design**




#### **Data Collection**




#### **Data Analysis**


**Null Hypothesis I:** Participants' ability to detect various changes at jobsites does not depend on the types of change.



**Null Hypothesis II:** Participants' ability to detect various changes at jobsites does not depend on the fall target types.



**Null Hypothesis III:** Participants' ability to detect various changes at jobsites does not depend on their level of working experience.




## Can you see the change between these two almost identical images?




**Null Hypothesis IV:** There is no association between the dependent variables (percent accuracy and mean response time) and the individual factors

**Null Hypothesis V:** There is no difference in attentional allocation (i.e., fixation metrics) of observers towards a type of changes (i.e., safety-relevant versus safety-irrelevant changes)




**Null Hypothesis VI:** There is no difference in attentional allocation (i.e., fixation metrics) of observers towards the various types of fall hazard changes








#### **Real-time Situation Awareness Using Wearable Technology**



## **Real-time Situation Awareness Using Wearable Technology**




## **Real-time Situation Awareness Using Wearable Technology**


Scene 1



High SA



Low SA



ET metrics	AOI	Hig	h SA	 Low SA		Permutation results		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Welch's t	<i>p</i> - value	
Run count	Scene 1	2.167	1.941	0.000	0.000	2.735	0.10**	
	Scene 4	8.000	4.099	4.500	2.887	1.584	0.15	
Fixation	Scene 1	2.000	2.898	0.000	0.000	1.690	0.25	
count	Scene 4	42.667	29.248	11.000	9.764	2.455	0.05*	
Fixation	Scene 1	0.144	0.188	0.000	0.000	1.709	0.00*	
duration	Scene 4	0.853	0.585	0.220	0.195	2.457	0.05*	
Dwell	Scene 1	0.143	0.186	0.000	0.000	1.891	0.10**	
duration	Scene 4	0.857	0.583	0.220	0.195	2.475	0.05*	

<sup>\*</sup>p< 0.05, \*\*p< 0.1


#### The Influence of Time Pressure on Safety Performance






**Null Hypothesis I:** Time pressure does not impact attention to safety hazards (e.g. slips, trips, falls, hand injuries)

**Null Hypothesis II:** Time pressure does not impact unsafe behavior of construction workers





#### **Statistical Analysis**







#### **Attention and Unsafe Behavior**


AOIs	TTFF	TFD	TVD	VC
Harness	7.726*	9.604*	16.431*	28.367*
Edges	8.408*	9.197*	15.478*	26.029*
Footwear	13.968*	8.920*	15.043*	27.695*
Shingles	13.853*	6.081*	8.826*	19.661*
Hand	13.884*	5.471*	8.062*	17.038*
Hammer	19.795*	4.418*	6.137*	15.290*
Nails	42.917*	2.183*	3.009*	7.077*
Harness anchor	68.436*	1.128*	1.404*	4.172*





**Unsafe behavior**: (a) Sitting close to roof edge; (b) Hammer too close to finger; (c) Poor hand coordination; d) Hammer for support at roof tip




Safety incidents: (a) Near-skid; (b) Slip hazard; (c) Nail puncture hazard; d) Fall off roof











28 participants x 22 installations = **616 installations** 




- ✓ Pulse Ox
- ✓ Respiration rate
- ✓ Stress level





#### **Primary Task Duration**

	Primary task durations (milliseconds)						
Day	N	Mean (10 <sup>4</sup> )	Std. Deviation (10 <sup>4</sup> )				
Day 1	28	26.976	7.563				
Day 2	28	21.406	4.815				
Day 3	28	19.767	5.254				
Day 4	28	17.091	4.279				



## Repeated Measures ANOVA of Primary Task Duration: Multivariate tests


Effect		Value	F	Hypothesis df	Error df	P-value
Day	Pillai's Trace	0.768	27.529 <sup>b</sup>	3.000	25.000	<0.001
	Wilks' Lambda	0.232	27.529 <sup>b</sup>	3.000	25.000	< 0.001
	Hotelling's Trace	3.303	27.529 <sup>b</sup>	3.000	25.000	< 0.001
	Roy's Largest Root	3.303	27.529 <sup>b</sup>	3.000	25.000	< 0.001

<sup>\*</sup> Design: Intercept; Within Subjects Design: Day; b. Exact statistic

#### **Descriptive Statistics of the Eye-tracking Metrics**

AOIs		Total Fixation  Duration		Fixation Count		Dwell Time Percent		Run Count	
	Statics	Novice	Expert	Novice	Expert	Novice	Expert	Novice	Expert
Roof Edges	Mean	0.006	0.004	0.037	0.004	0.929	0.528	0.019	0.014
	Std Dev	0.007	0.004	0.040	0.004	1.059	0.623	0.017	0.012
Safety Harness	Mean	0.006	0.004	0.040	0.019	0.836	0.457	0.026	0.011
and Anchor	Std Dev	0.006	0.005	0.036	0.023	0.864	0.583	0.020	0.013
Hand	Mean	0.015	0.014	0.085	0.074	2.117	1.996	0.044	0.043
	Std Dev	0.010	0.015	0.055	0.066	1.545	2.196	0.025	0.033
Hammer	Mean	0.013	0.005	0.075	0.035	1.758	0.677	0.040	0.023
	Std Dev	0.010	0.005	0.055	0.033	1.350	0.676	0.027	0.022
Shingles	Mean	0.067	0.048	0.385	0.314	12.838	9.248	0.117	0.122
	Std Dev	0.036	0.028	0.158	0.161	4.963	4.949	0.036	0.046
Work Area	Mean	0.185	0.125	0.972	0.708	38.704	31.774	0.155	0.134
	Std Dev	0.081	0.066	0.334	0.315	8.247	10.091	0.048	0.049

#### **Data Analysis**




#### Variables in the Proposed BLR Model Equation

AOIs/PCs	β	S.E.	Wald	df	P-value	$Exp(oldsymbol{eta})$	95% C.I. fo	or Exp(β) Upper
Roof Edges	603	.446	1.832	1	.176	.547	.228	1.310
Safety Harness & Anchor	-1.489*	.484	9.472	1	.002	.226*	.087	.582
Hand	.445	.396	1.265	1	.261	1.560	.719	3.389
Hammer	-1.521*	.511	8.847	1	.003	.219*	.080	.595
Shingles	.248	.379	.429	1	.512	1.282	.610	2.695
Work Area	864*	.428	4.080	1	.043	.421*	.182	.975
Constant	140	.384	.132	1	.716	.870		

<sup>\*</sup> The regression coefficient is significant at the .05 level.


$$\begin{split} \ln(odds) = & - .140 - .603 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Roof Edges}} - 1.489 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Safty Harness & Anchor}} \\ & + .445 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Hand}} - 1.521 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Hammer}} \\ & + .248 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Shingles}} - .864 \text{x} AOI_{\text{Work Area}} \end{split}$$

<b>Evaluation Statistics</b>	SVM (LOOCV)	BLR (LOOCV)
Accuracy	.768	.768
95% Confidence Interval	(0.636, 0.870)	(0.636, 0.870)
No Information Rate	0.5	0.5
P-Value [Acc > NIR]	3.667e-05	3.667e-05
Карра	0.536	0.536
Precision	0.727	0.742
Sensitivity/Recall	0.857	0.821
Specificity	0.679	0.714




# 3. Ergonomics

### **Assessing Lower Extremity Kinematics of Roofing Tasks**



#### The Effect of Fatigue on Workers' Safety Performance



#### **Experiment Conditions:**

No.	Factors	Level		
1	Lifting height	Below knee	Waist	
2	Weight of Loads	Light	Heavy	
3	Working pace	Slow	Fast	
4	Fatigue	Yes/No	Yes/No	





- √ Ground reaction forces (GRF)
- ✓ Ground reaction moments (GRM)

#### **Kinematic and kinetic outputs:**

- Median frequency of lumbar muscles
- Peak compressive force and Shear force at joints.
- Joint angles

Camera

# 4. Training and Visualization


#### **Visualization for Safety**

















## Silica Hazard in Construction (SH-05053-SH8)




Wind Tower Construction Safety (SHTG-FY-20-02)












### Internal factors (e.g. different abilities of situational awareness)



Lower situational awareness

Higher situational awareness







Lower situational awareness


Higher situational awareness

### **Overall Goal**

The overall goal of this research is to translate non-invasive neuro-psychophysiological metrics (e.g., brain signals, emotional responses, eye movements) into information personalized Al-based training systems








Hazard identification index (HII)

 Subjective hazard identification and demographic data





Identifying hazards by safety professional

Predefined hazards









 Worker's subjective hazard identification by using surveys and interviews


Individual hazard identification index (HII) score














Eye-tracking data

 Various eye-tracking metrics (e.g., fixation duration and count)






Area of Interest (AOI)
 was marked in each
 scenario based on
 predefined hazards




Framework of the proposed safety training



A Windows application incorporating with HTC Vive headset with embedded eye-tracking capability and an Empatica E4 medical wristband

Al system embedded in the personalized training




#### Cognitive failures and classification mechanisms

Visual attention	Physiological reaction	Subjective report	Cognitive Status
No	No	Miss	Attentional failure
			(i.e., when hazard is not viewed and not identified)
Yes	No	Miss	Inattentional blindness
			(i.e., when hazard is viewed and not identified + the risk of hazard is not perceived)
Yes	Yes	Miss	<b>Low-risk perception/High-risk tolerance</b> (i.e., when a hazard is viewed and not identified + the perceived risk associated with the hazard is below the individual's risk tolerance)
Yes	Yes	Identify	Correct hazard identification
			(i.e., when hazard is viewed and identified + the risk of hazard is perceived)
No	No	Identify	You got lucky
		•	(i.e., when hazard is not viewed and but reported as identified)
Yes	No	Identify	Inappropriate risk perception
		· 	(i.e., when a hazard is viewed, but the risk of hazard is not properly perceived)

Classification of key cognitive failures by combining multi-modal datasets


Cognitive failures and recommended interventions





Aiming to enhance workers' fundamental visual scanning abilities by showing an expert's visual search patterns


Cognitive failures and recommended interventions






Aiming to enhance workers' safety knowledge by providing relevant information regarding different hazards

Cognitive failures and recommended interventions




Aiming to enhance workers' perceived risk level by illustrating the severity of potential consequence of various hazard types

Overview of the validation process





#### Improvement in hazard Identification performance



#### **Original HII score:**

The ratio of identified hazards to the total number of hazards


VS.

#### **Adjusted HII score:**

The ratio of identified hazards (*excluding improper identification*) to the total number of hazards

Adjusted hazard identification scores were significantly increased in post-training sessions

Improvement in visual search strategies




Subjects showed slightly lower 360 spatial attention abilities in Post-training session 1

Virtual reality fatigue from experimental design


Participants' 360 spatial attention abilities were remarkably improved in Post-training session 2 (Improvement in visual search skills)

#### Reduction of cognitive failures and improper identification




Perceptual-based errors were <u>significantly</u> reduced in post-training sessions


Skill-based errors were <u>marginally</u> reduced in posttraining sessions



#### Changes in brain activation




Functionality of PFC: Decision-making / Integrating sensory information




Slightly higher activation of prefrontal cortex in Post training sessions

## **Synthesizing and Personalizing Safety Training Scenarios**






$$C_{\rm total}(R,H) = w_{\rm D}C_{\rm D}(R,H) + w_{\rm S}C_{\rm S}(R,H) + w_{\rm T}C_{\rm T}(R,H), \label{eq:condition}$$




# 5. Cyber-Physical-Human Systems



#### **Worker-AI Teaming to Enable ADHD Workforce Participation**






# **Worker-Autonomy Trust**

 Attributing Responsibility for Performance Failure on Worker-robot Trust in Collaborative Tasks

Chang, W. C., Ryan, S. M., Hasanzadeh, S., & Esmaeili, B. (2023, July). Attributing responsibility for performance failure on worker-robot trust in construction collaborative tasks. In EC3 Conference 2023 (Vol. 4). European Council on Computing in Construction. (*Best paper*)




Background Point of Departure Methodology Results Discussion

#### Attributing Responsibility for Performance Failure on Worker-robot Trust in Collaborative Tasks

- The **perfection** of autonomous agents still **cannot be guaranteed**, especially in such dynamic and unpredictable workplaces.
- Their unexpected performance (e.g., failures) will decrease human trust levels.
- In human-robot collaboration, responsibility attribution for the failures could be humans (wishful thinking) or robots (self-serving bias).
- Two types of **trust transfer** (i.e., **multi-tasks** and **multi-agents**) have been proposed by the literature.



Limitations of current literature:




This study aims to investigate the effect of attributing responsibility for failure and trust transfer on worker-robot trust in the future jobsite




#### **Autonomous Agents**








#### **Synchronization**








Trust Survey Baseline Module Trust Survey Error Module Trust Survey Post Survey


- To what extent the autoagent's behavior can be predicted?
- To what extent can you depend on the auto-agent to do its job?
- What degree of faith do you have that the auto-agent will be able to cope with similar situations in the future?
- Overall, how much do you trust the auto-agent?








The impact of **robot failures** on trust changes



**Robot failure** did **not** significantly affect worker **trust** 




The impact of **responsibility** on trust changes



**Robot failure** did **not** significantly affect worker **trust** 

**Attributing responsibility** significantly affected workers' **trust changes** 





**Robot failure** did **not** significantly affect worker **trust** 

**Attributing responsibility** significantly affected workers' **trust changes** 

**Distrust in other agents** significantly affected workers' **trust change** 



**Robot failure** did **not** significantly affect worker **trust** 

Those participants might overtrust a faulty auto-agent

**Attributing responsibility** significantly affected workers' **trust changes** 

SAFE

Safety issues


**Distrust in other agents** significantly affected workers' **trust change** 

Inappropriate trust transfer
might lead to overtrust /
undertrust



#### **Situational Awareness**

• The Importance of Situational Awareness (SA) in Future Jobsite: Toward the Effects of Faulty Robot, Trust, and Time Pressure



Background Point of Departure Methodology Results Discussion

## The Importance of Situational Awareness (SA) in Future Jobsite: Toward the Effects of Faulty Robot, Trust, and Time Pressure

- Workers must allocate attention to dynamic objects (e.g., robots) to maintain situational awareness (SA).
- The decreasing trust, caused by failures, makes workers more attentive to robots.
- **Time pressure** forces workers to focus on the designated tasks and to become **less attentive to robots**.







Limitations of current literature:

1

Not considering the impacts of **robotrelated** and **work-related** factors on **trust** simultaneously



This study aims to examine which factor plays a dominating role in affecting workers' SA



Point of Departure

Methodology

Results

Discussion

# The Importance of Situational Awareness (SA) in Future Jobsite: Toward the Effects of Faulty Robot, Trust, and Time Pressure





Bricklaying Robot



Drones



Al-assistant

(Dynamic objects)






1 HTC VIVE (Eye-tracking)



3 fNIRS



#### **Performance Metrics**



(Situational Awareness)

(Areas of Interest)

#### **Dwell Time**

How much time did participants fixate on AOIs

#### **Run Count**

How many times did participants return their attention to AOIs




Point of Departure

Methodology

Results

Discussion

The Importance of Situational Awareness (SA) in Future Jobsite: Toward the Effects of Faulty Robot, Trust, and Time Pressure




Within-subject variable

Between-subject variable

**Mixed-designed ANOVA** 






72%

Reducing Trust  $(\Delta T < 0)$ 

28%


Not Reducing Trust
(ΔT ≥ 0)





**Decreasing trust** did **not** significantly affect the **SA** 





**Decreasing trust** did **not** significantly affect the **SA** 

**Time pressure** significantly affected the **SA** 




**Decreasing trust** did **not** significantly affect the **SA** 

**Time pressure** significantly affected the **SA** 

**Time pressure** plays a **dominating** role in affecting worker SA than trust

Time pressure provokes attentional tunneling and overtrust for workers





#### **Conclusions**

What are the next steps after identifying the following uncertainties?







Human-centric, sustainable, and resilient worker-autonomy teaming

















# ANY QUESTIONS? Thanks for your Time and Attention!